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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate whether individuals with autism 
lack a natural drive towards central coherence as predicted by weak central 
coherence theo1y (Frith, 1989). To investigate the nature of this difficulty, two main 
areas of proposed impairment, context (Experiments 1-9) and global processing 
(Experiment 1 0), were separated out. In Experiments 1-3 a method was developed 
to test the ability to use context information in the visual and verbal domains. 
Results showed that the performance of individuals with autism was facilitated by 
the provision of visual and verbal context information. Experiment 4 showed that 
the same children were able to use semantic category information to aid recall. 
However in Experiment 5 the same individuals had difficulties with a sentence 
processing task when using sentence context to disambiguate homographs. 
Experiments 6-9 examined two possible alternative explanations for the difficulties 
in Experiment 5. The results of these experiments indicated that the difficulties in 
Experiment 5 were not due to a failure is using context when targets are embedded 
in the context (Experiment 6). It remains to be tested whether the difficulties are 
related to the processing of ambiguous information as Experiments 8-9 failed to 
develop a method to examine this possibility. Having established that the 
impairment in using context was highly specific to the use of sentence context to 
disambiguate homographs, Experiment I 0 moved away from examining context to 
study a different measure of central coherence, global processing by use of a face 
recognition task. The results of this study have confirmed that there is a deficit in 
the ability to process global information in autism. However further confirmation of 
a global impairment will be needed by use of non-facial tasks. In summary, the 
findings fail to support the claim of a general impairment in autism regarding central 
coherence. 
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Chapter 1 Historical and theoretical background 
Autism is one of the most intriguing syndromes in psychology. Although 
sixty years have passed since Kanner ( 1943) first described the syndrome, the exact 
cause of this syndrome still remains unknown. In recent years however, important 
changes have taken place in our understanding of this disorder. It is now widely 
recognised that people with autism have impairments in biological, psychological 
and behavioural levels of functioning. In recent years therefore, research has been 
directed towards understanding the nature of impairment at each of these levels in 
order to answer the question of how these impairments at different levels of 
functioning might be causally connected to each other (Morton & Frith, 1995; 
Bailey, Rutter & Phillips, 1996). 
This thesis focuses on cognitive impairments at the psychoJogical level. It is 
nearly thirty years since Hermelin and O'Connor made the proposal that children 
with autism have a cognitive impairment in the ability to integrate information. 
Since their pioneering work, cognitive research in autism has flourished. Hermelin 
and O'Connor's original ideas have provided the influence for the main cognitive 
theories that followed, their early work directly influencing the view that children 
with autism are impaired in their ability to process information for meaning. This 
view subsequently led Frith ( 1989) to claim that children with autism have difficulty 
integrating information into higher-level representations, a problem, that she argued, 
could be attributed to weakness in 'central coherence'. The view that children with 
autism were impaired in processing meaningful information also influenced the 
separate claim that children with autism have a specific difficulty interpreting 
meaning in relation to people's inner mental states. The authors of this claim, 
Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith ( 1985), attributed this difficulty to an impaired 
'theory of mind', a view that was subsequently been challenged by the executive 
functioning account of autism (Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 1991 ). 
The rapid development of cognitive research in recent years has left many 
questions unanswered. Because of the way the theories have been formulated, it has 
been difficult to test which of the three competing theories; central coherence, 
theory of mind or executive functioning, is correct in explaining the cognitive 
difficulties of children with autism. On the other hand, it has also proved difficult to 
establish if all three theories are correct and that there are independent, 
complementary cognitive impairments that coexist in people with autism. This 
makes the overall aim of establishing the exact nature of the psychological 
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impairment difficult to achieve and makes the goal of connecting psychological 
with biological or behavioural levels very elusive. 
One reason why it has been difficult to establish the exact nature of the 
psychological impairment may be because there is difficulty in demonstrating the 
distinctiveness of the cognitive impairment. This particularly applies to the 
predictions of the executive functioning and theory of mind accounts. Results of 
research studies that are claimed to provide support for one theory also provide 
support for the other theory. In addition, impairments in executive functioning and 
theory of mind may not be distinctive to children with autism but found also in other 
clinical groups. The research in this thesis therefore focused on the claim made by 
weak central coherence theory that people with autism have a cognitive profile of 
strength and weakness. This cognitive profile does appear to be distinctive to 
autism. It is not easily explained by either of the other theories and to date has not 
been systematically found in other clinical groups. 
The work for the thesis stmied with an examination of the claim by central 
coherence theory that there is a distinctive cognitive profile in autism. In particular, 
a conceptual analysis of the notion of 'central coherence' led to an attempt to 
specify the concept further in terms of two distinct constructs - contextual 
processing and global processing, a distinction drawn from research in cognitive 
psychology. The empirical work started with the question raised by the weak central 
coherence account as to whether children with autism are impaired in their ability to 
process context. In establishing across a series of experiments that the impairment in 
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contextual processing does not constitute a general difficulty but is highly specific 
to particular task demands, the final empirical investigation tested the claim that 
children with autism have problems with global processing. 
In this first chapter I first set the scene for the investigation of context and 
global processing by providing background to the cognitive theories of autism, 
focusing particularly on the claims of weak central coherence theory. I then explain 
why the study of global and contextual processing became the focus of the empirical 
investigation in this thesis, dealing with issues of theoretical definition in the current 
chapter and empirical evidence in Chapter 2. Chapters 3 to 8 report the empirical 
studies. In Chapter 9 the results of these studies are interpreted in the light of issues 
of definition and the claims of cognitive theories raised at the outset. 
1.1 The emergence of cognitive psychological explanations of autism 
The term autism was originally adopted by Bleuler ( 1908) to refer to 
schizophrenic patients with limited relations with the external world and limited 
interpersonal relations. Although initially this term was used for schizophrenic 
patients, Leo Kanner in 1943 borrowed the term to describe an entirely distinctive 
syndrome. Kanner (1943) described 11 cases of children that, although different 
from one another in some respects such as mental ability, shared a similar pattern. 
All had language and communication difficulties, social impairments and a 
insistence of sameness in the environment and repetitive interests. 
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Kanner's paper has been extremely influential in the study of autism. This 
paper gave a very detailed and insightful description of the cases, highlighting the 
three main characteristics of autism and the innate nature of the syndrome. At the 
time of Kanner's proposal however the predominant approach in psychology was 
psychoanalysis, thus the initial attempts to explain autism were focused on the 
affective and not cognitive aspects of the syndrome. Despite Kanner's insight and 
accuracy in the description of the symptoms, and his suggestion that genetic factors 
played an important role in autism, research for the following twenty years focused 
on the explanation suggested by Kanner (1949) in a later paper, that autism was the 
result of defective parental care. Specifically, he suggested that parents of children 
with autism were cold and detached and this resulted in an affective impairment for 
the children. For many years this was the predominant view in psychology. The 
emergence of behaviourist psychology did not have a great influence in the 
theoretical approach to autism as behaviourist psychologists focused on the 
treatment of symptoms and not theoretical explanations. 
In the 1960s however there was a dramatic turn in the study of autism. Two 
factors made possible this change. First, there was a large parental movement 
against the view that autism was a result of defective parental care. Researchers 
started to seriously investigate the role of parents in the emergence of autism and 
found no evidence of a relation between rearing patterns and autism (DeMyer, 
1975). 
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Parallel to this movement a new approach emerged, shifting away from 
affective explanations to the study of cognition. Serious attempts were made to 
refine the diagnostic criteria, (e.g. Latter, 1966; Wing & Gould, 1979), and also to 
investigate the cognitive abilities of chi ldren with autism. Rutter and colleagues, for 
instance, investigated in the 1960s the ch ildren 's profiles on intelligence tests and 
also attempted to describe in detail the clinical features of autism. They found that 
the performance of children with autism varied significantly across tests . Whilst in 
some tests, such as the Comprehension test of the Weschler Intelligence Scale for 
Children (WISC), they performed very poorly, in some others such as the Block 
Design (see Figure 1.1), children with autism performed extremely well (Lockyer & 
Rutter, 1970). 
Figure 1.1 Example of design and blocks used in the Block Design test (Weschler, 
1974). 
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Also in the 1960s, Beate Hermelin and her colleague Neil O'Connor 
investigated the perceptual and language abilities of children with autism. These 
investigations on cognitive abilities revealed that autism was characterised not only 
by social, language and repetitive impairments but also by the presence of a 
particular cognitive profile. These studies suggested abnormal processing of 
information in individuals with autism. For instance, children with autism showed 
similar recall rates for sentences ('they ate the apple') than random word strings 
('went leaf the up') whilst comparison samples show enhanced recall for sentences 
than word strings (Hermelin & O'Connor, 1967). 
Further studies by Uta Frith in the 1970s showed that the particular cognitive 
style was not restricted to language tasks. Children with autism also had abnormal 
processing of visual and acoustic information. In one of the studies for instance, 
Frith (1970b) presented a sequence of coloured beads to a sample of children with 
autism and a control sample of typically developing children (i.e. blue, red, blue, 
red, blue, red, blue, blue). The results showed that children with autism learned the 
sequence quickly, but made mistakes that showed they were influenced by the last 
elements in the sequence and not by the overall pattern (blue, blue). Typically 
developing children on the contrary, tended to make errors that reflected an over-
generalisation of the overall pattern (blue, red). A different study in which 
sequences of sounds (i.e., rut-mic-rut-mic) were presented instead of coloured beads 
provided similar results (Frith, 1970). 
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Clinical accounts also reported abnormal patterns of processing of sensory 
stimuli. In particular clinical observations suggested detailed focus processing of 
incoming sensory information (Omitz, Guthrie & Farley, 1977; Rimland, 1964). 
Bearing in mind these results, Hermelin and O'Connor (1970) proposed that 
individuals with autism have difficulty integrating incoming information. Kanner 
(1943) had already mentioned in his first description of autism that 'the children 
read monotonously, and a story is perceived in unrelated portions rather than its 
coherent totally'. 
Following Hermelin and O'Connor's suggestion, Uta Frith carried out a 
series of studies investigating language and visual processing in autism in the 1980s. 
In one of these studies she investigated performance of children with autism in a 
series of verbal tasks (Frith & Snow ling, 1983 ). The results of this study showed 
that language difficulties in autism were restricted to a difficulty in the use of 
semantic information in the absence of semantic cues. Specifically they found that 
children with autism failed to use sentence context information to disambiguate 
homograph words (i.e. 'tear'). They also had difficulty selecting the right word 
missing in a sentence according to semantic information. On the basis of these 
findings, Frith and Snowling argued that individuals with autism have difficulty 
processing verbal information for meaning. 
Additional research in visual perception showed that this difficulty in 
processing information for meaning was not restricted to language material. Shah 
and Frith (1983) administered the Embedded Figures test (Witkin, Oltman, Raskin 
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& Karp, 1971; See Figure 1.2), initially developed to investigate field independence 
in non-autistic populations, to a sample of children with autism. This task measures 
the ability to ignore a global visual pattern and focus on the parts in order to find an 
embedded shape in a picture. Results showed superior performance of individuals 
with autism relative to a comparison sample. The studies mentioned earlier 
investigating cognitive profiles in intelligence test in autism also provided evidence 
of superior featural processing in autism. Individuals with autism tend to have a 
peak of performance in the Block Design test. This test as the Embedded Figures 
test also requires the ability to segment a design into its parts. 
Figure 1.2 Example of stimuli used in the Embedded Figures test (Witkin et al., 
1971 ). 
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On the basis of the results from these studies and clinical observation data, 
Uta Frith (1989) fom1ally proposed a new theory of autism, Weak Central 
Coherence theory. This theory will be discussed in the next section, together with 
the two other cognitive theories of autism that emerged at around the same time, the 
theory of mind and executive function accounts of autism. 
1.2 Weak Central Coherence and other cognitive accounts of autism 
1.2.1 The 'theory ofmind' account 
The term 'theory of mind' was first coined by Premack and Woodruff(1978) 
to refer to the capacity to predict other's behaviour on the basis of inferred mental 
states. Wimmer and Perner (1983) argued that the most suitable way of testing 
whether an organism has theory of mind is to assess its capacity to predict another's 
behaviour on the basis of a false belief. In order to investigate theory of mind 
abilities in children, Wimmer and Perner designed a false belief test. In this test, 
children hear a story about a character that leaves an object in a particular location. 
While this character is absent, the object is transferred to a different location. 
Children then are asked where the character will look for the object. If they 
understand false belief, children will predict that the character will look for the 
object where he/she left it. However, if they do not understand false belief, they will 
predict that the character will look for the object in the new location. Wimmer and 
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Perner (1983) found that children only develop this ability at around four years of 
age. The emergence of the concept of theory of mind opened a whole new field in 
developmental psychology. 
Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith ( 1985) were the first to apply this concept to 
the study of autism. They argued that autism could be characterised by an inability 
to understand other people's mental states. When Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith 
administered the false belief test to a sample of individuals with autism they found 
that individuals with autism consistently failed to solve the task. Furthermore, this 
inability to solve the task seemed related to autism only and not to a general 
cognitive handicap as a matched sample of children with learning difficulties were 
able to solve this task despite their developmental delay. Theory of mind therefore 
seems to be relatively independent of general intellectual abilities in non-autistic 
samples. 
Later research consistently reported deficits in theory of mind in autism 
usmg different paradigms (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1986; Baron-Cohen, 
1989a,c). The emergence of the 'theory of mind' theory had a great impact in 
research in autism and typical development as it provided a theoretical framework 
from which to draw specific predictions. This account of autism could explain the 
language and communication difficulties in autism as well as the social interaction 
impairments, in other words the social deficits in autism. However, autism IS 
characterised also by deficits in the non-social domain. For instance, autism IS 
related to repetitive and perseverative behaviour and abnormal patterns of 
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perception. These impairments cannot be easily explained by a theory of mind 
deficit. The two altemative theories of autism, executive function theory (Russell, 
1996; 1998; Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 1991) and weak central coherence 
theory (Frith, 1989) are more successful in accounting for the non-social 
impairments. 
1.2.2 The executive function account 
Executive function (EF) is an umbrella term that covers a range of abilities 
such as attention shifting, set-shifting, inhibition of automatic responses, generation 
of goal-directed behaviour, holding information on-line in working memory and a 
series of high-level functions that are controlled by the frontal lobes. 
The proposal that individuals with autism have an executive dysfunction is 
based on the finding that many of the deficits in autism resemble those of brain-
damaged patients with lesions to the frontal lobes. Traditional tests of executive 
function abilities include the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) in which 
participants have to flexibly shift from one card sorting strategy to another. The 
ability to plan strategies and inhibit prepotent responses, measured by the Tower of 
Hanoi, are also part of the executive functions. 
There is wide evidence for executive deficits in autism. Research has shown 
that individuals with autism have difficulties in strategic and motor planning, set-
shifting, attention shift, generating novel behaviour and working memory among 
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other components of executive function (see Pennington and Ozonoff, 1996 for a 
review). However, not all executive function abilities are impaired in autism and 
impairments also vary as a function of age and IQ level. In addition, EF 
impairments are not specific to autism as other clinical groups such as 
schizophrenia, Tourette's syndrome, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
(AHDH) or Parkinson's disease also present an executive dysfunction (Ozonoff, 
Strayer, McMahon & Filloux, 1994). 
The executive function account has attempted to explain both the social and 
non-social deficits in autism. Several authors have suggested that the ability to shift 
cognitive set is linked to social abilities (McEvoy, Rogers and Pennington, 1996; 
Berger et al., 1993 ). In addition, it has been suggested that the difficulties 
experienced by individuals with autism in theory of mind tasks such as the false 
belief test can be explained by a deficit in disengaging from the salience of reality 
(Hughes & Russell, 1993 ). Evidence however shows that individuals with autism 
are able to disengage from reality when they need to distinguish between reality and 
the content of a photograph (Leekam & Perner, 1991; Swettenham, Baron-Cohen 
G6mez & Walsh, 1996) or a map (Leslie & Thaiss, 1992). 
The relation between executive functions and theory of mind abilities is an 
Issue of debate in current research. Theorists of the executive function account 
claim that the difficulties in theory of mind can be explained by an executive 
dysfunction (Russell, 1996), while theorists of the theory of mind account claim that 
social impairments in autism can be explained by a theory of mind impairment 
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(Perner, 2000). This debate has not yet been resolved, thus further research will be 
needed to establish the relationship between these two abilities. Regardless of which 
of the two theories may account best for the diagnostic criteria of autism, neither of 
the two theories attempts to explain the unique cognitive profile found in autism. An 
alternative theory has been proposed to explain this cognitive profile, weak central 
coherence. 
1.2.3 The weak central coherence account 
The weak central coherence account proposed by Frith ( 1989) was based on 
evidence from research by Hern1elin and O'Connor (1970) and by Frith and 
colleagues (Frith & Snow ling, 1983; Shah & Frith, 1983; Frith, 1970) showing that 
children with autism have difficulty in integrating incoming information and in 
processing information for meaning. 
Central coherence is the term coined by Frith ( 1989) to refer to the tendency 
of the cognitive system to integrate information into meaningful higher-level 
representations. 
"The normal operation of central coherence compels us human beings to 
give priority to understanding meaning. Hence we can easily single out meaningful 
from meaningless material. Indeed it goes against the grain to deal with anything 
meaningless. Despite the processing effort that it involves, we remember the gist of 
the message, not the message verbatim" (Frith, 1989, p.l 01 ). 
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Frith ( 1989) claims that in typical cognitive functioning there is a central 
high-level component, what she terms 'central coherence', that selects what to 
attend to from the vast amount of information that reaches the perceptual systems. 
The selection of what is appropriate to attend to is based on the basis of the 
integration of the information available. Without this high-level integrative 
component, she argues, the coherence would be weak and attention would be 
random. 
Frith's proposal is that autism is characterised by a cetiain cognitive style. 
The particularity of this cognitive style is that individuals with autism, unlike 
normal populations, do not tend to integrate incoming information in its context, but 
instead preferentially attend to local information. Unlike the other theories of 
autism, this theory attempts to explain not only impairments but also the islets of 
abilities that have been repeatedly found in autism. For instance, this theory predicts 
relatively good perfotmance in tasks where attention to local information is 
advantageous, but poor performance on tasks requiring the recognition of global 
meaning or integration of stimuli in context. 
The advantage of wee theory as opposed to the other two theories is that, to 
date, no other syndromes have been found to have the distinctive cognitive profile 
identified by weak central coherence theory. In addition, whereas even when the 
minority of high functioning children are able to pass tests of theory of mind, it 
seems that central coherence difficulties are nevertheless still present in these 
children (Happe, 1996; 1997). This therefore seems to be a cognitive style that is 
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distinctive to autism. The proposal of a cognitive style with various degrees along a 
continuum also allows a better explanation of autism as a spectrum of disorder. 
Finally, this proposal not only explains attentional and perceptual deficits but also 
the presence of superior abilities in autism in certain tasks. 
In spite of the advantages of WCC theory over the other two theories, this 
theory suffers from a critical problem, namely the poor definition of the concept of 
central coherence. Although the concept of central coherence is very appealing, 
accounting for piecemeal processing and islets of abilities that have been repeatedly 
found in autism, it is 'a very slippery concept to define' (Baron-Cohen & 
Swettenham, 1997). In the next section I examine in more detail this slippery 
concept. Issues of theoretical definition are dealt with in the remaining part of this 
chapter while empirical evidence is discussed in Chapter 2. 
1.3 Examining the concept of central coherence 
The claim that children with autism have weak central coherence is based on 
evidence for a distinctive cognitive profile. This profile reveals superior featural 
processing combined with poor global processing, recognition of the global 
meaning or poor integration of stimuli in their context. There are two assumptions 
within this claim that I attempt to address in this thesis. The first is that the existence 
of superior featural processing presupposes a lack of holistic processing. The second 
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is that it is assumed that 'global processing' and 'integration of stimuli in context' 
are one and the same thing. 
Taking the first assumption, there is now considerable evidence supporting 
the claim for superior featural processing but little evidence focusing on the global 
impairment. The evidence that exists is based mainly on the results of very specific 
tasks with high cognitive demand, making it difficult to ascertain whether the 
impairment is due to holistic processing or simply complexity or information load. 
This thesis therefore specifically focused on whether individuals with autism are 
impaired in holistic processing. 
Taking the second assumption, central coherence has been defined as either 
the ability to process contextual information or the ability to process global patterns 
of visual stimuli. It has been assumed that if central coherence is weak, the two 
abilities would be impaired. However, nowhere has it been demonstrated that these 
two abilities are one and the same thing. Indeed, research with typical and atypical 
populations investigate these two abilities separately. The work of this thesis 
therefore separated out the notion of contextual and global processing. Evidence of 
difficulties in global and contextual processing will be discussed in Chapter 2 and in 
Chapters 3 to 8 a series of experiments investigating the ability to process global 
and contextual information are presented. 
Further examination of the concept of central coherence reveals other 
difficulties that are addressed in the thesis. These difficulties concern the 
confounding of the definition of central coherence when dealing with the issue of 
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level and domain of cognitive processing. In the model originally proposed by Frith, 
(1989), central and peripheral processes were differentiated. Peripheral processes 
were described as specialised processes, that transform sensations into perceptions 
with a low degree of interpretation whereas central processes in contrast, were 
described as processes that interpret information further by integrating the 
information received from the different peripheral sources. Frith (1989) argued that 
a weak central coherence impairment would only affect central and not peripheral 
processes. An example she gives of low-level integration processes by peripheral 
systems is for instance, that of visual illusions where the illusion is created even 
before the information is passed on to the central processes. The perception of visual 
illusions would therefore be no different from that of typical populations according 
to her initial account. One difficulty here is the failure to specify the boundaries of 
peripheral and central processes. In subsequent work, Happe ( 1996) examined the 
local-global distinction within a low level visual task such as the visual illusion task. 
Despite Frith's earlier prediction, Happe did not find children with autism 
susceptible to visual illusion, a finding that Ropar and Mitchell (1999) did not 
replicate. These mixed results leave open the question of how global ability should 
be interpreted in visual tasks involving different levels of cognitive demand. 
To date, the impairment in central coherence is documented using a diverse 
range of global and contextual tasks, assessing different cognitive abilities (e.g. 
perception, memory, language) across visual and verbal domains. For instance, 
weak central coherence has been investigated in tasks testing the ability to use 
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sentence context to disambiguate a homograph (Frith & Snowling, 1983), to select 
the right word missing in a sentence (Frith & Snowling, 1983), to facilitate recall of 
words (Hem1elin & O'Connor, 1967), to recall semantic category information 
(Tager-Flusberg, 1991) and to extract holistic properties of visual stimuli (MottTon 
& Belleville, 1993 ). One of the claims of weak central coherence theory is that 
central coherence is a general property of the cognitive system. It has therefore been 
assumed that if central coherence is weak in autism, individuals with autism will 
have difficulties across domains of perfom1ance. However, the evidence suggests 
that studies investigating context processing in the verbal domain (e.g. sentence 
processing tasks) reveal difficulties whereas studies investigating global and context 
processing in the visual domain have provided mixed evidence. It would be possible 
therefore that performance is particularly impaired in the verbal domain. 
Demonstrating competence in the visual domain in both the ability to process 
context and global information would seriously damage weak central coherence 
theory and in particular the definition of central coherence as a general capacity. 
1.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter a historical perspective of how cognitive theories of autism 
emerged was presented. The discussion of three current cognitive theories of autism 
revealed that weak central coherence theory, unlike the other two theories of autism, 
has the potential to explain the unusual cognitive style characteristic of autism. This 
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particular cognitive style has been conceptualised by Frith ( 1989) as a failure to 
integrate information, manifest by difficulties in processing global, context 
information and relative good detailed focused processing. 
The analysis of the weak central coherence theory of autism revealed that 
although this theory is important in proposing a cognitive profile that might be 
distinctive to autism, it suffers from various conceptual difficulties. In an attempt to 
deal with these difficulties, the work of this thesis concentrates on the proposed 
impairment in processing global, contextual information, separating out these two 
notions from each other and attempting to avoid previous difficulties of 
confounding with respect to the level and domain of processing. 
In Chapter 2 a detailed literature review of part/whole processmg will 
demonstrate that supenor part processmg can be accompanied by a lack of 
impairment in global processing. Evidence for the assumption that central coherence 
is a general capacity is also examined by reviewing evidence from studies testing 
difficulties in the visual and verbal domain at different levels of cognitive 
processmg. 
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Chapter 2 Contextual and global processing: Evidence from typical 
and atypical populations 
The claim of the weak central coherence theory of autism is that children 
have a distinctive cognitive profile. This profile includes superior featural 
processing together with impaired holistic processing. In Chapter 1 it was proposed 
that the concept of central coherence confounded two notions that refer to holistic 
processing, that of global processing and contextual processing. In this chapter the 
evidence in support of difficulties in contextual and global processing will be 
discussed separately, following the traditional approach of models of typical 
cognitive functioning and neuropsychological research. As Chapter 1 pointed out, 
existing research following weak central coherence theory has assumed that 
perfom1ance on visual and verbal tasks can be equated together. As it will be 
discussed later, evidence for difficulties in the visual domain is scarce and 
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contradictory. Evidence of contextual difficulties in both visual and verbal domains 
is therefore examined separately in this chapter. 
2.1 Evidence of context processing 
In this section the evidence for contextual difficulties in both the visual and 
verbal domains in autism will be discussed. Context is a very broad concept that 
includes many different notions. For instance, context can be defined as semantic 
information within a sentence, simply as semantic information of a word, a situation 
in which an utterance is produced, as the mutual knowledge that two speakers share 
about the world, as a visual scene, or the previous wealth of knowledge a person has 
about the world. It could therefore be argued that there are as many definitions of 
context as experimental paradigms and theories of context processing. It is very 
difficult, if not impossible, to empirically manipulate and control the knowledge a 
person has about the world, or how a person might interpret a situation, or the extent 
to which speakers are aware of a certain amount of shared knowledge. Thus, in the 
benefit of clarity, in this thesis 'context' will be operationalised as background 
knowledge elicited by means of exposure to either a word, sentence or picture. This 
specific infom1ation is provided in an experimental setting. 
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2.1.1 Evidence from language studies 
Language and communication are good examples of the necessity of a 
central integrating component in the cognitive system. In interpreting utterances, we 
continually have to select the referent of words or choose the right meaning of 
polysemic words according to the context. Figures of speech like irony and 
metaphors are also highly dependent on context. Without the ability to integrate 
verbal information into meaningful representations, language would become a very 
difficult and complex task. Understanding language however, is a relatively 
effortless task as context is taken in to account almost automatically without the 
need to stop and analyse consciously what might be the referent of a certain pronoun 
or article. 
Evidence in typical populations 
There is extensive evidence m typical populations for the tendency to 
integrate information in its context in language processing. Ambiguous sentences 
for example tend to go unnoticed and misinterpretations are rare (Hoppe & Kess, 
1986) demonstrating that the integration of incoming information is a relatively 
automatic process. The automaticity of integration processes has also been 
demonstrated in text processing, where it has been shown that participants tend to 
automatically integrate the ideas of different sentences and forget the actual 
sentences (Bransford & Franks, 1971). 
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A classical paradigm to study the effects of context in language processing is 
the semantic priming paradigm. In a typical semantic priming task, a word or 
sentence is presented prior to the presentation of another target word. In these tasks, 
the primes and targets can be either related or unrelated. Research has consistently 
shown that related prime words/sentences significantly facilitate word recognition 
(e.g., Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971; Becker, 1980). Priming tasks have also been 
used to study the role of context in semantic disambiguation. The presentation of a 
prime word related to one of the interpretations of an ambiguous word, facilitates 
that interpretation of the word and not the alternative (Simpson, 1984). 
Several theories have attempted to account for context effects in language. 
These theories can be classed into two main categories. Those that postulate that 
lexical access is independent of other processes and hence independent from 
contextual influence, namely modular theories (Neely, 1991; Foster, 1989). These 
theories suggest that contextual inforn1ation is accessed only after a word has been 
identified (i.e., post-lexical access). The second cluster of theories postulate that the 
presentation of a word automatically activates all words related to it, interactive 
theories. Examples of these latter theories are the automatic spreading model 
(Anderson, 1976; 1983; Posner & Snyder, 1975b) and the expectancy based priming 
theory (Becker, 1980; 1985). Empirical research has however provided evidence in 
support for both types of theories. Hence the debate concerning the precise nature of 
the influence of context in language processing is still open. 
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Evidence in autism 
Unfortunately, these cognitive theories of language processing have not been 
applied specifically to the study of autism. The basis for Frith's (1989) suggestion 
that individuals with autism fail to process information in context came instead from 
the evidence described in the previous chapter. This evidence indicated a failure to 
use sentence context to facilitate recall in autism (Hermelin & O'Connor, 1967). 
Additional evidence of a failure to use sentence context in autism comes from a 
study by Frith and Snowling (1983) in which they presented sentences containing 
homograph words to children with autism and two comparison groups matched on 
reading age. Homograph words are words that have two different meanings and 
pronunciations (i.e., bow). The results showed that children with autism tended to 
give the more frequent pronunciation of the homographs regardless of the context in 
which they were presented whereas the control samples tended to give the context-
appropriate pronunciation. In a second task, participants had to select a word out of 
three possible options to complete the missing word in a sentence. It was found that 
children with autism were less accurate than the comparison samples in selecting the 
appropriate word to complete the sentences. They did however choose words from 
the correct syntactic class. Frith and Snowling therefore argued that there is not a 
general language impairment in autism but that impairments are restricted to the use 
of semantic infom1ation. This was further confirmed by the results from other tasks 
investigating syntactic processing where children with autism performed as 
comparison samples (Frith & Snowling, 1983). 
25 
The results of the homographs task were later replicated in two studies by 
Happe (1997) and Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen (1999). Further evidence of difficulties 
in the use of sentence context to disambiguate information has been also found by 
use of an ambiguous sentences task in which individuals with autism fail to select 
the right interpretation of the ambiguous sentences according to context information 
(Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999). 
Contextual difficulties in autism are not restricted to the use of sentence 
context. In a second experiment, Hermelin and O'Connor (1967) investigated if 
children with autism would have difficulties even when syntactic information was 
removed. They presented lists of unrelated words (i.e., bear, cup, pencil, brown, 
three) and a list of words containing two semantic categories (i.e., three, red, four, 
five, green, blue) to the same sample of children. They found that although both 
groups of children had similar recall rates for the two lists, the comparison group, 
and not children with autism tended to recall the words of the same semantic 
category together (i.e., three, four, five, red, green, blue). Thus they concluded that 
children with autism have difficulties not only with sentence processing but even at 
the more basic level of processing semantic category information. 
This conclusion has been confinned in a later study by Tager-Flusberg 
( 1991 ). Tager-Flusberg presented two lists to children with autism and two 
comparison groups. One list contained words of the same semantic category (i.e., 
animals) and the second list contained semantically unrelated words. Results 
showed that whilst the recall rate was higher for the related than the unrelated list in 
26 
the two comparison groups, children with autism had similar recall rates for both 
lists. This finding, according to Tager-Flusberg reflects an inability to use semantic 
information to aid recall in autism. 
In contrast, research has shown that the ability to process single word 
meaning is intact in autism. Frith and Snowling (1983) found that children with 
autism are as susceptible as typically developing children and children with dyslexia 
to the Stroop effect (i.e., they find it harder to name the colour of the ink, namely 
'blue', when the word presented is 'red' than when presented with a string of Xs). 
Eskes, Bryson and McCormick ( 1990) also found normal interference effects in a 
Stroop task using concrete and abstract words. Thus Happe (2000) has suggested 
that individuals with autism can process single words for meaning but have greater 
difficulty making meaningful connections between words. 
In summary the evidence suggests that the language difficulties experienced 
by individuals with autism are the result of a specific impairment related to the 
ability to integrate information in its context. This deficit is demonstrated by a 
failure to use semantic category information in memory tasks and failure to use 
sentence context to disambiguate homographs, select missing words in a sentence or 
facilitate recall. 
It has been assumed that the contextual difficulties in autism are present in 
the visual and verbal domain (Frith, 1989; Happe, 2000), it would be therefore 
predicted that individuals with autism would fail to integrate not only verbal but 
also visual information in its context. 
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2.1. 2 Evidence from visual studies 
Evidence in typical populations 
Research in visual perception in typical populations has demonstrated that 
visual information also tends to be integrated in its context. The evidence comes 
from a wide range of studies in which the influence of context is assessed by use of 
object identification or eye movement paradigms. These studies show that objects 
are better identified when presented in or after an appropriate contextual than when 
presented in or after inappropriate contextual scenes (e.g., Palmer, 1975; 
Biederman, Mezzanotte & Rabinowitz, 1982). Similarly eye movement studies have 
found shorter gaze for objects consistent with a visual contextual scene than for 
objects inconsistent with the visual scene (e.g., Friedman, 1979; Rayner & 
Pollatsek, 1992). These findings have been interpreted as demonstrating that the 
context in which an object is presented influences the accuracy, and speed of object 
identification. 
Several models, based on the principles of the models of language 
processing, have been proposed to account for the influence of context in object 
processing. These models can be classed into two categories, models that propose 
that object identification is isolated from expectations derived from scene 
knowledge and models that propose that visual processing is influenced by 
expectations derived from scene knowledge. 
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An example of the first type of model is the functional isolation model that 
postulates that bottom-up visual analysis is sufficient to discriminate objects 
(Hollingworth & Henderson, 1998). Context effects, it is argued, occur because of 
later influences of scene constraint. The second type of model proposes that the 
presentation of a scene or object automatically activates information related to it. 
Examples of this type of model are the perceptual schema model (e.g., Boyce, 
Pollatsek, & Rayner, 1989; Metzger & Antes, 1983) and the priming model (e.g., 
Bar & Ullman, 1996). These models propose the memory representation of a scene 
type (a schema or frame) contains information about the objects and spatial relations 
between objects that form a type. The early activation of this schema facilitates the 
subsequent perceptual analysis of schema-consistent objects. 
Evidence in autism 
Very little research has been carried out to investigate the ability to process 
visual information in context in autism. Evidence for weak central coherence in the 
visual domain in autism has been drawn instead from studies investigating featural 
processing. It is however important to directly investigate if individuals with autism 
are able to process visual information in context. A failure to find an impairment in 
context or global processing in the visual domain would challenge the notion of a 
general impainnent in autism related to weak central coherence. 
A study by Pring and Hermelin (1993) suggests that, contrary to WCC 
theory, individuals with autism are able to use semantic visual information to aid 
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recall. In this study they presented two different sets of pictures. One set contained 
pictures of objects of the same semantic category (i.e., musical instruments). The 
second set contained pictures or objects with similar shapes (i.e., light bulb, pear. .. ). 
They found that children with autism, like comparison samples, had higher recall 
rates for the semantic related set than the structurally related set. They argued that 
this finding indicated intact semantic processing of visual stimuli in autism. This 
result contrasts with findings showing a failure to use semantic information to aid 
recall in verbal tasks (Tager-Flusberg, 1991). This would suggest the presence of a 
domain specific difficulty in autism in the ability to use context. 
A study by Jolliffe (1997) however has found evidence for abnormal context 
processing in the visual domain in autism. In this study participants had to choose 
which of the pictures in a set was incongruous with the rest (i.e., bucket, man, 
ladder, window, suitcase). In a second task, participants had to select what was the 
incongruous object on a contextual scene (i.e., a squirrel on a beach). High-
functioning individuals with autism had difficulties in both tasks relative to control 
participants. Specifically, they had difficulties deciding which was the incongruous 
object. 
It is difficult to explain the different results from the studies of Pring and 
Hermelin (1993) and Jolliffe (1997) regarding a deficit in autism to process visual 
information in context as the tasks used in both studies are very different in nature. 
The first study tests the ability to use semantic category to aid recall whilst the 
second investigates the ability to assess the appropriateness of an object in a 
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contextual scene. Further research using specific context tasks should be carried out 
to ascertain the presence of contextual difficulties in autism in the visual domain. 
As argued earlier, evidence for weak central coherence in the visual domain 
has been mostly drawn from studies looking at part/whole processing. This evidence 
will be reviewed in the next two sections in relation first to evidence of superior part 
processing and second, to evidence of a specific global impairment. 
2.2 Evidence of part/whole processing 
2. 2.1 Evidence of attentionallocal bias in autism 
Research in visual perception has provided evidence supporting the view 
that the cognitive system perceives the world hierarchically, that is, that the 
cognitive system tends to integrate parts into wholes. This proposal dates back to the 
early part of the last century when Gestalt psychologists proposed that perception of 
wholes is not the simple addition of its component parts (Koffka, 1935). Gestalt 
theorists argued that the cognitive system automatically integrates the different parts 
of a display into a global configuration. They proposed that although the system 
tends to integrate the parts automatically it is also possible, to perceive the separate 
parts. 
Typical examples of automatic integration of parts into wholes are visual 
illusions. In these figures, the perception of the parts is biased by the global 
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configuration. For instance, in the Titchener circles (Figure 2.1 below), despite the 
two central circles being the same size, people tend to perceive the circle surrounded 
by small circles as bigger than the circle surrounded by big circles. When global 
information is removed however, people have not difficulty perceiving the circles as 
the same size. 
Figure 2.1 Titchener visual illusion. 
A test that has been also commonly used to test the claim that the cognitive 
system tends to automatically integrate parts into wholes is the Embedded Figures 
test. This test involves finding a hidden shape (i.e., triangle) among a larger 
meaningful drawing (i.e., a pram). The difficulty of this test for normal populations 
has been ascribed to the overwhelming 'predominance of the whole' (Gottschaldt, 
1926). Hence, good performance in this test depends on the ability to focus on detail 
and ignore the global picture. Research in autism has demonstrated that children 
with autism are more accurate and faster than matched control children on the 
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Embedded Figures test (Shah & Frith, 1983). The fact that children with autism 
perform extremely well on this test has been taken as evidence of a local attentional 
bias. 
Several studies carried out before Frith's proposal (1989) consistently 
showed that children with autism show a peak of perfonnance in the Block Design 
test ofthe Weschler Intelligence Scales for Children (for a review see Happe, 1994). 
In this test subjects have to reconstruct a design by putting together individual 
blocks. In order to do so, participants have to be able to break up the line drawings 
of the design into parts. It has been argued that this test is measuring the same skill 
as the Embedded Figure test, that is, the ability to segment a picture into its parts 
and ignore the whole outline. 
In a later study, Shah & Frith (1993) set out to investigate whether superior 
performance in this type of test by individuals with autism is due to a general 
superior spatial ability or a specific ability to segment wholes in parts. In their study, 
they not only presented the standard version of the test but they also made two 
spatial transformations (obliqueness and rotation) and introduced a condition in 
which they presented the design segmented into its parts. They predicted that if 
children with autism have general superior spatial ability, they would be superior 
not only in the standard condition but also in the spatial transformation conditions. 
In contrast, if superiority in this test is due to superior ability to segment a picture in 
its parts, they would be superior in the standard condition only, and the presentation 
of segmented designs would not enhance their performance to the same extent as in 
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typically developing children. Results showed that children with autism were 
superior only in the standard condition. Furthermore, the segmentation of the design 
significantly helped the control sample but not children with autism. This result 
confirms that the superior perfmmance of children with autism in this task is the 
result of superior ability in segmenting objects into its parts and not general superior 
spatial abilities. 
The empirical evidence reviewed so far has referred to visuo-spatial tasks 
with a certain degree of complexity. Originally, Frith (1989) had predicted that the 
integration difficulties in autism would lie at the more complex level. Happe (1996) 
however investigated the possibility that a local bias would also be present in autism 
at more basic levels of perception. To investigate this possibility she presented 
visual illusions such as the Titchener circles (Figure 2.1) to a sample of children 
with autism matched on verbal mental age with typically developing children and 
developmentally delayed children. She introduced a condition in which brightly 
coloured plastic strips were added over the original drawings. This variation was 
introduced to help children to segment out the parts of the picture relevant for the 
decision. She predicted that children with autism would not succumb as much as 
control groups to visual illusions because of their tendency to focus on parts of the 
objects. 1n addition it was predicted that providing brightly coloured strips would 
only help the control sample and not individuals with autism. Results showed that 
children with autism were less likely to succumb to the illusions. Furthermore, the 
control samples were significantly better at the segmented condition while children 
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with autism seemed not to be aided by this segmentation. These findings show that 
whereas control samples need an extemal aid to segment an object into its parts, 
children with autism seem to do it spontaneously. These results also seem to support 
the claim that autism is characterised by a local bias in autism even at low levels of 
perception, contrary to the claim made by Frith (1989) that weak central coherence 
would only be apparent in higher-level tasks. 
Despite the initial success in finding evidence to support the claim of a local 
bias in autism, recent studies have failed to find evidence of superior performance in 
tasks such as the visual illusions or the Embedded Figures test (EFT). Two different 
studies have failed to replicate superior performance in the Embedded Figure test 
thus shedding doubt over Shah and Frith's findings and the existence of a local bias 
in autism. The first study by Brian and Bryson (1996) did not find any difference in 
performance in the Embedded Figure test between control samples and a sample of 
individuals with autism and pervasive developmental disorders (PDD). As the 
results of Brian and Bryson (1996) could be explained by sampling selection, 
because of the inclusion of participants with pervasive developmental disorders, 
Jollife and Baron-Cohen (1997) used a combined sample of people with autism as 
well as Aspergers syndrome. They predicted that in a sample of high functioning 
adults with a strict diagnosis of autism they would be able to replicate Shah and 
Frith's findings. Surprisingly, they also found like Brian and Bryson, that 
individuals with autism were not more accurate in the EFT test than the control 
samples. However, an analysis of the reaction times showed that autistic individuals 
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were actually faster at finding the embedded figures. Hence, although with a more 
subtle measurement, they concluded that their results supported, at least partially, 
Frith's claim. 
A recent study by Ropar and Mitchell (1999) has also failed to replicate 
Happe's findings with visual illusions. They found that children with autism were as 
susceptible to visual illusions as the comparison samples. Thus, this study did not 
provide evidence of superior processing of parts. In a later study however, Ropar 
and Mitchell (2001) reported that performance on visual illusions is not related to 
performance to other visual tasks such as the EFT or Block Design. More 
importantly, the performance on each of the visual illusions did not correlate with 
performance in other illusions. It seems therefore that visual illusions are a unique 
type of stimuli and might not be the best way of testing local bias at low levels. 
In summary, although there are some mixed findings, the weight of the 
evidence supports Frith's (1989) suggestion that autism is characterised by a local 
bias. Several studies find a peak of performance in the Block Design test (Lockyer 
& Rutter, 1970; Venter, Lord & Schopler, 1992). This peak has been confirmed to 
stem from an ability to segment pictures and not general superior spatial ability as 
demonstrated by two findings (Shah and Frith, 1993). Regarding the evidence from 
the Embedded Figures test, Brian and Bryson's (1996) failure to find superior 
perfom1ance in autism results can be explained by the nature of the sample used in 
the study. Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen's (1997) results have confim1ed the original 
findings of Shah and Frith (1983) of superior performance of individuals with 
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autism m this test relative to companson groups. The results from the visual 
illusions tasks m contrast have provided mixed evidence. However, this task 
examines low levels of integration which according to the original proposal (Frith, 
1989) should be spared in autism. More importantly visual illusions seem to be a 
unique type of stimuli as performance in this task does not correlate with 
performance in other visuo-spatial tasks. 
It has been assumed that the attentionallocal bias in autism is the result of an 
inability to perceive whales (Happe, 1999; Happe, 2000). However, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, the presence of a local bias does not necessarily mean the 
existence of a global impairment. It is therefore of great importance for the 
definition of wee to establish whether there is a global impairment in autism. 
2. 2. 2 Evidence of global processing deficits in autism 
Systematic research into part-whole perception started with a senes of 
studies by Navon (1977). Navon designed a task in which stimulus patterns with 
local letters were nested within a global letter to test part-whole processing in 
normal populations (see Figure 2.2). The identity of the large and small letters could 
be the same (compatible condition) or be different (incompatible). He found that 
normal adults were faster at recognising large rather than small letters, a 
phenomenon he labelled as 'global advantage'. He also found that when participants 
were asked to report the identity of the small letter in the incompatible condition, 
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the identity of the large letter interfered, slowing down reaction times and leading to 
increased errors. However, when reporting the identity of the large letter, there were 
no interference effects from the smaller letters in the incompatible condition. This 
effect is referred to as the 'global interference effect'. Based on these results, Navon 
proposed the 'global precedence' model. According to this model, global 
information is processed faster and before local information. That is, the cognitive 
system first processes the outline of objects and it is only later, if necessary, that it 
processes local information. 
Figure 2.2. Example of stimuli used in the Navon task in the compatible (a) and 
incompatible (b) conditions. 
a) H H b) s s 
H H s s 
H H s s 
H H H HH s s s s s 
H H s s 
H H s s 
H H s s 
Several studies have attempted to test global perception in autism by use of 
the Navon task. According to wee theory, it would be predicted that the lack of a 
natural drive to process information globally in autism would result in a lack of 
'global advantage' in the Navon task. That is, individuals with autism would not be 
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faster identifying the big letter rather than the small letters in the compatible 
condition. Secondly, if individuals with autism do not process global infom1ation 
faster and before local information, they would also fail to have 'global 
interference' effects in the incompatible condition, according to Navon model. As 
Frith (1989) proposes that autism is characterised by a local bias, a reversal of 
effects, that is 'local advantage' and 'local interference' effects, would therefore be 
expected in autism. 
In 1993 Mottron and Belleville conducted the first of a series of studies 
exploring perfom1ance in the Navon task by individuals with autism. In this first 
study they administered the Navon task to a savant draughtsman with autism. 
Contrary to expectations, it was found that the autistic draughtsman presented a 
global bias (i.e. he was faster and more accurate when identifying the large letter 
than small letters). However, in the incompatible condition, unlike the comparison 
group, he did not show a global interference effect. In fact, he did not show any 
preference for either level in this condition. 
As a result of these findings, Mottron and Belleville (1993) proposed an 
alternative theory: the hierarchisation theory. According to this theory, people with 
autism do not have any advantage for either local or global levels of processing. 
What Mottron proposes is that impairments in information processing are related to 
the interaction between the local and global levels and not to a preference of part 
over whole processing. 
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Another study by Ozonoff, Strayer, McMahon and Filloux (1994) however 
showed evidence for neither wee theory nor the hierarchisation theory. They 
administered the Navon task to a sample of high functioning adolescents with 
autism. The results showed that there were no differences in the way people with 
autism processed local and global levels in relation to the control samples. Like the 
control sample, the autistic sample had global advantage and global interference 
effects. These findings did not confirm either weak central coherence predictions of 
a local bias and local interference effect nor Mottron's predictions of global bias but 
no interference effects. Results suggested that, on the contrary and at least in 
relation to this task, people with autism do not differ in terms of global/local 
processing from comparison samples. 
Jolliffe and Baron-eohen (1997) suggested that a difference in the 
methodology used in these two studies could explain the contradictory results. 
According to them 'Ozonoff et al. failed to replicate Mottron et al. findings, but this 
was probably because they used an exposure time far too long to bring out this 
subtle effect'. Jolliffe and Baron-eohen argued that local/global bias effects are too 
subtle to be detected, at least by this task, by long exposure times. Therefore it 
seems that the exposure times used in the study by Ozonoff et al. were too long to 
detect any difference between the autistic and comparison samples. 
Plaisted, Swettenham and Rees (1999) however proposed a theoretically 
more interesting altemative explanation of these contradictions. In Ozonoffs study 
they used what it is known as the selective attention procedure. That is, participants 
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are asked to concentrate on only one level at a time (i.e. decide whether the small or 
the large letter was an 'H' or a 'S'). On the other hand, in Mottron study, 
participants had to find a specific letter ('H' or 'S') in either the local or global 
level. This is known as the divided attention procedure because participants have to 
attend to both levels at the same time. They argued that this difference in 
methodology could be the explanation for the contradictory results. 
In this study, Plaisted et al. (1999) tested both procedures in the same sample 
using the long exposure times used by Ozonoff et al. (1994). Results confirmed that 
for Ozonoffs procedure adults with autism responded faster to larger rather than 
small letters (i.e. global advantage) and when the identity of the letters differed, the 
larger letter slowed down the response time to the small letter (i.e. global 
interference) but the small letters did not interfere with the processing of the large 
letter. With Mottron's procedure however, adults with autism presented the opposite 
pattern, they responded faster to small letters (i.e. local advantage) and the identity 
of the small letters slowed down reaction times for the larger letter (i.e. local 
interference). 
Plaisted et al. (1999) argued that this was confirmation of weak central 
coherence in autism. In particular they argued that global processing is intact in 
autism but that it only operates when cues are provided to focus the attention on one 
level only. They suggest that inhibitory mechanisms that operate upon the local 
information do not operate automatically in autism but must be primed. However, 
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this explanation does not explain why when directing attention to the local level 
participants, still had global advantage and interference effects. 
In summary, there is mixed evidence regarding the Navon task. Whilst 
Mottron et al. (1993) found global advantage but no interference effects, Plaisted et 
al.'s study could not replicate these findings and found instead a local bias and local 
interference as predicted by WCC theory. Using the selective attention task however 
Plaisted et al. replicated Ozonoff et al. findings of typical global bias and 
interference effects. 
To further complicate the picture, a very recent study by Mottron et al. 
(1999) using the divided attention procedure (i.e. attention not being focused in 
either local or global level) found global advantage and global interference effects in 
a sample of children and adolescents with autism. These findings contradict Plaisted 
et al. ( 1999) results showing local advantage and local interference effects using the 
divided attention procedure. They also contradict their own earlier study that 
showed no interference effects. Furthermore, they did not find global advantage in 
the control sample! 
There is reason to believe that the Navon task is not a reliable procedure to 
test global and local processing. Lamb and Robertson (1989) have found evidence 
that global advantage and interference effects are 'by no means universal'. Changes 
in factors such as discriminability, sparsity, size or brightness can reduce or even 
reverse the effects. Therefore, it is difficult to reach a conclusion regarding the 
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results on the Navon task because it is unlikely that all the studies employed stimuli 
that were equivalent in all these features. 
The only study using the Navon task that seems to reach a reliable 
conclusion is that of Plaisted et al. (1999). They used exactly the same stimuli and 
time exposure but two different procedures and found differences in performance. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that there is something about the nature of 
the procedure that affects whether stimuli are processed globally or not. One clear 
difference between both versions is that in the selective attention procedure 
participants are overtly primed by the instruction to attend at only one level. They 
conclude that 'global processing is intact in autism ... but operates only under 
conditions of overt priming'. It is interesting to note that even when they are cued to 
attend to the local level, they still show global advantage and preference. An 
important implication of this study therefore is that the provision of external cues to 
attend to only one level enhances normal global processing, regardless of whether 
the cue is to attend to the local or global level. 
In addition to the methodological problems inherent to the Navon task, there 
are also theoretical issues of concern. In particular, recent research has shed doubt 
over the model of global precedence postulated by Navon (1977). Navon argued 
that the explanation to the global interference effect is that the global level is 
processed faster and before the local level. Therefore the model predicts that global 
interference effects are necessarily a consequence of a global advantage (i.e. faster 
processing of global levels). 
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In contrast, research in neuropsychology using brain-damaged patients has 
shown that these two effects are independent (Lamb & Robertson, 1989; Lamb 
Robertson & Knight, 1990). Some patients show a local advantage (i.e., they 
process faster the small letter), but still exhibit global interference effects, that is, in 
the incompatible condition, the processing of the big letter slows down response 
times to the small local letter. Thus, according to these results, the global 
interference effect is not due to the global level being processed faster and before 
the local level. Robertson and Lamb (1991) propose that there are three separate 
mechanisms, one that processes global information, one that is in charge of 
processing local information and an independent mechanism that integrates the 
information of the two levels. They argue that the three mechanisms can be 
selectively impaired and that integration deficits can co-exist with either normal 
global bias or local bias. 
This insight into the processing of parts and wholes might have important 
implications for weak central coherence theory. It has been assumed that the 
presence of a local bias in autism is a consequence of a global impairment. Most of 
the evidence in which Frith based the suggestion of a global impairment in autism 
came from studies using the Block Design, Embedded Figures test and clinical 
observations of good featural processing. These studies however show that children 
with autism are good at processing parts not that they have difficulty processing the 
whole. According to Navon 'global precedence' model, the presence of a local bias 
would imply a deficit in global processing. However, according to Lamb and 
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Robertson's (1991) model, a local bias can eo-exit with normal global interference, 
hence the issue is no longer as simple as first thought. Studies using the Navon task 
have failed to give reliable evidence to either confirm or refute the claim of a global 
impairment in autism. It is therefore of the most importance to directly examine the 
extent to which children with autism are able to process visual arrays globally. 
2.3 Conclusions 
The first chapter identified several problematic aspects of the definition of 
central coherence. The first problem concerned the confounding of two different 
notions of central coherence, the notion of global processing and the notion of 
contextual processing. Context is usually operationalised as the background 
information, either of a sentence, word or picture provided in an experimental 
setting. Global processing, in contrast, refers to the ability to extract holistic 
properties of a visual pattern. Weak central coherence theory makes the claim that 
both global processing and the ability to process information in context are impaired 
in autism. As there is no evidence that these two abilities are one and the same thing 
however, evidence for each ability was reviewed separately. 
The literature review for contextual difficulties in autism revealed that 
individuals with autism have difficulty processing information in context, at least in 
the verbal domain. Children with autism have difficulty with the use of verbal 
context as shown by the failure to use sentence context to disambiguate homographs 
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(Frith & Snow ling, 1983; Happe, 1997), and the failure to use information about 
sentences to facilitate recall (Hermelin & O'Connor, 1967). There is even failure to 
use semantic category information to aid recall (Tager-Flusberg, 1991 ). 
Evidence for a global impairment in autism comes from studies investigating 
the ability to process parts of visual patterns. Several studies have demonstrated 
superior performance of part processing in autism (Shah & Frith, 1983; 1993; 
J olliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999). These findings have been taken as evidence for an 
inability to process patterns of stimuli globally and thus weak central coherence 
However, good featural processing does not directly demonstrate that there is a 
global impairment in autism. Most of the evidence for a global impairment in autism 
comes from studies using the Navon task. The evidence from these studies is 
contradictory, whilst some studies find typical global processing (Ozonoff et al., 
1994 ), other studies find that individuals with autism have a tendency to process 
parts over wholes (Mottron & Belleville, 1993). The problem with the evidence 
drawn from the studies using the Navon task, is that this task has been shown to be 
very susceptible to small changes in procedure so no conclusions can be made from 
these studies. No definite conclusions can therefore be drawn about the presence of 
a global impairment in autism. 
The second problem concerned the issue of domain and level of processing. 
It has been assumed that central coherence is a general component of the cognitive 
system and thus if impaired all areas of cognition will be affected. However, the 
literature review revealed that evidence of contextual difficulties in the visual 
46 
domain is scarce and contradictory. Whilst one study shows that individuals with 
autism are able to use semantic information (Pring & Hermelin, 1993) another study 
shows difficulties in selecting the incongruous object in a set or visual contextual 
scene (Jolliffe, 1997). Hence, the assumption that there is a general impairment 
regarding context processing in autism needs further confirmation. 
The literature review also revealed that research to date has also failed to 
define the specific level of cognitive processing at which difficulties in autism arise. 
Evidence suggests that in verbal contextual tasks, the difficulty lies in making 
meaningful connections between words (Tager-Flusberg, 1991; Hermelin & 
O'eonnor, 19767). In visual contextual tasks however, children with autism seem to 
be able to make connections between objects in terms of semantic category 
information (Pring & Hermelin, 1993). The attempts to establish if there are 
difficulties at low levels of perception have provided mixed evidence. However, 
although there is some evidence for failure at low levels (Happe, 1996) the evidence 
seems to indicate that central coherence as operationalised in terms of global 
processing, is intact at low levels of perception (Ropar & Mitchell, 1999). 
Demonstrating intact abilities in autism to process visual patterns of stimuli 
globally would seriously damage the notion of wee in autism, especially if no 
evidence was found either of an impairment in the use of visual context information. 
It has been assumed that the tendency to draw information together is a general 
property of the cognitive system that if impaired will affect performance in all areas 
of cognition, such as verbal or visual processing. If individuals with autism had an 
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impairment restricted to the verbal domain, the notion of central coherence would 
have to be redefined in terms of a specific language impairment. Having weak 
central coherence in one domain only would imply that integration mechanisms 
could be selectively impaired. 
The aim of the experiments reported in the next two chapters was to 
investigate the difficulty in using visual (Experiment 1 and 2) and verbal 
(Experiment 3) context to facilitate object and word identification. Performance on 
these tasks was compared to performance in two tasks traditionally used to evaluate 
weak central coherence in autism, the semantic memory task (Tager-Flusberg, 1991; 
Experiment 4) and the homographs task (Happe, 1997; Experiment 5). Experiments 
6, 7, 8 and 9 investigated possible explanations for the failure of children with 
autism to use sentence context information (Experiment 5). As the series of 
experiments testing ability to use context demonstrated only a very specific rather 
than a general impairment in contextual processing the final experiment tested the 
ability to use global processing in a new task designed to test the ability to extract 
holistic properties from a visual pattern, (Experiment 9). These experiments are 
reported in chapters 3 to 8. 
Before presenting these studies I include a note about methodology. In 
research investigating weak central coherence theory, there is a tendency to develop 
diverse new paradigms instead of using well-established paradigms drawn from the 
study of cognitive psychology. In this thesis I attempt to follow existing cognitive 
models of perception and use established paradigms in order to be able to compare 
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performance of children with autism with norm data from non-autistic populations 
and avoid the difficulties of interpretation that arise from studies using new 
developed paradigms. Thus the majority of empirical studies reported in this thesis 
were based on paradigms already established with non-autistic populations except 
with the exceptions of Experiment 4 and 5 which used traditional tasks from 
research within the wee account. 
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Chapter 3 Can children with autism use visual context information 
to facilitate object identification? 
It has been claimed that 'individuals with autism fail to integrate 
information in its context' (Frith, 1989). Although there is wide evidence for an 
impairment in the verbal domain regarding the ability to process information in 
context, the evidence from visual tasks is still not clearly established. A new 
method was therefore devised to examine the ability of children with autism to 
use visual context information to facilitate object identification. This new visual 
context task was based on a paradigm developed by Palmer (1975). Two 
empirical studies are reported in this chapter. The first study tested the modified 
visual context task in a non-autistic population of adults. In the second study the 
modified task was administered to children with autism and typically developing 
children to examine their ability to use visual context infonnation to facilitate 
object identification. 
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Since Frith's (1989) original claim that people with autism lack a natural 
drive towards central coherence there has been increasing interest in this 
proposal as an explanation for the perceptual and cognitive difficulties of people 
with autism. A key contribution of the proposal is the claim that individuals have 
a unique profile of perceptual and cognitive abilities in which superiority in 
processing of local, featural information is contrasted with inferiority in 
processing global and context information. Evidence for this pattern has been 
examined with respect to low-level visual processing (Ropar & Mitchell, 1999; 
Happe, 1996; Plaisted, Swettenham & Rees, 1999), high level visuo-spatial 
processing (Shah & Frith, 1983; 1993; Brian & Bryson, 1996), semantic memory 
(Tager-Flusberg, 1991) and sentence processing (Hermelin & O'Connor, 1967; 
Happe, 1997; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999). 
The weak central coherence account of autism is wide ranging in its 
scope of application, yet the empirical evidence for this proposal is still not 
clearly established. On the one hand there is considerable evidence to support the 
claim that children with autism have enhanced ability to discriminate features 
(Shah & Frith, 1983,1993). On the other hand there are contradictory findings as 
to whether this ability occurs alongside impairment in global processing. Some 
studies do show evidence of deficits in the ability to process global infonnation 
(Hermelin & O'Connor, 1967; Frith & Snowling, 1983; Happe, 1997; Jolliffe & 
Baron-Cohen, 1999), whereas other studies show no differences between 
individuals with autism and non-autistic populations in global tasks (Ropar & 
Mitchell, 1999; Brian & Bryson, 1996; Plaisted, Swettenham & Rees, 1998; 
Pring & Hermelin, 1993; Ramondo & Milech, 1984). 
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These contradictory findings may be best understood by examining the 
way that global processing has been conceptualised across different perceptual 
and cognitive tasks. The impairment in global processing has been interpreted 
both in terms of a conceptual semantic deficit, or context deficit, and in terms of 
a failure to extract holistic perceptual properties as demonstrated by studies of 
visuo-spatial processing. Evidence that specifically relates to the failure in using 
context information rests almost exclusively with studies of verbal processing. 
For example individuals show impairments in the recall of semantically related 
words (Tager-Flusberg, 1991; Hermelin & O'Connor, 1967). They are also 
impaired in the use of context information when reading homographs in a 
sentence processing task (Frith & Snowling, 1983; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 
1999). The results of these studies are considered to demonstrate impairment in 
the ability to 'integrate information in context', due to difficulties in forming 
meaningful connections between different items (Happe, 2000). On the other 
hand evidence for a deficit in the ability to extract holistic properties of visual 
patterns of stimuli is contradictory. Whilst some studies provide evidence for a 
global impairment (Mottron & Belleville, 1993; Plaisted, Swettenham & Rees, 
1999), other studies have provided evidence of intact global processing abilities 
in autism (Ozonoff, Strayer, McMahon & Filloux, 1994). 
It is well known clinically that individuals with autism have superior 
non-verbal skills relative to verbal skills. An obvious question, given that global 
processing difficulties have been demonstrated mostly in verbal tasks, is whether 
the global impairment proposed by the weak central coherence explanation is 
simply a reflection of difficulties in processing complex verbal stimuli rather 
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than a general difficulty in global processing. The next section presents a review 
of the evidence for an impainnent in the ability to use visual context 
information. 
3.1 Use of context 8011 vosual processi1111g ftasks 
Happe (2000) has argued that in visual tasks 'people with autism can 
process single objects for meaning but have greater difficulty making 
meaningful connections between objects' (p. 210). The evidence for the 
suggestion of intact processing at single object level, she argues, comes from 
two studies looking at visual processing in autism. The first study by Ameli, 
Courchesne, Lincoln and Grillon (1988) reports that adults with autism have 
better recall rates for meaningful objects than for abstract shapes. The second 
study reports two different experiments (Pring & Hermelin, 1993). In one 
experiment, children were presented with sets of pictures. Some sets contained 
pictures of objects of the same semantic category (i.e. musical instruments) and 
other sets contained pictures of objects with similar shapes (i.e. pear, light bulb). 
It was found that children with autism, as with the control sample, tended to 
remember better the objects from the semantically related set than the objects 
from the structurally similar set. In a second experiment, Pring and Hermelin, 
presented children with sets of three pictures (i.e., wineglass, bottle and tulip). 
The pictures could be sorted by either structural similarity (i.e., wineglass with 
tulip) or by semantic category (i.e., bottle with wineglass). They found that 
children with autism, as with the control sample, also tended to pair together 
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pictures of objects on the basis of semantic information rather than on the basis 
of the shape (i.e., they paired the bottle with the wineglass and not with the 
wineglass with the hllip ). In an unpublished study Ropar (2000) has further 
confirmed that individuals with autism tend to pair objects on the basis of 
semantic information. 
Happe (2000) has suggested that these experiments provide evidence of 
intact processing at single object level. There are two problems however with 
this interpretation. The first problem is that the tasks used by Pring and Hermelin 
require the ability to connect objects on the basis of semantic information, that is 
the tasks are not evaluating single object processing but integration processes 
(i.e., integration on the basis of semantic relations). Hence, Pring and Hermelin's 
findings cannot be taken as evidence for intact single object processing but 
rather as evidence of intact semantic processing in autism. 
Second, Tager-Flusberg's (1991) semantic memory task described 
earlier, also requires the ability to connect stimuli, in this case words, on the 
basis of semantic relations. Hence, it would be expected that children would 
show either difficulty or competence in both Pring and Hermelin and Tager-
Flusberg tasks. Specifically, whilst the Pring and Hermelin study using a visual 
task found that children with autism are able to use semantic information of 
objects to aid recall, Tager-Flusberg has found an impairment in the use of 
semantic information of words to aid recall in a verbal semantic memory task. 
These results would suggest that there is a discrepancy in the ability to connect 
items of information between the visual and verbal domain in autism. 
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In contrast, Jolliffe (1997) has found that individuals with autism are 
poor at spotting the incongruous object in a scene (i.e. a squirrel on a beach). In 
the same study she found that individuals with autism were also poor at selecting 
which objects should go together to form a coherent scene (i.e., a man, a bucket, 
a window, a ladder and a suitcase). 
Based on this evidence, Happe (2000) has suggested that individuals with 
autism ' ... have greater difficulty making meaningful connections between 
objects'. As discussed above, the study by Pring and Hermelin also examined the 
ability to make meaningful connections between objects and have failed to find 
difficulties in autism. 
3.2 Developing a new method to test the use of contextual 
information 
The aim of this study was to investigate further the ability of children 
with autism to integrate and use visual contextual information. To do this a 
different methodology was required in order to test the extent to which 
individuals with autism make use of visual contextual information. Pring and 
Hermelin's (1993) study examined only the ability to connect objects on the 
basis of semantic information and not the ability to use visual context 
information as such. Jolliffe's study on the other hand, examined the ability to 
identify an incongruous object and not directly the ability to use visual 
contextual information. Therefore to investigate directly the extent to which 
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children with autism may use visual contextual information we looked for an 
alternative methodology that would allow a direct comparison between the 
performance of children when context was provided and in the absence of 
context. An additional aim was to find a task that would be easily adapted to a 
verbal format to compare performance in the visual and verbal domains. 
The literature review revealed several paradigms that have been 
developed to test the extent to which the provision or absence of context 
information influences object identification in non-autistic adult populations. 
The advantage of these paradigms is that they provide an exact measure of the 
extent to which visual context information facilitates object identification. Thus 
these paradigms would allow the investigation of the extent to which children 
with autism are able to use visual context to improve performance, in this case, 
facilitate object identification. 
Research investigating the influence of visual contextual information on 
perception started with a pioneering study devised by Palmer in 1975 to 
investigate the effect of visual context on object identification. The method used 
by Palmer was originally inspired by studies of language processing showing 
that words are easier to identify when presented after appropriate contexts and 
more difficult when presented after inappropriate contexts (Tulving & Gold, 
1963). Palmer argued that visual perception processes would be similar to 
language processing and thus predicted that object identification would be 
facilitated by appropriate contextual scenes and hindered by inappropriate 
contextual scenes. 
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In order to test these two hypotheses, Palmer developed a paradigm in 
which visual contexh1al scenes (i.e. the picture of a kitchen) were presented for 2 
sec. These contextual scenes were followed by the brief presentation (20, 40, 60 
or 120 msec.) of an object. The object could be either likely to appear in that 
scene in everyday life (i.e. toaster) or unlikely to appear in that scene (i.e. drum). 
As a control condition Palmer presented the same objects preceded by a neutral 
visual scene, which consisted of a black frame. Thus there were three conditions: 
appropriate, neutral and inappropriate contextual scenes. 
Participants had to both name the objects and fill in a 5-point rating scale 
stating how confident they were in their responses. Results showed that, as 
expected, contextual scenes influenced the accuracy and confidence of object 
identification. Unfortunately, although a main effect of context is reported, 
Palmer did not report the pair-wise comparisons to confirm specifically the 
hypotheses that appropriate contextual scenes facilitate identification and 
inappropriate scenes hinder identification of objects. 
This pioneering research was followed by a series of studies trying to 
determine which specific mechanisms facilitate the influence of contextual 
scenes in object identification. These studies have confirmed Palmer's prediction 
that appropriate contextual scenes facilitate object identification (Biederman, 
Mezzanote & Rabinowitz, 1982; Boyce & Pollatsek, 1992; Hollingworth & 
Henderson). In a comprehensive literature review, Henderson and Hollingworth 
(1999) conclude that 'there is sufficient converging evidence to support the 
general conclusion that consistent scene context facilitates the identification of 
objects'. The evidence that inappropriate visual contextual information also 
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interferes with object identification is less clear. In contrast to the evidence for 
verbal contextual information, empirical evidence for the presence of 
interference effects in visual context tasks has been contradictory. Although 
most of the studies find a trend suggesting a negative effect of inappropriate 
scenes on object identification, this trend fails to yield significance in most cases 
(e.g., Boyce, Pollatsek & Rayner, 1989). Most importantly, neither of the current 
theories accounting for the influence of context in object identification would 
predict the presence of interference effects in object identification tasks. These 
theories assume that the presentation of contextual scenes activates objects 
related to the scene (Biederman, 1981; Friedman, 1979). These theories however 
do not propose that the presentation of contextual scenes inhibits the activation 
of objects unrelated to that contextual scene. 
Although Palmer's paradigm offered a technique to test children's use of 
visual contextual information, it was not the only paradigm that was potentially 
suitable. One of the most common paradigms used to examine context influence 
in object identification is the object detection paradigm (Biederman et al, 1982). 
In this paradigm a word (i.e., 'mixer' or 'chicken') is presented prior to a 
contextual scene which contains the target object (i.e., a mixer in inappropriate 
trials or chicken in appropriate trials). It has been repeatedly found that 
participants are faster at detecting the target objects when they are presented in 
appropriate than in inappropriate contextual scenes. The adequacy of this 
paradigm to evaluate contextual influence has been recently challenged 
(Hollingworth & Henderson, 1998). One of the major concerns is that in this 
paradigm the word labelling the object may automatically generate expectancies 
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of the kind of contextual scene (i.e., for the mixer, a kitchen). Slow reaction 
times in inappropriate trials therefore might be the result of the expectancy 
drawn from the word and not from the expectancies drawn from a visual context. 
Thus, Hollingworth and Henderson ( 1998) argue that this paradigm is not testing 
how visual contextual scenes might affect object but the effects of verbal primes 
on object identification. 
Another common research method is the recording of eye movements. In 
this type of paradigm participants are instructed to memorise visual scenes. It is 
assumed that the amount of time the participant focuses on each object when 
memorising a visual scene reflects the amount of time necessary to identify the 
objects. It has been found that participants focus less time on appropriate than 
inappropriate objects. Thus it has been argued that appropriate contextual scenes 
facilitate object identification. Hollingworth and Henderson (1998) have argued 
however that the amount of time the participant focuses on the object might 
reflect the time taken for the participant to memorise an object and not the time 
taken to identify the object. In addition, the recording of eye movements in 
children, especially children with autism may be problematic. Due to the 
methodological problems of the paradigms mentioned above, in this study 
Palmer's (1975) original paradigm was used to assess children's sensitivity to 
visual context information. 
Palmer's paradigm had not previously been used with children. In order 
to adapt the task for the use of children, and in particular children with autism, 
three major changes were needed. First, participants in Palmer's study had to 
name the object and also rate how confident they were of their response in a 
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five-point rating scale. It was felt that children with autism could have difficulty 
understanding how to fill in a confidence rating scale. To obtain a more 
objective dependent measure, it was decided to rely instead on reaction time 
measures. Many other studies using other types of paradigms have used this 
measure successfully (e.g., Biederrnan, 1972; Boyce, Pollatsek & Rayner, 1989; 
Boyce & Pollatsek, 1992) but this response measure has not previously been 
applied to the Palmer procedure. In addition to the recording of accuracy 
measures therefore, a voicekey attached to the computer was employed to 
measure the time from the onset of the object to the participant's response. 
Palmer presented the target objects for very short times of either 20, 40, 
60 or 120 msec. A study by Teunisse (1996) revealed that children with autism 
have difficulty recognising visual stimuli presented for less than 1000 m sec. As 
reaction times were to be recorded, the objects were presented instead for a 
maximum of 3000 msec., or until participants responded. 
Finally, Palmer used a between-participants design. Due to restrictions in 
the access to participants with autism it was necessary to use a repeated-
measures design. The main advantage of using a between-participants design is 
that the same object can be paired with different contextual scene and thus it is 
possible to test the differential effects of each type of contextual scenes in the 
same object. Using a within-participants design on the other hand, may be 
problematic as the repeated presentation of the same object, each time paired 
with a different contextual scene, may influence participants' responses. To 
avoid the effects of repeated presentation of the same objects, a new complete 
set of stimuli was therefore created by selecting sets of triplets of objects 
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matched in terms of complexity and familiarity. Once these triplets were created, 
each object of the triplet was randomly assigned to a condition to ensure that any 
difference between contextual conditions might not be explained by differences 
in the complexity or familiarity of the different objects. Given the changes in 
procedure, it was necessary to first test the new task with a group of non autistic 
adults. 
3.3 Testing the modified visual context task with non-autistic adults 
EXPERIMENT 1 
In order to test if the adaptation of Palmer's procedure in response 
measure, design and stimulus presentation were successful, the new procedure 
was first tested with a group of typical adults before giving the task to children 
with autism. It was predicted that, as found by Palmer using accuracy measures, 
appropriate visual contextual scenes would facilitate object identification. 
Specifically it was predicted that adults would identify faster and more 
accurately objects that were preceded by appropriate contextual scenes. On the 
basis of previous research, no interference effects of inappropriate contextual 
scenes were predicted. 
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Participants 
The participants were seventeen undergraduate students of the University 
of Kent. 
Design 
The experiment had a repeated measures design. The within-subject 
factor was the type of context that preceded each object: Appropriate context 
(A), Neutral (N), and Inappropriate context (I). The dependent variable was the 
time taken to name the objects and the accuracy of the responses. 
Materials and apparatus 
Eight triplets of objects were selected from the standardised set of 
pictures created by Snodgrass and V anderwart ( 1980). Within each triplet, the 
objects were matched on familiarity, complexity and image agreement to ensure 
that any differences in reaction times between conditions were due to the effects 
of the contextual scenes and not to differences in the characteristics of the 
objects. Once the triplets were constructed, the objects were assigned randomly 
to one of the three conditions so that each of the objects in one condition had a 
match in the other two conditions. 
Each object was then paired to a contextual scene. For the appropriate 
context condition, 8 objects were paired with visual scenes in which the object 
would be very likely to appear in everyday life (i.e. Kitchen-Jug). For the 
inappropriate condition, eight objects were paired with visual scenes in which 
the object would not be likely to appear in everyday life (i.e. Office-Lemon). 
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The remaining eight objects were paired to the same neutral scene, neutral 
condition. Thus in total the experiment consisted of 24 trials. Neutral contextual 
scenes as in Palmer's original design consisted of a black rectangular frame only 
(14 x 10 cm.). The contextual scenes were selected from children's books or 
drawn by the experimenter (see Figure 3.1 for examples of contextual scenes and 
objects). 








The objects and contextual scenes were black drawings over a white 
background. All the scenes were drawn within a black rectangular frame of 
14cm x 1 Ocm. Contextual visual scenes did not contain the target object. 
Reaction times were measured from the presentation of each object to the 
acoustic onset of the participant's verbal response by means of a voicekey 
attached to the computer. All stimuli were presented in a Macintosh Computer 
and the experiment was run using Superlab software. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room at the University. 
Each participant was given 24 trials composed of the same sequence as in 
Palmer's original study except for the change in the time exposure of the target 
object that was 3000 msec. instead of20, 40, 60 or 120 msec. The sequence thus 
was as follows: a) presentation ofthe contextual scene for 2000 msec.; b) a delay 
of 1300 msec. and c) the presentation of the target object for a maximum of3000 
msec., or until the student responded. Unlike Palmer's procedure, participants 
were not informed of the existence of the three different conditions or the nature 
of the experiment. The trials were presented in a random order. Participants were 
instructed to name only the objects and not the contextual scenes. 
Results 
Scoring criteria 
Responses were scored as correct if the most common name for the 
object or a synonym was given. Those responses that were not correct (i.e. 
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'apple' for 'strawberry') or referred to a higher semantic category (i.e. 'fruit' for 
'strawberry') were scored as incorrect, and therefore excluded from the data. 
Accuracy Data 
It was not possible to analyse error data as overall performance was at 
ceiling. Ten participants made no errors, three participants made one, two 
participants made two and another two made three errors. Of these, three were of 
objects in the appropriate condition, three in the neutral condition and seven in 
the inappropriate condition. 
Analysis of R T Data 
All correct trials were included in the analysis. The mean reaction times 
for each condition are summarised in Table 3.1. 













A one-way ANOVA on the mean RT scores revealed a significant main 
effect of context (F(2,32)= 14.477, p=.001), indicating that participants were 
faster at identifying objects when these were presented after an appropriate 
context than when presented after an inappropriate context (t(16)= -5.76, 
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p=.OOI) or a neutral context (t(16)= -4.70, p=.OOI). The difference between 
inappropriate and neutral context was not significant (t(16)= -1.353, p=.195). 
Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to ensure that the adapted visual context 
task based on Palmer's original paradigm was suitable to test contextual 
influence in object identification. If this task was suitable for the assessment of 
contextual influence, it would be predicted that appropriate contextual scenes 
would facilitate object identification. 
The results of the present study confirmed that appropriate contextual 
scenes facilitate object identification, and it can thus be assumed that the 
adaptation of the task was successful. As predicted, participants were faster at 
identifying objects after the presentation of appropriate contextual scenes than 
after inappropriate or neutral contextual scenes. 
An additional aim of the study was to investigate the sensitivity of the 
new measure of reaction time. This was necessary since this measure has not 
been used previously with Palmer's paradigm. The analysis of the reaction time 
data showed a significant main effect of context and significant facilitation 
effects of context thus confirming that the effects of contextual scenes on object 
identification can be measured with reaction times using this paradigm. In fact, 
this was the only measure that could be used in the statistical analysis due to 
ceiling effects in terms of accuracy. The ceiling effects in this study are likely to 
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be explained by the extended exposure times. Whilst Palmer presented the 
objects for either 20, 40, 60 or 120 msec., in this study objects were presented 
for a maximum of 3000 msec. so participants had more time to identify the 
objects. 
In relation to Palmer's prediction that inappropriate visual contextual 
scenes may hinder recognition, neither this study nor previous research have 
found evidence to support the claim (Boyce et al, 1982). Existing theories such 
as the perceptual schema model (Biedem1an, 1981 ), or the priming model 
(Friedman, 1979) explaining the influence of context on object identification, 
suggest that the presentation of contextual scenes primes the stored 
representations of schema-consistent object types, thus facilitating the 
identification of objects. This activation however does not interfere, at least to 
the same extent, with the identification of inconsistent objects, and thus 
inappropriate contextual scenes do not produce interference effects. A closer 
look at the mean reaction times suggests that inappropriate contextual scenes 
interfere to some extent with object identification as the mean reaction times for 
the inappropriate condition were higher than for the neutral/control condition. 
This study employed a quite small sample (n=17) and thus it is possible that with 
a larger sample this difference would become significant. Regardless of this 
possibility, the results showed that facilitation effects are larger than interference 
effects, thus providing further evidence for these two theories of object 
identification. 
The purpose of this study was to confirm that the adaptation of Palmer's 
task could be used to measure the influence of context on object identification. 
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The results confirmed that the new method was successful as appropriate 
contextual scenes facilitated object identification. This task was therefore 
regarded as suitable for the evaluation of children's sensitivity to contextual 
visual information. 
3.4 Arre typically developing children and children with autism 
sensitive to vosua~ context? 
EXPERJMENT 2 
In the present experiment a sample of children with autism and a 
comparison sample of typically developing children were tested using the 
revised context task methodology to investigate the extent to which children with 
autism make use of contextual visual information. Although Palmer's paradigm 
has not previously been used with children, there is evidence that prior 
presentation of pictures of related objects facilitate object identification in 
children as young as six years of age (McCauley, Weil & Sperber, 1976). 
McCauley et al. presented a picture naming task to six and eight year olds in 
which objects to be named were preceded by either related or unrelated objects. 
For instance, the picture of a hat was preceded by either a coat (related) or a 
butterfly (unrelated). They found that both groups of children were faster naming 
the objects that were preceded by related objects than those preceded by 
unrelated objects. 
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It was therefore predicted that the typically developing children would be 
sensitive to contextual visual information. That is, they would be faster and more 
accurate identifying objects after appropriate contextual scenes than after neutral 
or inappropriate contextual scenes. 
In relation to autism, it was predicted that, if children with autism have 
weak central coherence, they would fail to use visual contextual information to 
facilitate object identification. An interaction between group and context was 
therefore expected, with typically developing children showing greater accuracy 
and speed in naming objects than children with autism after appropriate 
contextual scenes were presented. 
Method 
Participants 
Fifteen high functioning adolescents with autism (AD: 1 girl, 14 boys) 
took part in the study. Thirteen children were recruited from a range of special 
schools in Kent, England. The remaining two children had taken part in a 
previous project, thus their parents were contacted directly. All had received a 
diagnosis of autism by experienced clinicians using the guidelines of standard 
criteria as DSM-III, DSM III-R (APA, 1987), or ICD-10. The children were 
matched to a sample of sixteen typically developing children (TD: 5 girls and 11 
boys) on the basis of chronological age (CA). Participants' IQs were measured 
using four subtests of the Weschler Intelligence Scale for Children - Revised 
(WISC-R; Weschler, 1974; Information, Vocabulary, Block Design and Object 
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Assembly). Following Ozonoff et al (1994), these four subtests were chosen 
because they load most highly on the verbal comprehension and perceptual 
organisation factors of the WISC-III-R (Weschler, 1974). Participants' 
characteristics are summarised in Table 3.2 below. 
Table 3.2. Mean chronological age (CA), verbal IQ (VIQ), performance IQ 
(PIQ) and full score IQ (FIQ) of participants across groups. 
N Group CA VIQ PIQ FIQ 
16 TD Mean 14:4 94.12 102.87 98.75 
SD 0:10 19.31 18.25 16.20 
15 AD Mean 13:10 83.53 93.80 87.13 
SD 2:4 28.11 20.64 24.93 
Neither CA, FIQ, VIQ nor PIQ were significantly different in the two 
groups (t(29)= .859, p=.397; t(29)= 1.548, p=.132; t(29)= 1.230, p=.229; t(29)= 
1.299, p=.204, respectively). 
Design 
A mixed design was employed. The within-participants factor was 
context with three levels: Appropriate (A) vs. Neutral (N) vs. Inappropriate (I) 
and the between-participants factor was group with two levels: Children with 
autistic disorder (AD) vs. typically developing children (TD). The dependent 
measures were reaction time and accuracy. 
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Materials and apparatus 
The same materials as in Experiment 1 with adults were used in this 
experiment. All stimuli were presented in a Macintosh laptop computer and the 
experiment was run using Superlab software. 
Procedure 
The same procedure as in Experiment 1 was employed. Participants were 
tested individually in a quiet room either at their school or home. The children 
were told that they would see a series of pictures on the computer screen, some 
depicting visual scenes and some single objects. Their task was to name the 
objects and not the scenes. Before the proper experiment began participants were 
given three training trials to ensure they understood the procedure. The 
contextual scenes for these trials were a 'Garden', a 'Post Office' and a 'Room'. 
The objects chosen were 'Cap', 'Bottle' and 'Button'. During these trials the 
experimenter pointed to the objects that the child had to name. Only if the child 
understood the procedure, was the proper experiment started. All children 
understood the procedure by the end of the training session. 
Results 
Scoring criteria 
The same scoring criteria as in Experiment 1 was employed. One trial in 
the appropriate condition of the visual task had to be excluded from the analysis 
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as none of the children in either group named it correctly. All children mistook a 
'nail file' for either a 'knife' or a 'pen'. As none of these objects appear usually 
in a 'bathroom' the trial was deleted from all analyses. 
Analysis of Accuracy data 
Five trials had to be excluded from the analysis due to equipment 
malfunction (less than 1% of the total number of trials). Of these, four trials were 
of AD children and one of the TD group. Due to the missing trials, raw data 
were converted into proportion scores for the purpose of analysis. Table 3.3 
below summarises the proportion of accuracy responses for both groups across 
conditions. As can be seen, there seems to be a ceiling effect as both groups had 
high rates of accuracy in identifying the objects. This ceiling effect may have 
influenced the results of the analysis; the data however were not significantly 
skewed which provides some guarantee for the results of the analysis. 
Table 3.3. Proportion of accurate responses and standard deviations across 
contextual conditions in Experiment 2. 
N Group Appropriate Neutral Inappropriate 
16 TD Mean .944 .885 .871 
SD .075 .096 .107 
15 AD Mean .911 .836 .757 
SD .107 .121 .158 
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Although the two groups of children did not differ significantly in terms 
of IQ levels and chronological age (CA), the children had not been individually 
matched. Full IQ scores (FIQ) and CA were therefore introduced in the analysis 
as covariates to test the extent to which these variables were related to the group 
differences for the dependent variable. Neither of the two measures covaried 
significantly with either overall performance (CA: F(l,27)= .001, p=.973; FIQ 
(1,27)= 2.323, p=.163) or the context factor (CA: F(2,54)= 1.408; p=.259; FIQ: 
(2,54)=1.192, p=.312), thus they were removed from the analysis. 
The data were therefore analysed by means of a mixed ANOV A with 
group as the between participants factor (TD vs. AD) and context as the within-
participants factor (appropriate vs. neutral vs. inappropriate). The analysis of the 
accuracy data revealed that there was a significant main effect of context 
(F(2,58) = 9.632 p=.001). Pair-wise comparisons using Bonferroni adjustment 
for family-wise errors indicated that the provision of an appropriate context 
facilitated accuracy in the identification of objects as compared to providing a 
neutral (p=.OlO) or an inappropriate context (p=.001). The comparison between 
providing a neutral context and providing an inappropriate context was not 
significant (p=.340). 
The interaction between group and context was not significant 
(F(2,58)=1.464, p=.240) indicating that, in terms of accuracy, both groups of 
children were affected by the context to the same extent. Further analysis 
revealed that both samples had significant context effects independently (AD: 
F(2,13)= 6.472, p=.005; TD: F (2,14) =4.845, p=.025). The main effect of group 
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was significant (F (1,29)= 5.459, p=.027), indicating that typically developing 
children were more accurate than children with autism at identifying objects. 
Analysis of R T Data 
One of the disadvantages of using a voicekey is that it records any first 
sound after the stimuli onset. Although every attempt was made to avoid the 
recording of sounds different from the child's response, in some cases this was 
not possible. The experimenter was behind the child at all times to ensure that 
the response recorded was the child's verbal response and not any other sound. 
In those cases where a sound different from the child's was recorded, the trial 
was removed from the analysis ofRT data. 
Twenty-three trials in total were deleted for the above mentioned reasons 
(3% of the total number of trials). Of these, 13 trials were of children with 
autism, the remainder from the TD children. Table 3.4 shows mean RT on 
correct trials to appropriate, neutral and inappropriate trials for each group. 
Table 3.4. Mean reaction times and standard deviations for accurate responses 
across conditions in Experiment 2. 
N Group Appropriate Neutral Inappropriate 
16 TD Mean 937.04 1056.93 1087.63 
SD 178.51 185.67 164.64 
15 AD Mean 987.3 1024.26 1060.60 
SD 245.63 229.5 259.86 
74 
As in the analysis of the accuracy data, Full IQ scores (FIQ) and CA 
were introduced in the analysis as covariates to correct for differences between 
the groups on these measures. Neither of the two measures however covaried 
significantly with either overall performance (CA: F(l ,27)=3.002, p=.095; 
FIQ(1,27)=2.154, p=.154) or the context factor (F(2,54)=2.062, p=.137; 
FIQ(2,54)=1.169, p=.318), thus they were removed from the analysis. 
A mixed ANOV A was conducted on these data, with context 
(appropriate vs. neutral vs. inappropriate) as a within-subjects factors and group 
(AD vs. TD children) as a between-subject factor. The analysis revealed a 
significant main effect of context (F (2,58) = 6.267, p=.003). To further 
investigate the context effect, pair-wise comparisons using Bonferroni 
adjustment to correct for family-wise errors were carried out. These comparisons 
showed that children were faster at identifying objects when these were preceded 
by an appropriate context than when preceded by a neutral (p=.029) or an 
inappropriate context (p=.003). The comparison between the neutral and 
inappropriate contexts, as in the study with adults, did not yield significance 
(p=.999). The interaction between context and group did not yield significance 
(F(2,58)=1.019, p=.367; respectively). Further analysis however revealed that 
only TD children showed context effects (F (2,14)= 12.062, p=001); AD 
children in contrast did not show evidence of context effects in terms of RT (F 
(2,13)= .794, p=.473). Unlike in the analysis of accuracy date the group main 
effect did not yield significance (F(1 ,36)=.002, p=.963 ). AD children were as 
fast as TD children in identifying objects. 
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Discussion 
It was predicted, according to weak central coherence theory, that 
children with autism would fail to use visual contextual information to facilitate 
object identification. Specifically, a significant interaction between context and 
group was predicted as a result of greater context effects in typically developing 
children than in children with autism. 
The results of this study failed to support this prediction. Instead, the 
results showed that children with autism were faster and more accurate at 
identifying objects after an appropriate contextual scene than after either neutral 
or inappropriate contextual scenes. Moreover, children with autism used visual 
contextual information to aid object identification to the same extent as typically 
developing children as revealed by the non significant interaction between group 
and context. It could be argued that there is some indication that children with 
autism are less able in using contextual information as separate analysis for each 
group revealed that AD children only showed context effects for accuracy data 
and not for R T data. There are two reasons however to question this possibility. 
First, the overall interaction did not yield significance and therefore there is no 
statistical evidence that the context effect sizes are different for each group. 
Second and most important, the power of the statistical analysis was over 85% 
which suggests that the absence of an interaction effect is not due to a statistical 
flaw ofthe analysis. 
Although the expected interaction between group and context was not 
found, the analysis of a main effect of group was found for accuracy of 
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responding. Children with autism made more errors overall in naming objects 
than TD children. The higher frequency of errors cannot be explained by 
differences in either IQ or chronological age as neither of these measures 
covaried significantly with overall performance. The group difference cannot be 
explained by semantic difficulties in the autism group either. The analysis of the 
type of errors children made revealed that errors could be grouped in two main 
categories. Visual errors, where children failed to identify the object (i.e. they 
said 'spade' instead of 'broom') and semantic errors, where children produced a 
word semantically related to the target object (i.e. 'bikini' for 'vest') or a word 
that referred to the higher-level category (i.e. 'insect' for 'fly'). The majority of 
errors in both groups were visual errors (TD: 68.08%; AD: 68.11 %), followed 
by semantic errors (TD: 31.92 %; AD: 31.89%). This analysis suggests that the 
difficulty AD children exhibit in this task is not due to a semantically related 
impairment. 
It is difficult to explain why children with autism made more errors, 
especially when considering that IQ scores, did not influence accuracy of 
responses as shown by the ANCOV A. It might still be possible that the higher 
rate of errors is due to lower IQ scores in the AD group. Even though the IQ 
scores were not significantly different in the two samples, the verbal subscales 
used to measure IQ did not include a vocabulary test as only two of the five 
verbal subtests of the WISC were presented to the children. Hence, the higher 
rate of errors might be due to limited vocabulary in the autistic sample. 
Regardless of this possibility, the analysis of errors demonstrates that the naming 
difficulty experienced by children with autism is not related to a semantic 
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impairment as shown by the similar pattern of types of error in the two samples. 
An alternative explanation for the group difference might relate to the fact that 
there was a ceiling effect in terms of accuracy which would have inflated or 
distorted the difference between the two samples. 
The results of this study indicate that, over and above the nammg 
difficulties, children with autism are able to use visual contextual information to 
aid object identification. This finding fails to support weak central coherence 
theory, which proposes that the impairment to use contextual information is 
present in both the visual and verbal domain. 
These results appear to refute the unpublished finding by Jolliffe (1997) 
showing a difficulty judging whether an object is incongruous in a visual scene 
(i.e., squirrel in a picture of a beach) or which is the odd object in a set of 
pictures (i.e., a bucket, a man, a window, a ladder and suitcase). However, 
Jolliffe's task required individuals to make an evaluation of appropriateness that 
might be much more difficult than the current task. Also the current task 
depended on facilitation of appropriate context rather than interference by 
inappropriate contexts. 
The results are more difficult to reconcile with other previous evidence 
showing that children with autism have difficulty connecting words on the basis 
of meaning in a verbal task. A study that is particularly relevant to the discussion 
ofthese results is that ofTager-Flusberg (1991). She read two lists ofwords to 
young children with autism and two comparison groups. One contained 
semantically related words (i.e., a list of animals) and the other contained 
unrelated words (i.e. a list of words pertaining to different semantic categories). 
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The two comparison samples recalled more items from the semantically related 
list than the unrelated list. Children with autism however, had similar recall rates 
for both types of lists indicating a failure to use semantic information to aid 
recall. One would therefore expect that individuals with autism would also fail to 
use visual contextual information to aid object identification in a task involving 
cmmecting pictures on the basis of meaning. 
A possible explanation is that children with autism might not be able to 
use context information when verbal stimuli alone are presented. Although it has 
been assumed that there is a general difficulty in autism, the contextual difficulty 
might be restricted to the verbal domain and not apply when visual information 
is presented. It is important for the definition of wee to establish that context 
difficulties in autism are not language specific as it is proposed that central 
coherence is a central component of the cognitive system that applies to both the 
visual and verbal domain. To investigate potential differences in performance in 
the visual and verbal domains, an adaptation of the visual context task was made 
so that the stimuli were presented in a verbal format without pictorial 
information being available. This study is presented in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 Can children with autism use verbal context to identify and 
recall words? 
The findings reported in the previous chapter contradict the weak central 
coherence theory prediction that individuals with autism fail to process information 
in its context. This claim has been supported by studies using verbal tasks (e.g. 
Hermelin & O'Connor, 1967; Frith & Snowling, 1983) and visual tasks (Jollife, 
1997). The results of Experiment 2 and a study by Pring & Hermelin (1993) 
however, show competence in autism in the use of visual information to aid recall 
and object identification. 
In the present chapter an adaptation of the visual context task used in 
Experiment 2 was developed to investigate the ability of children with autism to use 
verbal contextual information to aid word identification. To adapt the visual context 
task for this purpose, each contextual scene was substituted for the word that best 
described that scene (i.e. the school scene was substituted by the word 'school'). 
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The pictures of the objects were substituted by the most common word used to refer 
to each of the objects (i.e. the picture of a 'jug' was substituted by the word 'jug'). 
The resulting verbal context task highly resembled single-word semantic priming 
tasks which have been used to test context effects in word identification. This 
literature is reviewed in the section below. 
4.1 Use of verbal context in single word semantic priming tasks 
There is large body of evidence from adult and developmental studies 
showing that presentation of prime words facilitate word identification (e.g., Meyer 
& Schvaneveldt, 1971; Becker, 1980). Furthermore, unlike in visual context tasks, 
there is sound evidence indicating that the presentation of unrelated or inappropriate 
word primes hinders word identification (Fischler & Bloom, 1979; Neely, 1976). 
Simpson (1984) has however suggested that there is a trend across studies for the 
size of the facilitation effect to be larger than the interference effect, although this 
difference invariably fails to reach significance in any individual study. 
Priming effects appear early in development. One study has reported 
priming effects in children as young as 6 years of age (Radeau, 1983). Moreover, it 
appears that priming effect sizes are larger in younger children than in adults. 
Initially, it was thought that a larger priming effect in younger children was the 
result of children being more sensitive to context effects than adults. This illusory 
effect however has been suggested to be due to larger overall reaction times 
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(Chapman, Chapman, Curran & Miller, 1994). That is, the larger overall reaction 
times in children artificially inflate the difference between conditions. 
Although there are no studies to date investigating verbal priming effects in 
children with autism, Tager-Flusberg (1991) has provided evidence of a difficulty 
using verbal contextual information to aid recall in autism in a single word semantic 
memory task. On the other hand Experiment 2 and the study by Pring and Hermelin 
(1993) provide evidence of competence in the use of context information in the 
visual domain. It was thus predicted that if the difficulty in autism was restricted to 
verbal material only, children with autism would fail to use verbal context 
information to aid word identification. In contrast, if children with autism are 
competent in the use of context regardless of whether stimuli are presented verbally 
or visually, they would be able to use verbal information to aid word identification. 
4.2 Are children with autism sensitive to verbal context in a semantic 
priming task? 
EXPERIMENT 3 
In this study the same two samples of children from Experiment 2 were 
tested using the adapted verbal context task. If the difficulty with context is 
restricted to the verbal domain, an interaction between group and context would be 
expected with only typically developing children showing facilitation and 
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interference effects. Alternatively, if children with autism are competent in the use 
of verbal context, both groups of children would show large interference and 
facilitation effects, although the facilitation effect would be larger than the 
interference effect (Simpson, 1984). 
Method 
Participants 
The same participants as in Experiment 2 took part in this experiment. To 
avoid practice effects from Experiment 2, the study was carried out 4-7 months after 
the earlier experiment. 
Design 
The same mixed design was used. The within-participants factor was 
context: Appropriate (A) vs. Neutral (N) vs. Inappropriate (I). The between-
participants factor was group: Children with autistic disorder (AD) vs. typically 
developing children (TD). 
Materials 
In order to keep the materials as close as possible to the visual context task, 
the words chosen for this experiment were those that best described the pictures 
used in the visual context task. For instance, the picture of a kitchen was substituted 
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by the word 'Kitchen'. The 'Nail file' object could not be described in a single 
word, thus this object was substituted in the verbal task by the word 'Brush'. For the 
neutral condition trials, before presenting the target word a series of five X's were 
presented. All stimuli were presented in capital letters. 
Procedure 
Children were tested in a quiet room at either their school or home. The 
same procedure as in the visual task was followed. Three training trials were used to 
ensure that children understood the task before the commencement of the 
experiment. These training trials were the same as the ones used in the visual task 
but presenting words instead of pictures. Thus the priming stimuli used for the 
training trials were the words 'Garden', 'Post Office' and 'Stairs' and the targets 
were "Bottle', 'Cap' and 'Button'. All children understood the task by the end of the 




An exploration of the accuracy data revealed that the data were significantly 
skewed in all conditions due to ceiling effects in both groups (see Table 4.1 below 
for summary of results). None of the attempted transformations (e.g., logarithmic, 
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square root, and inverted transformations) could correct the distribution of the data, 
thus no further analysis was carried out on the accuracy data. 
Table 4.1. Proportion of accurate responses and standard deviations across 
conditions and groups. 
N Group Appropriate Neutral Inappropriate 
16 TD Mean .992 .992 .925 
SD .032 .032 .199 
15 AD Mean .992 1.00 .925 
SD .030 .00 .113 
Reaction time data 
Due to the problems with the use of a voicekey, twenty-one trials needed to 
be removed from the analysis (2.84% of the total number of trials). Seven were of 
children with autism and 14 of typically developing children. The reaction time data 
from one TD child was not collected due to equipment malfunction and therefore 
only the data from fifteen TD children were included in the analysis. A summary of 
the results is shown in Table 4.2. 
As in previous analysis, Full IQ scores (FIQ) and CA were introduced in the 
analysis as covariates to correct for differences between the groups on these 
measures. CA did not covary significantly with either overall performance 
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(F(1,26)=.439, p=.513) or context (F(2,52)=.432, p=.651). FIQ however covaried 
significantly with both overall performance and context and was thus kept in the 
analysis (F(1,26)= 5.810, p=.023; F(2,52)= 14.075, p=.OOO, respectively). 
Table 4.2. Mean reaction times and standard deviations across conditions and group 
in Experiment 3. 
N Group Appropriate Neutral Inappropriate 
15 TD Mean 624.76 676.00 713.62 
SD 107.18 152.86 179.72 
15 AD Mean 617.60 715.27 744.40 
SD 108.52 138.66 171.18 
The data were analysed by means of a mixed ANCOV A with context 
(appropriate vs. inappropriate vs. no context) as a within-subjects factors and group 
(AD children vs. TD children) as a between-subject factor and FIQ as a covariate. 
The statistical analysis revealed a significant main effect of context 
(F(2,54)=19.908, p=.001). Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni adjustment to 
correct for family-wise errors revealed that children were faster at recognising 
words when preceded by an appropriate context than when preceded by a neutral 
(p=.002) or an inappropriate context (p=.001). The comparison between the neutral 
and inappropriate context also yielded significance (p=.002). 
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Neither the interaction between context and group nor the main effect of 
group were significant (F(2,54)=1.292, p=.283; F(1,27)=.029, p=.867 respectively). 
Children with autism were as fast as typically developing children at identifying 
words and they were affected by contextual infmmation to the same extent. Also, 
and most importantly both groups showed evidence of a contextual effect when data 
were analysed separately for each group (AD: F (2,13)=6.514, p=.Oll; TD: 
F(2,13)=8.413, p=OOS). 
Discussion 
This study tested whether a context deficit would be found for individuals 
with autism when information was presented in the verbal domain only. Results 
showed that children with autism were as sensitive to verbal contextual information 
as typically developing children. Both groups had similar facilitation effects in that 
words preceded by a related prime were identified faster than words preceded by a 
neutral prime. Also both groups had similar interference effects in that words 
preceded by inappropriate primes were identified less rapidly than words preceded 
by neutral primes. The results of Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 therefore provide 
evidence that children with autism take account of context whether or not pictorial 
information is provided. It is possible that the presence of a ceiling effect in 
Experiment 2 as well as Experiment 3 might have influenced the results. However, 
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priming studies using similar methodology to the one used in these studies also 
report ceiling effects as accuracy in these studies is also very high. Moreover these 
studies usually rely primarily on reaction times rather than in accuracy data (e.g. 
Boyce & Pollatsek, 1992; Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971 ). Therefore there is no 
reason to believe that context effects in Experiment 2 and 3 or the lack of difference 
between the two groups in terms of the size of the effect are a result of flawed data. 
Thus it can be concluded that the results fail to provide evidence to support Happe's 
(2000) suggestion that in autism 'single word/object meaning is intact while 
connections between items are weakened'. 
Unlike Experiment 2, children with autism were as accurate as TD children 
at correctly identifying words. This result could have been due to the practice effects 
from presentation of the same words that they named earlier from pictures. The time 
delay between testing sessions however makes this unlikely. More likely is that the 
task in this experiment did not involve searching for a word but simply reading it, 
and therefore this task was less demanding. Despite an overall improvement in both 
accuracy and speed for both groups between the two experiments, the context 
effects remained. 
Given the results for this study, the question to be addressed is why children 
with autism are able to use verbal contextual information in this task when there is 
evidence supporting a deficit in the use of verbal contextual information from a 
single word semantic memory task (Tager-Flusberg, 1991). One possibility is that 
children with autism do have difficulty connecting single words on the basis of 
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meaning, but only in tasks that involve making connections between subordinate 
and superordinate category information. This could be due to an alternative 
explanation such as failure to organise information hierarchically. 
An examination of the evidence for impairment to use semantic category 
information in semantic memory tasks has however revealed mixed findings. Only 
two studies have found evidence for a difficulty in integrating words on the basis of 
semantic category information in single word tasks (Tager-Flusberg, 1991; 
Hermelin & O'Connor, 1967). In contrast two other studies have failed to find a 
deficit in use of semantic category information (Ramondo & Milech, 1984; Pring & 
Hermelin, 1993). This evidence will be reviewed in the next section. 
4.3 Use of verbal context in memory tasks in autism. 
Research into the ability of children with autism to integrate verbal 
information to aid recall started in the late 1960s. The purpose of tllis research was 
to evaluate general language abilities rather than the ability to integrate information. 
It was not until 1989 that Frith integrated the evidence from these studies to 
formulate weak central coherence theory. In a seminal study Hermelin and 
O'Connor (1967) showed that whilst children with learning disabilities had better 
recall rates for sentences (i.e., 'We went to town') than for random word strings 
(i.e., 'Some that a went'), children with autism had similar recall rates for sentences 
and word strings. 
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In a second experiment Hermelin and O'Connor evaluated the extent to 
which the difficulty children with autism had with the sentence task was due to an 
impairment in semantic processing. They presented word strings instead of 
sentences. The strings could contain unrelated words (i.e., glass, hand, cow, pot, 
cup, meat, spoon, place) or words that belonged to two categories (i.e., colours and 
numbers; blue, three, red, five, six, white, green, eight). The results showed no 
differential performance between autism and non-autism groups for the number of 
items recalled from each list. However, children with learning difficulties, and not 
children with autism, tended to reorganise the material so that related items were 
recalled together. 
The difficulty to use syntactic and semantic information to enhance sentence 
recall has been confirmed in later studies by Frith (1969) and Wolff and Barlow 
(1979). In the latter study, although there was a significant interaction, the children 
with autism showed a significant improvement for sentences if to a lesser extent 
than the control sample. One study however has failed to find differences between 
autistic and control samples. Fyffe and Prior (1978) found that children with autism 
who had high memory spans had similar enhanced recall for sentences than a 
comparison group. In a second experiment, where they presented standard sentences 
and anomalous sentences, it was also found that children with autism perfmmed 
worse when recalling anomalous sentences than correct sentences. It is possible that 
although children with autism have a difficulty processing sentences, this difficulty 
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disappears when memory develops. That is, the ability to integrate words into 
sentences might depend on general memory skills in autism. 
Ramondo and Milech ( 1984) have argued that the difficulty with sentences 
experienced by children with autism is related to a specific difficulty in processing 
syntactic information and not semantic information. In this study Ramondo and 
Milech manipulated the syntactic structure and meaningfulness of word strings. The 
word strings could be meaningful and well structured (i.e., Last week we all went by 
train to see the big farm), meaningless and well structured (i.e., Last six we all went 
by tree to see the big box), meaningful but badly structured (i.e., red, white, blue, 
green, cat, bird, dog, horse, train, car, bus, boat), or meaningless and badly 
structured (i.e., week went see big last the all to train we farm by). The meaningful 
but badly structured strings resembled those used by Hermelin and O'Connor 
(1967) since they included words from colours, animals and vehicles. The results 
showed that when the material was well structured typically developing children 
performed significantly better than children with autism. Children with autism 
however performed as well as children with learning difficulties. Regarding the 
semantic component, all groups of children improved to the same extent when the 
material was semantically related. This latter fmding suggests that children with 
autism are as able as the comparison groups in using semantic information to aid 
recall. 
In summary, most of the studies have found difficulties with sentence 
processing in autism. It is not clear however to what extent the deficit is specific to 
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autism. Ramondo and Milech did not find differences between children with autism 
and children with learning difficulties regarding recall for sentences and the studies 
by Frith (1969) and Wolff and Barrow (1979) failed to include a learning disability 
group as a comparison sample. Hence it is not possible to conclude from these 
studies if the deficit is specific to autism. 
Regarding the semantic component, although Ramondo and Milech (1984) 
suggest that semantic processing is intact in autism, Hermelin and O'Connor (1967; 
Experiment 2) have found evidence for a semantic deficit in autism. In an attempt to 
investigate if there is a deficit in autism related to the encoding of semantic 
information, Tager-Flusberg (1991) designed a semantic memory task in which the 
syntactic component was removed. This task involved the processing of semantic 
relations between single words in order to facilitate recall. She presented two types 
of lists to children with autism, typically developing children and developmentally 
delayed children. One list contained semantically related words (i.e., animals) and 
another list of unrelated words drawn from different semantic categories. She found 
that the two comparison groups recalled more words from the semantically related 
list than from the list that contained unrelated words. Children with autism however 
showed similar recall rates for both types of list. This result has been taken as 
evidence indicating an inability to use semantic information to aid recall (Tager-
Flusberg, 1991; Happe, 2000). 
In the same study, Tager-Flusberg ( 1991; Experiment 2) used a cued recall 
task to investigate the extent to which children with autism could use semantic cues. 
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She provided children with two types of cues, rhythm cues (target: fox; cue: box) or 
semantic cues (target: cherry; cue: fruit). The results showed that children with 
autism were as able as the comparison groups to use semantic cues. This finding 
replicated the results of Boucher and Warrington (1976) who also found that 
children with autism are able to use semantic cues. Tager-Flusberg therefore 
concluded that the difficulty children with autism have with semantic information is 
related to retrieval and not encoding processes. Specifically, she argues, it is not that 
children with autism do not process semantic information but that they fail to use it 
to aid recall. 
The results from Tager-Flusberg (1991) and Hermelin and O'Connor's 
(Experiment 2) studies indicate that there is a deficit in autism related to the ability 
to use semantic information. This evidence together with the evidence showing that 
children with autism have similar recall rates for sentences than random words 
(Hermelin & O'Connor, 1967; Frith, 1969; Wolff & Barlow, 1979) has been taken 
as evidence of an integration deficit in autism (Happe, 2000). 
Tager-Flusberg's results are based on the comparison of only two word lists 
(i.e., a list of animals and a list of unrelated words) containing only twelve words 
each, which is insufficient material on which to base firm conclusions. Hermelin 
and O'Connor's results, on the other hand, provide only indirect evidence of a 
deficit as children with autism had similar recall rates to LD children for both types 
of lists. In contrast, the findings from Experiment 3, the results of Ramondo and 
Milech (1984) and the results of Pring and Hermelin (1993), using a visual task, 
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have also failed to find a deficit in autism related to semantic processing. Thus it 
may be possible that semantic processing is intact in autism and Tager-Flusberg 
results are due to confounding variables. 
To further explore children's with autism ability to use semantic information 
to aid recall, the task originally developed by Tager-Flusberg was administered to 
the same children as in Experiments 2 and 3. To increase the number of stimuli, 
Tager-Flusberg's task was adapted to include an additional set of lists. In addition, 
to investigate potential differences in performance in the visual and verbal domains, 
a new visual condition was devised in which objects were presented instead of 
words. 
4.4 Can children with autism use semantic information to aid recall of 
words and objects? 
EXPERIMENT 4 
The first aim of this study was to confirm the presence of difficulties in 
autism in the use of semantic information to aid recall. An additional aim of the 
study was to investigate if the difficulty in autism in using semantic information to 
aid recall is confined to verbal semantic memory tasks. To achieve this aim an 
adapted version ofTager-Flusberg's task was used which included a visual condition 
as well as the original verbal stimuli used by Tager-Flusberg. If the difficulty 
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children with autism experience with semantic category information is confined to 
the verbal domain, they should show poorer recall of semantically related 
information only in the verbal condition but not in the visual condition. 
Method 
Participants 
The same participants as in Experiment 2 and 3 took part in the experiment. 
This experiment was administered in the same session as Experiment 3. 
Design 
A mixed design was used with two within-participants factors, modality 
(visual vs. verbal) and list (semantically related vs. unrelated) and one between-
participants factor, group (children with autism vs. typically developing children). 
The dependent measure was the number of words recalled correctly from each list. 
Materials 
Half the stimuli were the same as those used by Tager-Flusberg. One list 
contained words drawn from different categories (apple, brown, cabin, drum, farm, 
elephant, lamp, onion, pencil, pot, shirt, thumb). The semantically related list 
contained words from the same semantic category (bear, cow, giraffe, horse, lion, 
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monkey, pig, rabbit, racoon, sheep, turtle). Tager-Flusberg reported that she 
matched the words in these two lists approximately for frequency. 
In order to increase the number of stimuli, another pair of lists was added to 
the procedure. Of these, one list contained words of vehicles (bike, boat, bus, car, 
helicopter, motorbike, plane, roller skate, sledge, train, truck, wagon). The other list 
contained words from different semantic categories (birds, biscuits, booklet, drink, 
gentlemen, hill, seven, sugar, tonic, toothpaste, word, yellow). The words of these 
two lists were individually matched on frequency on the basis of the Celex lexical 
database (Baayen, Piepenbrock & Gulikers, 1995). 
To further explore potential differences in performance between the visual 
and verbal domain in autism, a new visual condition was added to the original 
procedure. Four sets of pictures were used in the visual condition each containing 
twelve pictures of objects. The two semantically related sets were the same lists of 
animals and vehicles used in the verbal condition. The unrelated sets contained 
pictures from different semantic categories (Animal matched list: axe, barrel, harp, 
kite, mushroom, rolling pin, spinning top, suitcase, thimble, trumpet, watering can, 
windmill; Vehicles matched list: brush, coat, flute, fork, racket, scissors, 
screwdriver, tie, toaster, trousers, violin, whistle). The pictures of the unrelated sets 
were matched individually to the semantically related sets of pictures on the basis of 
familiarity and complexity. All the pictures were taken from the standardised set of 
pictures created by Snodgrass & Vanderwart (1980). The pictures were presented 
one at a time in a laptop computer. 
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Procedure 
All children were tested in a quiet room at either their school or home. The 
administration of this task was part of a wider battery of tests investigating other 
aspects of perception. Following Tager-Flusberg's procedure, a practice set of four 
simple words (pin, cat, tea, wall) or four objects (flower, frog, sock, star) was used 
to familiarise the child with the task. Half of the children in each group received the 
verbal condition first and the other half received the visual condition first. 
The session began with the experimenter explaining the task to the child. For 
those children starting with the verbal condition the experimenter told them: "I will 
read a list of words, and when I'm done, you have to repeat the same words, or at 
least as many words you can remember from the list I read. You don't need to repeat 
them in the same order". After these instructions, the experimenter read the words 
of the practice trial in a monotone voice. All children understood the aim of the task 
after this single trial. 
For the visual condition the instructions were the same except that they were 
told they would see a series of pictures on the screen of the laptop and once the 
presentation was over they had to recall as many objects as they could. After the 
instructions the practice trail was conducted. Again, all children understood the task 
after this first practice trial. 
Once the practice trial was completed, the child was presented with one test 
list. The order of the lists was counterbalanced within each modality condition 
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across participants. The items from each list were presented in random order at a 
rate of one word/object every two seconds. The experimenter recorded all the words 
that were correctly or incorrectly recalled by the child. 
Results 
The number of correctly recalled items from the two semantically related 
and the two unrelated lists of each modality condition were added for the purpose of 
analysis. A summary of results broken down by modality and group is shown in 
Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3. Mean number of items recalled from related and unrelated lists in the 
visual and verbal conditions (Maximum= 24). 
Visual Condition Verbal Condition 
N Group Related Unrelated Related Unrelated 
16 TD Mean 14.37 9.62 14.12 9.93 
SD 1.99 1.89 2.06 1.84 
15 AD Mean 11.80 7.67 11.33 8.20 
SD 4.10 2.16 3.52 2.18 
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As can be seen, although AD children had lower recall rates in all 
conditions, both groups of children performed better in the related than unrelated 
conditions for both the visually and verbally presented lists. To test if the difference 
between semantic conditions was statistically significant an AN COV A with 
modality (visual vs. verbal) and list (related vs. unrelated) as within-participants 
factors, group as a between participants factor and FIQ and CA as covariates was 
conducted on the data. Neither FIQ nor CA covaried significantly with either 
context or overall performance thus they were removed from subsequent analysis 
(F(1,27)=1.020, p=.322; F(1,27)=2.538, p=.123 respectively). 
The analysis revealed a significant main effect of list (F(1,29)= 108.39, 
p=.OOl) indicating that children recalled significantly more words from the 
semantically related lists than from the unrelated lists. Unlike Tager-Flusberg's 
study, the interaction between list and group was not significant (F(l ,29) = 1.152, 
p=.292). 
The main effect of modality was not significant (F(1 ,29)= .009, p=.927), nor 
was the interaction between modality and list (F(1,29)= 2.301, p=.998), indicating 
that the provision of related material improves performance on the visual and verbal 
domains. Furthermore, the interaction between modality, list and group was non-
significant (F(1,29)= .159, p=.693), providing further evidence for semantic 
processing in both the verbal and visual domain in autism. 
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Post hoc t- tests carried out separately for each group and condition revealed 
that both groups recalled more words from the semantically related lists than the 
unrelated lists in both modalities (TD: Verbal t(15)= 10.108, p=.001; Visual t(15)= 
7.84, p=.001; AD: Verbal t(14)= 4.68, p=.001; Visual t(l4)= 4.11, p=.001). 
The main effect of group was significant as, overall, typically developing 
children recalled more items than children with autism (F(1,29)= 10.071, p=.004), 
indicating that there is a memory deficit in autism. 
The results of this study are at odds with those found by Tager-Flusberg. To 
directly compare the results from both studies a separate ANOVA was conducted on 
the data from the two original lists only (i.e., animal and matched unrelated list). 
Figure 4.1 shows a comparison between the results of the present study and the 
original study of Tager-Flusberg. As can be seen, the results of the present study 
regarding the original lists show a similar pattern to those in Tager-Flusberg's study, 
except that the children in the present study had overall higher recall rates, as would 
be expected due to the higher chronological age of participants. 
The results of the statistical analysis matched those of Tager-Flusberg. 
Specifically, there was a significant main effect of list (F(1,29)= 52.45, p=.001) and 
a significant interaction between group and list (F(1,29)= 4.858 p=.036), indicating 
that AD children were less sensitive to semantic information than TD children, since 
AD children had similar recall rates for both lists. The main effect of group only 
approached significance (F(1,29)= 3.587, p=.068). 
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Figure 4.1. Comparison between Tager-Flusberg results and the results of this study 
including the original lists of animals and matched list only (Maximum=12). 
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However, if there was a difficulty in the use of semantic relations to aid 
recall this effect would be observed in any type of list. The only comparison that 
showed a significant group by list interaction was the original animal verbal list. In 
neither of the other three comparisons this interaction did yield significance 
(Vehicles verbal list: F(1,29)=.054, p=.818; Vehicles visual list: F(1,29)=1.401, 
p=.246; Animals visual list: F(l ,29)=2.485, p=.126). In sum, the results from this 
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study provide no evidence of an impairment in autism related to the ability to use 
semantic relations. 
Discussion 
The evidence regarding the existence of a semantic memory impairment in 
autism is contradictory. On the one hand, Tager-Flusberg (1991) has found that 
children with autism fail to use semantic information to aid recall. In contrast, two 
other studies using more than one semantic category, have failed to find a group 
difference in the number of items recalled from the semantically related and 
unrelated lists (Ramondo & Milech, 1984; Hermelin & O'Connor, 1967). Also, a 
study by Pring & Hermelin (1993) suggests that any difficulties in Tager-Flusberg's 
task are overcome when visual information is provided. The aim of this study was to 
confirm the presence of a difficulty in using semantic information in memory tasks. 
Secondly, the study aimed to investigate potential differences in autism in the use of 
visual and verbal semantic information. 
The results of this study indicate that, as in Experiment 3, children with 
autism are able to integrate words on the basis of meaning and they do so to the 
same extent as TD children. Both groups of children showed enhanced performance 
for semantically related lists. In relation to modality, children with autism showed 
evidence of connecting semantically related items in both the visual and verbal 
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domain. Thus, Experiments 2, 3 and the present study, all provide evidence that the 
ability to connect items on the basis of meaning is intact in autism in both the visual 
and verbal domains. 
The analysis of the original lists (i.e. animals and matched list) matched 
Tager-Flusberg's results showing a significant interaction between group and 
condition. To explore if the results for the original list were related to the specific 
semantic category used, an ANOVA including semantic category (i.e., animals vs. 
vehicles) was conducted. These analyses showed that neither semantic category nor 
the interactions between semantic category and type of list or group were significant 
(F(1,29)=.072, p=.791; F(1,29)= .627, p=.435; F(1,29)= .722, p=.403, respectively). 
Furthermore, in the visual condition the comparison of the animal list did not yield a 
significant group interaction, as it would be expected if the deficit was related 
specifically to the animal category. The only comparison that showed a significant 
group by list interaction was the original verbal list. None of the other lists (vehicles 
visual and verbal and animals visual) produced significant interactions between 
group and type of list. Thus it can be concluded that the results from this study do 
not support the claim for impairment in the ability to use semantic relations to aid 
recall. 
It is difficult to explain why the original lists produce an interaction effect 
indicating a failure in autism to use semantic information. The only differences 
between the original and new lists was that the original lists were matched 
approximately on frequency (as reported in Tager-Flusberg, 1991) whilst the new 
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lists were individually matched exactly on frequency and, in the case of pictures, 
individually matched on familiarity and complexity. It is thus possible that the 
failure to match words carefully results in confounding findings, though it is 
difficult to explain why the frequency matching would have an effect in the recall 
processes of children with autism or TD children. It could be that the words 
included in the animal lists were more frequent than in the unrelated list and this 
would result in an additional advantage for TD children which are more sensitive to 
word frequency effects. 
The children with autism in Tager-Flusberg's study had, on average, a verbal 
mental age of five years, although their chronological ages were around eleven 
years of age. The typically developing children had a mean chronological age of 
four and a half. The children used in this study had an average age of fourteen years, 
and due to high IQ levels, similar mental ages. It could be argued that the difference 
in results is due to differences in the age of participants. However, despite being 
older, the performance of children with autism was similar to the children in Tager-
Flusberg's study on the original lists. Hence, this explanation can be ruled out. If we 
had used only the original lists we would have found the same results as Tager-
Flusberg. 
It is still possible that there is a developmental delay in semantic processing 
in autism. To confirm the existence of an impairment in younger children with 
autism it would be necessary to conduct a study with young children using a wider 
range of material, and not just the original set used by Tager-Flusberg. The reason 
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for including an additional set of lists was that it was felt that Tager-Flusberg's 
conclusions were based a set of stimuli far too small to be statistically reliable. The 
pattern of results in this study has confirmed that performance varies depending on 
the set of stimuli. For this reason it seems especially important to use a wide range 
of stimuli when investigating the ability to process semantic relations. 
Regarding modality of presentation, children with autism showed evidence 
of semantic processing in both the visual and verbal domain. Thus, Experiments 2, 3 
and the present study provide evidence that the ability to use semantic relations is 
intact in autism in both the visual and verbal domains. None of the three studies 
provide evidence supporting the claim that individuals with autism fail to process 
information in its context, as Frith ( 1989) suggested since at least they are able to 
integrate stimuli on the basis of semantic information. 
Children with autism had in general lower recall rates than TD children, 
confirming previous findings showing a general memory impairment in autism 
(Boucher & Wanington, 1976). Over and above this impairment though, children 
with autism were able to use semantic information to aid recall to the same extent as 
TD children. 
4.5 Conclusions 
None of the three experiments reported so far in this dissertation provide 
evidence supporting the claim that individuals with autism fail to process 
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information in context, as Frith (1989) has suggested. Individuals with autism are no 
different than typically developing children in their ability to integrate stimuli on the 
basis of semantic information, whether information is presented visually or verbally 
and whether connections are based on items within semantic categories or objects 
associated with familiar everyday locations. 
Tager-Flusberg's and Hermelin and O'Connor's (1967) results have been 
often cited as evidence of an impairment in autism in the ability to integrate 
information in context (Brian & Bryson, 1996; Happe, 2000; Happe, 1999; Happe, 
1997). As previously argued earlier, Hermelin and O'Connor's task only provides 
indirect evidence as children with autism had similar recall rates to children with 
learning difficulties. The results of Experiment 4 indicate that Tager-Flusberg's 
findings are due to the inclusion of a small set of stimuli rather than a deficit in the 
use of semantic information to aid recall. 
The remaining evidence for failure to integrate context information comes 
from sentence processing tasks in which semantic connections between items is 
made across multiple stimuli. Two different types of task have been used, memory 
tasks and the homographs task. In memory tasks the recall rates of sentences ('They 
went to the theatre') vs. word strings ('School run the on girl') are compared. The 
evidence from these studies is contradictory. Research has shown that typically 
developing children benefit to a greater extent than children with autism from the 
presentation of sentences (e.g., Frith, 1969; Wolff & Barlow, 1979). It is not clear 
however to what extent the deficit is specific to autism. Hermelin and O'Connor 
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( 1967) found that children with leaning difficulties benefit to greater extent by the 
provision of sentences than children with autism. In contrast Ramondo and Milech 
(1984) failed to find differences with a learning difficulty sample and, in another 
study, it was shown that the deficit was related to low memory span (Fyffe & Prior, 
1978). 
The studies using the homographs task have consistently demonstrated that 
individuals with autism experience difficulties with the use of sentence context to 
disambiguate homographs. This task not only involves sentence processing but also 
the ability to process ambiguous information. In the homographs task, originally 
developed by Frith and Snowling (1983) children have to read sentences aloud. 
Each of these sentences contains a homograph word, which are words that have two 
different pronunciations (i.e. 'tear'). The sentence can be consistent with the 
frequent pronunciation of the homograph (i.e. 'There was a big tear on her cheek) or 
the rare one (i.e. 'There was a big tear on her dress'). 
Several studies have found that children with autism fail to use contextual 
information to disambiguate homographs (Frith & Snowling, 1983; Happe, 1997; 
Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999). Specifically, it has been found that individuals with 
autism tend to give the most frequent pronunciation of the homograph regardless of 
the context. To explore if the same children with autism used in the previous studies 
have difficulty in a sentence context task which involves making connections across 
multiple items, the homographs task was administered to the same two samples of 
children. The results of this study are presented in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 5 Can children with autism use sentence context to 
disambiguate homographs? 
The results reported so far in this dissertation have failed to provide 
evidence of an impairment in autism in the use of verbal and visual context 
information in single words/objects tasks. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
most of the evidence of an impairment in autism in the ability to use contextual 
information comes from studies using sentence processing tasks, such as the 
homographs task. The homographs task, originally developed by Frith and 
Snowling (1983), is a sentence processing task in which connections between 
items are made across multiple stimuli. This task additionally involves the ability 
to process ambiguous stimuli. 
Homographs are words that have two different pronunciations (i.e., 
'tear'), where one of the pronunciations is more frequent than the other. The aim 
of Frith and Snowling's task is to evaluate the extent to which participants make 
use of sentence context information to disambiguate homographs. If participants 
use the context they would give the same amount of frequent and rare 
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pronunciations. If, on the other hand, participants do not take into account 
contextual information they would tend to give the most frequent pronunciation 
regardless of the context in which the homograph is embedded. Happe (1997), 
Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen (1999) and in an earlier version of the task, Frith and 
Snowling (1983) found that individuals with autism tend to give the most 
frequent pronunciation regardless of the context. This finding has been taken as 
evidence of an impairment in the use of context in autism. 
An additional finding reported by Happe (1997) is the effect of the 
homograph position in the sentence. If children are sensitive to context, they will 
tend to perform better when the homograph is placed towards the end of the 
sentence, since sentence context is available. Happe found that children overall 
were more accurate when the homographs were placed towards the end of the 
sentence than when it was presented at the beginning of the sentence. However, 
the influence of the position of the homograph in the sentence had a greater 
impact in typically developing children than in children with autism. This 
finding provides additional evidence for a context difficulty. In contrast, Jolliffe 
and Baron-Cohen failed to find the same position effect. Unlike Happe's study 
with children, Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen tested adults with autism and Asperger's 
syndrome and a comparison sample of non-autistic adults. They argued that 
adults' 'reading ability and experience enables them to read ahead and thus 
perfom1 similarly irrespective of the position of the homograph'. Thus, the 
position in which the homograph is placed in the sentence seems to have an 
impact early but not later in development. 
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The aim of Experiment 5 was to replicate Happe's (1997) and Jolliffe 
and Baron-Cohen's (1999) findings using the same design, material and 
procedure in order to explore if the same children that have no difficulties in 
making connections between single items such as in Experiment 2 and 3, would 
have difficulty making connections across multiple items. 
5.1 Do children with autism read homographs in context? 
EXPERIMENT 5 
Experiments 2, 3 and 4 showed that children with autism take account of 
context information when connecting single items on the basis of meaning. In 
order to investigate if these children have difficulty with a sentence task that 
involves connecting across multiple items, the same sample of children was 
tested on Frith and Snowling's (1983) homograph task. If children with autism 
have difficulty using sentence context to disambiguate homographs, they should 
give the most frequent pronunciation of the homographs regardless of the 
context. It was also predicted that children with autism would be less sensitive 






The same participants as in Experiment 2, 3 and 4 took part in this 
experiment. 
Design 
The experiment had a mixed design with two within-participants factors: 
pronunciation (frequent vs. rare) and position of the homograph (before context 
vs. after context). The between-participants factor was group (children with 
autism vs. typically developing children). 
Materials 
Four homograph words were used in the experiment (tear, row, bow and 
lead). Although previous studies have used an additional homograph word, read, 
the two different pronunciations of this word, unlike the other homographs, 
depend on syntactic and not semantic context. As there is evidence of spared 
syntactic abilities in autism (Bartolucci, Pierce, Streiner & Eppel, 1976; Frith & 
Snowling, 1983) this word was excluded from the original design to avoid 
confounding effects. 
The stimuli consisted of sixteen sentences, the same as in Happe' s (1997) 
original study except for the four sentences containing the word read. None of 
the sentences referred to mental states or were social in nature. As in Happe' s 
study, there were four types of sentences: frequent pronunciation and homograph 
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before sentence context (FB), frequent pronunciation and homograph after 
sentence context (FA), rare pronunciation and homograph before sentence 
context (RB) and rare pronunciation and homograph after sentence context 
(RA). Examples for each condition are shown in Figure 5.1. 
Figure 5 .1. Examples of sentences used in the homographs task. 
Frequent pronunciation before context (FB): 
'There was a big tear on her cheek'. 
Frequent pronunciation after context (FA): 
Molly was very happy but on Lily's cheek there was a big tear'. 
Rare pronunciation before context (RB): 
'There was a big tear in her dress'. 
Rare pronunciation after context (RA): 
'The girls climbed over the hedge. Mary' s dress was spotless, but in 
Lucy' s dress there was a big tear'. 
A pre-test list of thirteen single words including the four homographs 
words (bow, light, lead, bank, tear, nail, row, palm, read, letter, bat, glasses 
ball) was used to evaluate participants' ability to read the target words. Only one 
child (in the autism group) gave the two pronunciations of each of the 
homographs. All children gave the most frequent pronunciation of 'bow' and all 
except two children (one AD and one TD) gave the most frequent pronunciation 
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of 'row'. The two pronunciations of the other two homographs ('tear' and 'lead') 
were more evenly distributed. All pre-test words were presented on a single card. 
Each sentence was presented on a different card one at a time. 
Procedure 
All children were tested in a quiet room in either their school or home. 
The pre-test words were always presented first. Children were told that they 
would see a list of words that they were to read aloud. All participants read this 
list without difficulty. All sentence cards were shuffled before the administration 
of the test to ensure random order presentation. After the pre-test was completed 
the experimenter told participants that they would be given cards containing a 
single sentence each and that they had to read them aloud. The experimenter 
then handed one card at a time to the child. The experimenter recorded the 
pronunciation of the homograph, any reading mistakes and any self-corrections 
regarding the pronunciation of the homographs. As in Happe's (1997) study, 
children were not alerted to the special status of the homographs to ensure the 
evaluation of the spontaneous processing style. 
Results 
Scoring Criteria 
Following Happe's (1997) and Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen's (1999) 
scoring criteria, trials in which participants corrected themselves were regarded 
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as correct (self-corrected score). The first pronunciation attempt (initial score) 
was also recorded and this more stringent score is also reported below. 
As with the data reported in Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen study, the data 
were severely positively skewed (see Table 5.1 for summary of results). This 
skew was not corrected by logarithmic transformation thus non-parametric tests 
were employed and the median is reported instead of means. The use of non-
parametric tests does not allow the investigation of interactions between 
conditions, thus the amount of frequent pronunciations given by the two groups 
was analysed separately from the effects of the position of the homograph in the 
sentence. 
Table 5 .I. Median of homographs pronounced context appropriately (Maximum 
=4) 
Frequent Pronunciation Rare pronunciation 
N Group Before After Before After 
16 TD Median 3.50 4.00 3.50 4.00 
SD .79 .97 .86 .62 
15 AD Median 4.00 4.00 1.00 2.00 
SD 1.98 .59 1.58 1.52 
Analysis of Frequent and Rare Pronunciations 
Self-corrected scores: To test for the effect of pronunciation frequency, 
the scores for the two frequent conditions (before and after) were combined in a 
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composite score (F). The scores for the two rare conditions (before and after) 
were also combined in a single score (R). The median and range of the two 
composite scores are given in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2. Median of frequent and rare context appropriate responses, including 


















As can be seen, whilst TD children gave roughly the same amount of rare 
and frequent pronunciations, AD children tended to give the most frequent 
pronunciation regardless of the context. Two Mam1-Whitney tests were 
performed using these combined scores to compare the two groups. These tests 
revealed that whilst there were no differences in the amount of frequent context 
appropriate responses given by the two groups (U= 114.5, p=.830), there was a 
significant difference in the number of context appropriate rare pronunciations 
(U=49.5, p=.004). AD children gave significantly less context appropriate rare 
pronunciations than TD children. This was the case whether the homograph was 
placed before or after the context (RB: 0=54.0, p=.008; RA: 0=52.5, p=.006). 
Furthem1ore, there was a significant difference in the number of rare and 
frequent context appropriate pronunciations given by the AD group (Z= -2.595, 
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p=.009) but not in the TD group (Z= -.214, p=.831). These analyses confirm that 
AD children tend to give the most frequent pronunciation regardless of context. 
Initial scores: The analyses using the initial pronunciation only, produced 
similar results to the analysis of self-corrected scores. Children with autism gave 
significantly fewer rare responses than TD children (AD mean: 3.27 (2.65); TD 
mean: 5.62 (1.36); U=52, p=.006). Within-subject analysis also showed that AD 
children, but not TD children, gave significantly more frequent than rare 
responses (AD frequent mean: 6.93 (1.39), rare mean: 3.17 (2.65), Z= -2.925, 
p=.003; TD frequent mean: 6.19 (1.33), rare mean: 5.62 (1.36), Z= -1.276, 
p=.202). 
Analysis of Position ofthe Homograph in the Sentence 
Self-corrected scores: To test for the effects of the position of the 
homograph in the sentence (before or after the context), the frequent and rare 
scores were combined into a single score for the before condition (B) and the 
after condition (A). The median and range of these two scores are shown in 
Table 5.3. 
As can be seen, both groups had more correct responses when the 
homographs were placed after the sentence context than when placed before 
although the effect was only marginally significant in the TD sample (AD: Z= -
.2.36, p=.018; TD: Z=-1.778, p=.075). These results are very surprising as they 
suggest that children with autism benefit from the provision of context 
information to the same extent than TO children, if not to a greater extent. 
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Table 5.3. Median number of context appropriate pronunciations, including self-
corrections, when homographs were placed before and after the sentence context 
(maximum=8). 
N Group Before After 
16 TD Median 7.00 8.00 
SD 1.36 1.22 
15 AD Median 5.00 6.00 
SD 1.44 1.71 
Two Mann-Whitney tests were perfom1ed to compare the performance of 
the two groups. These tests revealed that TD children were more accurate than 
children with autism both when the homographs were placed before (U=50.5, 
p=.005) and after the context (U=67.5, p=.037). 
Initial scores: As can be seen in Table 5.4, when accounting only for 
initial scores, the impact of the position of the homograph in the sentence was 
larger for TD than AD children. The statistical analysis confirmed this 
observation. Although both groups improved significantly when the homographs 
were placed after the sentence context, the difference seemed larger for the TD 
group (AD: Z= -2.027, p=.043; TD: -3.128, p=.002). Unfortunately, the 
interaction could not be investigated by use of a parametric test. 
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Table 5.4. Median and range of initial context appropriate responses when the 


















Two Mann-Whitney tests were performed to compare performance 
between the two groups in relation to the position of the homographs in the 
sentence. These tests revealed that the two groups were not significantly 
different when the homograph was placed before the sentence context (U= 99.5, 
p=.423). When the homograph was placed after the sentence context however 
there was a significant difference in accuracy between the two groups (U= 67.0, 
p=.024). TD children were more accurate than AD children when the homograph 
was presented after the sentence context. 
Discussion 
The aim of this study was to explore if the same children that were able 
to use contextual information in single-item tasks such as the ones used in 
Experiments 2 and 3 would have difficulty using contextual information when a 
task (i.e., homographs task) demands making connections across multiple 
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stimuli. On the basis of previous research (Happe, 1997, Jolliffe & Baron-
Cohen), it was predicted that children with autism would tend to give the most 
frequent pronunciation, indicating a failure to use contextual information. It was 
also predicted that the position of the homographs in the sentences would have a 
greater impact in TD than AD children. 
The results of this experiment support the evidence of Frith and 
Snowling (1983), Happe (1997) and Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen (1999), showing 
that children with autism are impaired in using sentence context in a homograph 
task. Whereas typically developing children gave the pronunciation most 
appropriate to the context of the sentence, children with autism did not adapt 
their pronunciation to sentence context and gave the most frequent pronunciation 
for the homograph. Given the proficiency shown by the same children with 
autism in our earlier experiments, it appears that difficulties in processing 
context information are specific to particular characteristics of this task. 
The analysis of the effect of position of the homograph using the more 
stringent initial score revealed that children in both groups gave more context-
appropriate pronunciations when the homograph was placed at the end rather 
than at the beginning of the sentence. The effect of position was, as predicted, 
larger in TD children than AD children. This result is consistent with Happe's 
findings, although her results were based only on self-corrected rather than 
initial response. In the present study there was no evidence for position for self-
corrected responses in the typically developing group but there was for AD 
children. This was because the typically developing group made a large number 
of self-corrections that cancelled out the position differences revealed by their 
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initial score. Typically developing children made 34 corrections to their initial 
responses. Twenty-nine (85%) of these were made when homographs were 
placed before the context. In contrast, children with autism made 15 corrections, 
6 (40%) of which were made when the homograph was placed before the 
sentence context. 
Although the results help to identify the difficulty in autism as 
specifically related to ambiguous information within a sentence context, 
alternative explanations for the results are possible. An obvious explanation is 
that children with autism simply lack knowledge of the rare pronunciations of 
the homographs. In this study and in the studies of Happe (1997) and Jolliffe and 
Baron-Cohen (1999), children's specific knowledge of rare homographs was not 
tested. However, in one study by Snowling and Frith (1986) subjects were 
informed that each word had two possible meanings and were given training in 
the alternative use of each word. Performance for all children improved 
following training but children with autism did not show any greater 
improvement than non-autistic children. This result is not sufficient evidence to 
mle out the possibility that children with autism might be less familiar with low 
frequency words, and especially with ambiguous homograph words at the outset. 
Further studies are needed in which the effects of training are assessed against 
baseline knowledge and using stimuli that are controlled in terms of both 
frequency and ambiguity. 
Children with autism made fewer self-corrections. This could be 
explained by either lack of knowledge of the rare pronunciation or lack of access 
to the two alternative pronunciations simultaneously or, alternatively, by lack of 
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self-monitoring. Despite the lack of self-correction however, children with 
autism still gave more correct responses when the homograph was presented 
after rather than before the sentence, suggesting that children with autism may 
be capable to some extent of using sentence context. On balance then, the claim 
of a failure to take account of sentence context is best described, not as an 
absolute impairment, but relative only to the ability of typically developing 
children. 
5.2 Conclusions 
The weak central coherence account of autism makes the proposal that 
children with autism are impaired in processing information in its context. This 
difficulty in making use of context has been attributed to a problem with forming 
meaningful connections between semantically related items (Happe, 2000). To 
date, however, the evidence in support of this claim has rested mainly on the 
results of verbal tasks involving either recall of semantically related words or 
reading of sentences. As individuals with autism are known to have good visuo-
spatial ability, the aim of the current research was to investigate whether they 
would be able to make use of context when infom1ation was presented in the 
visual domain. 
Experiment 2 used an adaptation of Palmer's (1975) visual perception 
task to assess the influence of contextual scenes in object identification. For 
context information to have a facilitative effect on performance, children needed 
to link a visually presented contextual scene with an object that was either 
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typically or untypically associated with that scene. Results showed that children 
with autism were as able as the comparison group to use visual contextual 
information to facilitate object identification. Surprisingly, Experiment 3 showed 
that the ability to take account of appropriate context was not confined to 
pictorial information but was also found when verbal information alone was 
presented. 
Both these experiments suggest that children with autism can make 
meaningful connections between items. The results were unexpected in the light 
of evidence that children with autism have difficulty with a semantic memory 
task in which words are connected by means of their superordinate category 
(Tager-Flusberg, 1991 ). This evidence is often cited as providing support for the 
weak central coherence account (Happe, 2000; Brian & Bryson, 1996). To 
examine the discrepancy between our findings and those of Tager-Flusberg 
(1991), the original semantic memory task was given to the participants of 
Experiment 2 and 3. In addition, another set of stimuli was added in order to 
include more than one semantic category. The results of this replication showed 
that, contrary to previous findings, children with autism did use semantic 
category information to aid recall when several categories were used. The earlier 
reported results seem to be confined to the particular set of stimuli employed in 
the original study. 
Experiments 2 to 4 therefore failed to support the case for weakness in 
central coherence. Individuals with autism performed like non-autistic samples 
and were sensitive to context and in general were also sensitive to semantic 
category information, regardless of whether the information was presented 
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visually or verbally. Since these tasks require the integrating of single items on 
the basis of meaning, it is possible, in contrast to the suggestion by Happe 
(2000), that meaningful connections between words and objects are not 
weakened in autism, at least when tested in single word/picture tasks. 
The replication of the homographs test in Experiment 5, however, did 
provide evidence of a deficit in the use of contextual verbal information in 
autism. Children with autism, as in previous studies, failed to give context 
appropriate pronunciations and instead tended to give the most frequent 
pronunciation of the homographs. The results of this study however provided 
evidence for some sensitivity to context in children with autism as they were 
more accurate when the homographs were placed after the sentence context. 
There are several alternative explanations for the difficulty children with autism 
experience with this task. 
The first is that, as predicted, the ability to make meaningful connections 
between single items is intact, whereas ability to integrate multiple or higher 
level items of information within sentences is impaired for children with autism. 
This explanation has been earlier suggested by Brian and Bryson (1996). If 
children with autism have specific difficulty in making connections across 
multiple items of information, it will be important to understand how this 
difficulty relates to the proposed problem with context. Further research should 
identify whether people with autism have difficulties in making connections 
across multiple visual stimuli. 
An alternative explanation however, is that children with autism simply 
lack familiarity with rare forms of homograph words. In a previous study 
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Snowling and Frith (1986) administered the standard task and in a later session 
they provided training of the two meanings or pronunciations of the homographs 
immediately before presenting the homograph task. Results showed that children 
with autism did not make significantly greater improvements in performance 
between the first and second session compared with non-autistic children. 
However, this is the only study to date that has failed to find an impairment in 
the homograph task by children with autism. This finding suggests that when 
children are provided with training, that they are assisted in accessing the rare 
form ofhomograph word. The results from Experiment 5 indicating that children 
with autism perform better when homographs are presented after rather than 
before the sentence suggests that children can make use of context to aid access 
of rare pronunciation and meaning. However, they are less able to do this than 
children in the comparison group. What is not clear is whether children with 
autism are less familiar with the rare fom1s of homographs than other children or 
whether they are aware of both meanings but fail to access them without a cue or 
training. 
Another alternative for the view that children with autism have 
difficulties in integrating multiple items of information is the hypothesis that 
children may have difficulty with processing ambiguous stimuli in which two 
representations need to be held simultaneously. This hypothesis would predict 
that it is the ambiguity that creates the problem for children with autism rather 
than the context. If it is the case that the central difficulty for children with 
autism is with processing ambiguity rather than with processing sentence 
context, it is likely that children will have difficulty not only with processing 
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ambiguous words in a sentence but also with processmg ambiguous visual 
information in general. 
If the difficulty with processing ambiguous information is independent of 
context, this problem would be equally well explained by both theory of mind 
and executive function explanations of autism. For example, the ability to 
represent an alternative interpretation IS considered to reqmre 
metarepresentational ability (Perner, 1991) and is a hallmark of 'theory of mind'. 
The ability to shift between alternatives is also proposed as a critical element of 
executive function ability (Russell, 1998; Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996). There 
is some reason to predict that difficulty with ambiguity might not be independent 
of context however. Happe (1997) found that performance on the homograph 
task is not associated with performance on theory of mind tasks. This result 
suggests that these tasks have different task demands. It is possible that the 
sentence context in the homograph task might be important in addition to the 
problem with ambiguity. The possibility that children might have difficulty with 
ambiguous information will be investigated in Chapter 6 by use of an ambiguous 
figures task. 
In relation to the above suggested difficulty to hold two representations 
simultaneously, children with autism might have difficulty integrating 
information when this is presented simultaneously. In the contexts tasks 
presented earlier in this dissertation (Experiments 2-4 ), the information to be 
integrated was presented sequentially. That is, the context was presented first 
and targets followed. In the homographs task however, contextual information 
and targets were presented simultaneously. 
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Most of the evidence supporting the notion of weak central coherence 
comes from studies using tasks in which information is presented 
simultaneously. For instance, Jolliffe's visual context tasks (1997), the 
Embedded Figures test and the Block Design task all present the context or 
global patterns alongside the targets. Children with autism might have difficulty 
representing both the global/context and the local information simultaneously. If 
this is the case, they would have more difficulty to use context information when 
this is presented with the target than when presented prior to targets. This 
possibility is explored in the next chapter by adapting the visual context task to 
present the targets embedded in the contextual scenes. 
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Chapter 6 Can children with autism use context in an embedded 
context task? 
The results of Experiments 2, 3 and 4 showed that children with autism 
do not appear to have difficulty in using context information in either the visual 
or verbal domains in tasks using single words or objects. However in 
Experiment 5 it was found that these children did have difficulties using 
sentence context to disambiguate homographs. These findings fail to support the 
claim that children with autism have general difficulty in integrating information 
in its context as predicted by weak central coherence theory. 
One conclusion from these experiments is that children with autism have 
specific difficulty with complex verbal tasks involving the disambiguation of 
words within sentences. However it is difficult to reconcile the evidence from 
the visual context task with Jolliffe's (1997) findings. In Jolliffe's tasks 
participants had to choose which object was incongruous with the rest in a set 
(i.e., ladder, bucket, window, man, suitcase) or alternatively which was the 
incongruous object on a visual contextual scene (i.e. a squirrel in a beach). In the 
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visual context task, children with autism were able to use context information of 
scenes to facilitate object identification. In Chapter 3 it was argued that Jolliffe's 
task required individuals to make an evaluation of appropriateness that might be 
much more difficult than the current task, which merely tested accuracy and time 
to name object. Also the visual context task depended on facilitation of 
appropriate context rather than interference by inappropriate context. 
There is however an alternative explanation. In the visual context task, as 
m the verbal context and semantic memory tasks, context and targets were 
presented sequentially. In contrast, in Jolliffe's tasks the stimuli were presented 
simultaneously. In the homographs task, targets and context infom1ation were 
also presented simultaneously. Most of the evidence supporting the notion of 
context difficulties in autism comes from studies using tasks in which the stimuli 
are presented simultaneously (i.e., homographs task, Jolliffe's visual tasks, 
ambiguous sentences, the gap test). The only paradigms used to investigate 
integration problems in autism using sequential presentation of stimuli are the 
visual context task presented in Chapters 3 and 4, the semantic task presented in 
Chapter 4 and a task measuring memory for sentences versus memory for words 
(i.e., Hermelin & O'Connor, 1967). In all these tasks, except the latter one 
testing memory for sentences, individuals with autism seem to be able to 
integrate the stimuli and use semantic information to enhance performance. 
Another source of evidence of weak central coherence in autism comes 
from studies using visuo-spatial tasks, such as the Block Design or Embedded 
Figures test. Several studies have provided empirical evidence suggesting that 
individuals with autism are more proficient than TD children at processing parts 
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of objects in these tasks (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997; Shah & Frith, 1983, 
1993 ). All these studies have also used tasks in which the global and local 
information are presented simultaneously. 
The superiority in these tasks has been ascribed to a failure to process the 
global information. According to the global precedence model, proposed by 
Navon (1977), global information is processed faster and interferes with the 
processing of local information. A lack of global precedence therefore would 
result in no interference effects of the global level in the processing of the parts. 
This model can therefore explain why children with autism are superior in these 
tasks. As a result of a global impairment, the performance of children with 
autism, unlike TD children, is not affected by the global picture. 
The global precedence model however has recently been questioned in 
light of more recent research in neuropsychology (Robertson & Lamb, 1991 ). In 
particular it has been argued that a lack of global interference does not 
necessarily involve a global impairment. In a recent study, Robertson, Lamb and 
Knight (1990) found that patients with lesions in the right posterior temporal 
regions showed enhanced performance for global information than for parts, 
although the same patients lacked global interference effects due to a deficit in 
the integration of information from the local and global levels. Thus the lack of 
interference of the global picture in tasks such as the Embedded Figures test 
cannot necessarily be taken as evidence of a global impairment. The results of 
this task could be explained by an inability to hold the representations of the 
local and global levels simultaneously and not an inability to process global 
information. Similarly, when having to process information in context, children 
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might have difficulty in representing the context when information is presented 
simultaneously despite their ability to integrate information when presented item 
by item, such as in the visual and verbal context tasks presented earlier in this 
dissertation. 
Two different theories of autism propose that the ability to hold two 
representations simultaneously is impaired in autism, theory of mind and 
executive function theories. For example, the ability to represent alternative 
interpretations is considered to require metarepresentational ability (Perner, 
1991), an ability that is impaired in autism (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985, 
1986). The ability to shift between alternatives is also proposed as a critical 
element of executive function ability (Russell, 1998; Pennington & Ozonoff, 
1996). Autism is also characterised by executive impairment (Ozonoff, 
Pennington & Rogers, 1991; Hughes & Russell, 1993). Thus, if the difficulty 
was constrained to contextual tasks requiring the integration of simultaneous 
representations, any of these two theories could equally explain the contextual 
difficulty in autism. 
To investigate the possibility that the difficulty in autism might be related 
to the inability to integrate information when presented simultaneously, and not 
to a general difficulty to integrate information in context, the same visual context 
task reported in Experiment 3 was administered to the same children. A new 
condition was added to the design in which the objects were presented 
superimposed in the contextual scenes. If children with autism have difficulty in 
integrating stimuli presented simultaneously, they would not benefit from the 
130 
provision of contextual scenes to identify objects when these are superimposed 
in the context. 
6.1 Are children with autism sensitive to visual context when 
objects are embedded in a contextual scene? 
EXPERIMENT 6 
The aim of this experiment was to investigate if children with autism 
have difficulty integrating information that is presented simultaneously in 
contrast to information presented sequentially. To do so, the visual context task 
was adapted to include two conditions. In one condition the contextual scenes 
were presented prior to the objects, as in Experiment 2. In the other condition, 
embedded condition, the objects were superimposed in the contextual scene. If 
children with autism have an inability to process context information when 
presented alongside the targets, they would fail to use contextual scenes to 
identify objects only in the embedded condition. 
The embedded condition highly resembled the Embedded Figures test, 
although in the present task objects are only superposed in the scene and not 
embedded in the picture. In the Embedded Figures test individuals with autism 
show enhanced perception of parts relative to non-autistic populations. It was 
therefore predicted that, regardless of the ability of children with autism to use 
contextual information to facilitate object identification, children with autism 
would show enhanced performance in the embedded context task relative to the 
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comparison group. That is, children with autism would be faster overall than the 
comparison group at identifying objects in the embedded condition, regardless of 
whether they used contextual information to facilitate object identification or not 
as this task, like the Embedded Figures test require the ability to focus on a part 
of a picture 
The sequential condition was similar to Experiment 2, except for the 
substitution of some objects and the highlighting of the outline of the objects 
(see materials section for details). The administration of a similar task twice to 
the same samples is problematic as it might lead to practice effects. However, it 
was important to compare performance between the embedded and sequential 
conditions and it was not possible at this stage to recruit two other samples of 
children. To minimise the practice effects this experiment took place 4 to 7 
months after the administration of the standard visual context task. As a 
precaution, before analysing the data, performance in the sequential task was 
compared to the performance in Experiment 2. 
Method 
Participants 
The same participants as in previous experiments took part in this study. 
The administration of this experiment took place 4 to 7 months after the 
administration of Experiment 2. 
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Design 
The experiment had a mixed design with context (appropriate vs. neutral 
vs. inappropriate) and type of presentation (sequential vs. embedded) as within 
participants factors and group (children with autism vs. typically developing 
children) as the between-participants factor. The dependent measures were 
reaction time and accuracy. The order of the sequential and embedded tasks was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
Materials 
The same materials as in Experiment 2 were used in this study except for 
some substitutions. The object 'nail file' was replaced by a 'brush' because in 
Experiment 2, this object proved problematic as none of the participants named 
it correctly. Consequently the objects for the other two conditions (i.e., lettuce 
and strawberry) matched in terms of familiarity and complexity to the 'nail file', 
were replaced for a 'guitar' in the inappropriate condition and 'hat' in the 
neutral condition. 
In the embedded condition, the objects were superimposed 
approximately in the middle of the contextual visual scene. This scene contained 
a number of objects and it was difficult to decide which item to name. In order to 
make clear for the children which object to name, the outline of the target 
objects in both the embedded and sequential conditions were accentuated. This 
had the effect of highlighting the object against its background. The same 
treatment was given to all targets in both conditions (see Figure 6.1 for examples 
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of stimuli). A pilot study with adults revealed that this alteration made no 
difference in reaction times, accuracy or in the context effects. 
Figure 6.1 Examples of stimuli used in the embedded context task. 
Appropriate Condition Inappropriate Condition 
Procedure 
All the children were tested in a quiet room. In the embedded condition, 
children were told that they would see a series of pictures in the screen and that 
they would have to name the highlighted object. The pictures containing the 
contextual scenes and the objects were presented for a maximum of 3000 msec. or 
until the child responded. Three training trials were administered before the task to 
ensure that children understood the instructions. In the training trials, the 
experimenter pointed to the object the child had to name. All children understood 
the task after the training trials. The same procedure as in the visual context task 
(Chapter 2) was followed for the sequential task. 
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There was a break between the administration of the embedded and 
sequential tasks in which distracter tasks were administered to the children. The 
order of administration of the two tasks was counterbalanced across participants. 
Results 
Most of the materials used in the sequential task had been presented 
previously to the children in Experiment 2. To test for practice effects prior to 
the analysis of the data, the results of the sequential condition were compared to 
the results of Experiment 2. No differences were found in performance on the 
two tasks or in the context effects, thus it can be assumed that there were no 
practice effects. 
Accuracy data 
The data for all children were included in the analysis. Due to the 
problems linked to the voicekey twelve trials (1.53% of total trials) had to be 
excluded from the analysis. Of these, 4 were of TD children and 8 of AD 
children. The data was therefore converted into proportion scores (see Table 6.1 
for summary of results). 
An ANCOV A was performed on the proportion scores with FIQ and CA 
as covariates. This analysis revealed that CA did not covary significantly with 
performance (F(l,27)= .497, p=.487). FIQ however covaried significantly with 
both overall performance (F(l ,27)= 8.06, p=.008) and context (F(2,56)= 5.143, 
p=.009). 
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Table 6.1. Mean proportion of accurate responses and standard deviations in 
Experiment 6. 
Sequential Embedded 
N Group A N I A N I 
16 TD Mean .929 .790 .814 .894 .682 .786 
SD .10 .09 .12 .09 .18 .15 
15 AD Mean .899 .721 .759 .867 .681 .685 
SD .09 .11 .12 .11 .16 .19 
The results of the ANCOV A revealed a significant main effect of context 
(F (2,56)= 7.432, p=.001). Pairwise comparisons indicated that children were 
more accurate at identifying objects in the appropriate than in the neutral 
(p=.001) or inappropriate conditions (p=.001). As in Experiment 2, the 
comparison between the neutral and inappropriate conditions did not yield 
significance (p=.390). The interaction between context and group was not 
significant F(l,27)= .011, p<.989) indicating that AD children were as sensitive 
to the context as TD children. 
The main effect oftask did not yield significance (F(1,28)= .036, p=.851) 
nor did the interaction of task and context (F(2,56)= 1.375, p=.261) or task and 
group (F(1,27)= .014, p=.905). The 3-way interaction between task, context and 
group was not significant either (F(2,56)= 2.128, p=.129), indicating that, 
contrary to predictions, children with autism were as able as TD children at 
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usmg contextual visual infonnation regardless whether this information was 
presented before or alongside the target object. 
Accuracy levels, unlike in Experiment 2 were similar for both group of 
children (F(1,28)= 1.317, p=.261). 
Reaction time data 
Due to equipment malfunction, the data of two children, one from the 
AD group and one from the TD group, had to be excluded from the analysis, 
leaving the sample of TD children with 15 participants and the sample of AD 
children with 14 participants. Thirty-seven trials (2.48%) were also excluded 
from the analysis, of these 21 were of AD children and 16 of TD children. A 
summary of the results is shown in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2. Mean reaction times and standard deviations for each condition across 
groups in Experiment 6. 
Sequential Embedded 
N Group A N I A N I 
15 TD Mean 935.2 1043.5 1024.5 1135.3 1255.2 1247.8 
SD 255.1 206.3 241.1 210.4 247.56 312.8 
14 AD Mean 864.1 1010.8 1030.4 1070.3 1038.1 1177.8 
SD 233.3 153.8 201.1 189.6 182.5 315.9 
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As in previous analysis FIQ and CA were introduced in the analysis as 
covariates. Neither FIQ nor CA were significantly associated with either overall 
performance or context (F (1,25)= .054, p=.818; F (1,25)= .119, p=.733, 
respectively), thus they were removed from the analysis. 
An ANOV A with context and task as within-participants factors and 
group as a between participants factor was performed on the data. This analysis 
revealed a significant effect of context (F (2,54)= 9.977, p=.001). As in the 
analysis of accuracy data, pair-wise comparisons showed that the provision of an 
appropriate context facilitated identification of objects as compared to the 
neutral (p=.007) or inappropriate conditions (p=.OOl). The difference between 
the inappropriate and neutral conditions did not yield significance (p=.667). 
Unlike the analysis of the accuracy scores, the main effect of task was 
significant (F1,27)=19.491, p=.OOl). Reaction times were slower for the 
embedded task than for the sequential task regardless of the group as the 
interaction between task and group was not significant (F(1 ,27)= 1.501, p=.231 ). 
Neither the interaction between group and context, the main effect of 
group nor the 3-way interaction between context, group and task yielded 
significance (F (2,54)= 1.306, p=.279; F (1,27)= 1.143, p=.294; F(2,54)=2.105, 
p=.l32, respectively). These results confirm the findings for accuracy scores, 
indicating that children with autism are as sensitive to context when this is 




It was predicted that children with autism would have difficulty 
integrating context infom1ation and targets when presented simultaneously, as a 
result of an inability to hold two representations in mind. If the contextual 
difficulties in tasks such as Jolliffe's context task were the result of this 
impairment, children with autism would fail to use contextual information in the 
embedded condition and not in the sequential condition. The comparison 
between performance in the sequential task and the simultaneous task showed 
that both groups had similar context effects in both tasks. Children with autism, 
as TD children, were faster and more accurate at identifying objects when these 
were either embedded or presented after an appropriate contextual scene than 
when the contextual scene was not appropriate. Therefore, the prediction that the 
difficulty integrating stimuli is related to tasks in which stimuli are presented 
simultaneously was not supported. 
In the introduction of the chapter, it was argued that the difficulty 
experienced by individuals with autism in the homographs task or Jolliffe's 
visual tasks could be explained by an inability to integrate information presented 
simultaneously. The results of this study seem to indicate that individuals with 
autism are as able to c01mect items of information when presented 
simultaneously than when presented sequentially, although further research will 
be needed to confirm this finding. It is still possible that poor performance in the 
homographs task is the result of difficulties in the processing of ambiguous 
stimuli and not solely a contextual difficulty. This possibility will be explored in 
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the next chapter. In relation to Jolliffe's tasks, it is also possible that the failure 
to select the incongruous object in a set or contextual scene (i.e., Jolliffe's visual 
context tasks) is the result of advanced requirements of these tasks related to the 
notion of inappropriateness. 
Both groups of children were slower in the embedded than in the 
sequential task. A possible explanation for the enhanced performance for the 
sequential task could be that children might have improved at identifying objects 
in the second presentation of the sequential task. However, the comparison of 
performance in the sequential task and Experiment 2 did not yield significance. 
Alternatively these results might be the result of an additional difficulty in 
identifying objects in the presence of background information. Further research 
will be needed to ascertain the effects of providing context infonnation 
alongside targets in object identification. 
It was predicted that as the embedded condition highly resembled the 
Embedded Figures test, children with autism would show enhanced perfonnance 
in this condition relative to non-autistic populations, regardless their ability to 
use contextual information. Children with autism in contrast were as fast as TD 
children in the embedded condition. A possible reason for the failure to find 
enhanced performance for parts in this task relative to the comparison group is 
discussed in the following section. 
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6.3 Are children with autism really superior in the Embedded 
Figures test? 
EXPERIMENT 7 
The most highly regarded evidence for weak central coherence in autism, 
comes from the use of the embedded figures test (Witkin, Oltman, Raskin & 
Karp, 1971) and the block design test (Weschler, 1974). Several studies have 
shown that in both the Embedded Figures test (EFT) and the Block Design (BD) 
individuals with autism show superior performance as compared to matched 
samples (e.g., Shah & Frith, 1983; 1993). According to the findings from these 
studies using both the EFT and the Block Design, children with autism should 
have been faster than TD children in Experiment 6 when identifying objects 
embedded in a contextual scene. Children with autism however were as fast as 
TD children. It is difficult to explain why in this task, but not in the EFT or 
Block design, which share a similar format, TD children are as fast as children 
with autism. One possible explanation lies with the nature of the stimuli. In both 
the EFT and the BD, the global pattern needs to be broken up into meaningless 
parts. The parts in Experiment 6 in contrast, constituted meaningful objects (i.e., 
a 'jug'). 
There is some evidence showing that when provided with a meaningful 
global pattern TD children are as good as AD children in segmenting a given 
design. Pring, Hermelin and Heavey (1995) investigated the effects of providing 
meaningful and meaningless patterns of stimuli in an autistic and a typically 
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developing sample. They adapted the Block Design task so there was a condition 
in which the pattern was meaningful (i.e. a scene taken form a children's book) 
as well as the standard meaningless/geometrical condition. They found that 
individuals with autism were faster than non-autistic individuals at copying the 
patterns only in the meaningless/geometrical condition. ln the meaningful 
condition they were as fast as the comparison group. Pring, Hermelin and Heavy 
(1995) also compared the performance of artistically talented individuals with 
autism and non-autistic individuals. The results for the artistically talented 
individuals showed that the comparison sample were as fast as individuals with 
autism in the meaningless condition but talented non-autistic individuals were 
faster than autistic people in the meaningful condition. 
They concluded that the ability to segment pictures underlies artistic 
talent, an ability that is shared by both non-autistic and AD artistically talented 
individuals. However, only talented non-autistic individuals are able to use the 
additional meaningful information to facilitate performance in this task as shown 
by their superior speed in completing the meaningful designs. 
Experiment 6 resembled the meaningful condition in that the visual 
contextual scene constituted a meaningful picture and the task required the 
ability to focus on a part of the picture. It is therefore possible that the failure to 
find superior speed in AD children relative to TD children might be due to TD 
children using the additional meaningful information. If children with autism 
had only superior performance in tasks where the pictures are meaningless, such 
as in Pring, Hermehn and Heavey's (1995) study, this could have important 
implications for the definition of wee theory. No longer the superior ability in 
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tasks such as the EFT or the BD should be interpreted in terms of a general 
tendency to focus on parts, that is a local bias, but superior ability to process 
meaningless material. 
Experiment 7 investigates if the superior performance of children with 
autism in the BD or EFT is due to superior ability to segment pictures into 
meaningless parts and not to general superior ability to process parts. It was 
predicted that if they have a general superior ability to process parts, they would 
be faster and more accurate than TD children in finding a shape embedded in a 
picture even when the shape depicted was a meaningful object. If the ability is 
restricted to the segmentation into meaningless parts, as Pring et al's results 
suggest, the two groups should have similar reaction times. 
Method 
Participants 
The same participants as m previOus experiments took part m this 
experiment. 
Design 
The experiment had a between-groups design. The independent variable 




Six geometrical shapes were employed: Square, diamond, large circle, 
small circle, triangle and cylinder. All the shapes depicted a meaningful object in 
a picture (i.e. a circle was a ChTistmas decoration). These shapes were embedded 
in ten different pictures (See Figure 6.2 for examples of stimuli). Tmee other 
visual scenes were employed as training trials, a 'garden' (cylinder), a 'post 
office' (diamond) and an 'office' (cylinder). 
The pictures containing the visual scenes were the same as used in 
Experiment 2 but adapted to contain the shapes. For instance, the diamond shape 
was inserted as a kite in the picture depicting a beach or a triangle was inserted 
as a hat in the pictme of a children's party. The reaction times were recorded 
with a stopwatch. 
Figure 6.2. Examples of stimu li used in the Meaningful Embedded Figures task. 
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Procedure 
Children were tested in a quiet room at either the school or home. The 
same procedure as in the standard Embedded Figures test was used. The children 
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were told: ' I am going to show you some pictures and some shapes. Your task 
will be to find the shape in the pictures. I will show you first the shape and then 
the picture where to find the shape. The shapes are always up-right so you don't 
need to tilt the card over. The shape in the picture is identical to the sample I will 
be giving you. We are going to practice first with three pictures'. There were 
then showed one shape (cylinder) followed by the presentation of a picture 
depicting a visual scene (a 'garden' where the cylinder was a post in the fence). 
This training trial was followed by another two practice trials with different 
shapes and scenes. Once the child understood the purpose of the task the proper 
experiment commenced. 
The trials were presented m random order. The shapes were always 
shown before the pictures. If the child had difficulty to find the shape, he/she 
was encouraged to keep searching until found. Children were asked to point at 
the location where the shape was in the picture. 
Results 
All children found the embedded shapes, thus only the reaction time data 
were analysed. The reaction times for each picture were combined in a total 
mean score. A pre-screening of the data revealed an outlier in the AD group who 
had a mean reaction time 2 standard deviations above the mean for the AD 
group. The data for this child were therefore excluded from the analysis. The 
results ofthe remaining children are summarised in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.3. Mean reaction times in seconds and standard deviations across groups 













A t-test was performed on the mean reaction times to test for differences 
in speed between the two samples. The Levene's test assessing the assumption 
of equal variances was significant (F=8.298, p=.OOS) thus the t-test for equality 
of variances not assumed is reported. TD children tended to find the embedded 
shapes faster than AD children although this difference only approached 
significance (t(16.333)= -2.00, p=.062). 
Discussion 
The aim of this study was to test, by use of an adapted version of the 
Embedded Figures test, whether children with autism would show superior 
performance in comparison to TD children. In this adapted task the shapes to be 
found depicted meaningful objects and not parts of objects as in the standard 
embedded figures test. The results showed that children with autism were not 
faster than the comparison group at finding the embedded shapes. Moreover 
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there was a trend for TD children being faster. These results confirm the findings 
of Pring, Hermelin and Heavey ( 1995), indicating that when meaningful material 
is provided TD children are as fast as children with autism in the Block Design. 
It is difficult however to draw firm conclusions from this study because 
of the lack of a control task with a meaningless condition. It would have been 
ideal to administer the standard EFT to this same sample to compare children's 
performance in the two tasks, however this was not possible due to time 
limitations. We have some evidence that the sample of children with autism had 
a local bias from the scores in the Block Design sub-test of the WISC. Only 
eight out ofthe fourteen ofthe children with autism (57.14%) had the full WISC 
administered, six of these children (75%) had peak scores in this test. It is not 
possible to draw any conclusions for the other six children as there is only one 
other non-verbal subtest to compare performance with. None of the TD children 
had the full administration of the WISC. 
The performance of the six children with peak scores in the BD did not 
differ from the sample of TD children (AD mean=2.61 (.75); TD mean=2.84 
(1.4); t(20)=.376, p=.715). That is, these children did not have superior 
performance in the meaningful embedded figures test as would be expected from 
their superior performance in the Block Design test. The number of participants 
however is too small to draw any definite conclusions. 
The present experiment was an exploratory study. Further research with a 
control for meaningless stimuli will thus be needed to confirm the extent to 
which the local bias in autism is confined to meaningless material. Superiority of 
feature processing only in tasks containing meaningless material could have 
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important implications for the definition of central coherence. No longer should 
weak central coherence be defined in terms of a local attentional bias, but by a 
difficulty to process information for meaning. This was the original definition 
proposed by Frith (1989), however later developments in research in the area led 
to the assumption that failure to process for meaning and preference for part 
processing were part of the same underlying mechanism. 
6.4 Conclusions 
Experiment 6 (embedded context task) investigated the possibility that 
the difficulty children with autism experience with the homographs task might 
be due to an inability to integrate several pieces of information when presented 
simultaneously. Results showed that even when information was presented 
simultaneously, children with autism use contextual information to facilitate 
object identification. The next chapter investigates an alternative explanation to 
account for the difficulties children with autism have with the homographs task. 
This explanation relates to potential difficulties in the processing of ambiguous 
information in autism. 
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Chapter 7 Does context influence the interpretation of ambiguous 
figures? 
Experiments 2 to 4 showed that children with autism were competent in 
making use of both visual and verbal context information. They did however have 
difficulty using contextual information to disambiguate homograph words 
(Experiment 5). It was argued that children with autism might have experienced 
problems with the homographs task because in this task, the contextual information 
is presented alongside the target stimuli and not sequentially and/or because this 
task requires the processing of ambiguous stimuli. 
Having established that children with autism did not find it more difficult to 
integrate information in its context when the targets were embedded in the context, 
the next study investigated the question of ambiguity. The present chapter reports 
two studies which develop a paradigm designed to investigate the influence of 
context in the identification of ambiguous figures. 
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7.1 Perception of ambiguous figures 
Ambiguous figures have been used to investigate two different areas of 
cognitive functioning, perceptual processes and the ability to switch between two 
representations. The first area of investigation has examined the extent to which 
attention to certain aspects of the figure affects the interpretation of the figure. In 
this type of research participants' attention is drawn to critical aspects of the figure. 
For instance, for the duck/rabbit figure (see Figure 7.1) attention is drawn to either 
the ears of the rabbit or the beak of the duck. It is assumed that if there are bottom-
up perceptual processes, attention to a critical feature (i.e., ears) will increase the 
likelihood of forming that interpretation of the figure (i.e., rabbit). 
Attention has been manipulated in different ways by use of letter detection 
tasks in which the letters are presented in the same position as the critical feature 
(Tsal & Kolbert, 1985) and also by positioning the fixation point on the location of 
the critical feature (Goolkasian, 1987). A more direct approach has been to present a 
drawing of the critical feature or a biased version of the figure prior to the 
presentation of the ambiguous figure (Goolkasian, 1987). Overall the results of 
these studies have shown that focusing attention to critical features increases the 
likelihood of interpreting the figure in a certain way. This finding suggests that the 
formation and maintenance of a given interpretation is achieved by allocating 
attention to a focal area. To date no studies have investigated whether the 
presentation of contextual scenes pnor to presentation of an ambiguous figure 
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would facilitate the interpretation of the figure in the same way as a contextual 
scene facilitates object identification. 
The second area of investigation concerns the ability to reverse from one of 
the interpretations of the figure to the alternative interpretation. This ability has been 
related to executive function (Ricci & Blundo, 1990; Meenan & Miller, 1994) and 
to theory of mind (Gopnik & Rosati, 2001). 
Figure 7.1. Examples of figures used in Goolkasian's (1987) and Tsal and Kolbert's 
( 1985) studies. 
'-------~-----·--
a) Duck/Rabbit Figure b) Man/Mouse Figure 
~--------------
c) Bird/Plane Figure 
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Patients with damage in the frontal lobes have special difficulties to switch 
from the first interpretation they make of the figure to the alternative (Meenan & 
Miller, 1994 ). It has been suggested that individuals with autism have an executive 
dysfunction (Russell, 1996; Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996) and, in particular, 
difficulties in shifting attention and cognitive shifting (Courchesne et al., 1994). 
Moreover, individuals with autism have been reported to show difficulty in the 
inhibition of prepotent responses (Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 1991 ). 
Ambiguous figures like homograph words have one interpretation that is more 
frequent than the other (Goolkasian, 1987). It is therefore reasonable to argue that 
the difficulty experienced by children with autism might be related to a difficulty in 
processing ambiguous material, either related to a difficulty to shift between 
interpretations or an inability to inhibit the most frequent response. 
Ambiguous pictures and objects have been used also to investigate the 
ability of children to hold two different representations. Children acquire the ability 
to distinguish appearance and reality between the age of three and five years 
(Flavell, Green & Flavell, 1986). This ability to hold two representations has been 
suggested to underlie theory of mind abilities (Perner, 1991). In order to solve the 
traditional theory of mind tasks such as the false belief task the child needs to take 
in account the representation of the real world state and the belief held by the other 
person. Gopnik and Rosati (200 1) found that typically developing children who 
could solve theory of mind tasks, and therefore were able to hold two 
representations, were more likely to reverse ambiguous figures. Children with 
152 
autism have theory of mind deficits (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985, 1986; 
Leslie & Frith, 1988) thus it would be expected that they would also show difficulty 
in the ability to reverse ambiguous figures. 
Bearing in mind that both executive function and the theory of mind 
accounts provide explanations for the ability to process ambiguous figures and that 
children with autism have impairments in these two domains, it would be expected 
that individuals with autism would have difficulties processing ambiguous material 
regardless of whether they have difficulty with context. 
The aim of this study was to investigate if the difficulty experienced by 
children with autism in using context information in the homographs task is related 
to the processing of ambiguous material. There are no tasks in either the adults or 
child literature testing whether context information facilitates the disambiguation of 
ambiguous figures although there are tasks that test whether focusing attention on a 
critical feature increases the likelihood of giving a particular interpretation. These 
tasks however would not enable the investigation of the precise effects of an 
impairment in the processing of ambiguous material in the use of context. Rock, 
Gopnik and Hall (1994) have developed a paradigm that has been widely used with 
children. This paradigm however is based on a structured interview that investigates 
children's ability to reverse ambiguous figures and not the extent to which 
contextual factors affect the interpretation. Hence this paradigm is not suitable for 
the evaluation of the effects of context in the identification of ambiguous figures. 
The first stage, before testing the ability of children with autism or typically 
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developing children, was to construct a method for testing the influence of context 
on the interpretation of ambiguous figures. 
7.2 Developing a method to investigate the influence of context in the 
interpretation of ambiguous figures 
EXPERIMENT 8 
Children with autism benefit from the provision of contextual scenes when 
identifying objects as shown in Experiment 2. It was decided therefore to adapt this 
paradigm to investigate the effects of context on the identification of ambiguous 
figures. If children with autism do not have difficulty processing ambiguous visual 
information in context, they should use context information to disambiguate 
ambiguous figures. Alternatively, if they have a problem with ambiguity they would 
fail to use contextual information to disambiguate the figures as they fail to use 
context information to disambiguate homographs. 
This new context task followed the same format as the visual context task 
presented in Chapter 3. That is, a contextual scene was presented followed by a 
target picture and participants had to name the picture. In this case however, the 
pictures were ambiguous figures that could be interpreted in two ways. 
The contextual scenes needed to be adapted to facilitate each of the 
interpretations of the figures. Before running the experiment with children therefore, 
154 
it was necessary to assess whether each of the new contextual scenes would in fact 
facilitate each of the interpretations. The first stage was to test if the contextual 
scenes drawn for each of the figures were sufficiently related to each of the 
interpretations, allowing the method to work like the object identification paradigm 
ofExperiments 1-2. 
To complete this stage, the ambiguous figures were manipulated so that they 
were no longer ambiguous. For instance, for the Indian/Eskimo, the experimenter 
drew two figures, one looking more like an 'indian' and the other looking more like 
an 'eskimo' (see Figure 7.2). These biased figures were paired to the contextual 
scenes drawn by the experimenter. In the case of the 'eskimo' for instance, the 
experimenter drew a scene depicting an 'igloo' and for the 'indian' a scene 
containing a 'wigwam'. The design also included, as Experiment 2, a neutral 
condition and an inappropriate condition. In the latter condition the contextual 
scenes were paired to the opposite biased version of the figure. For instance, the 
scene depicting the 'igloo' was paired to the 'indian' and the scene containing the 
'wigwam' was paired to the 'eskimo'. This method was then tested with a group of 
adults. 
An additional a1m m testing this method with adults was to explore 
performance for each of the figures. Three of the ambiguous figures, and their 
corresponding biased versions, had been used in previous studies. Four figures 
however had not been used before in research and thus it was necessary to assess the 
extent to which these figures were easy to identify. 
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It was predicted that if the contextual scenes were approptiately related to 
each interpretation of the figure, they would facilitate the identification of the biased 
figures relative to the neutral and inappropriate conditions. As in Experiment 2, no 
interference effects of inappropriate scenes were predicted . 
Figure 7.2. Examples of biased figures and contextual scenes used in the present 
study. 
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Forty-five undergraduate students took part in this pilot study. 
Design 
To avoid presenting the same figures three times to each participant, each 
paired with a different contextual scene, a between-participants design was adopted. 
The independent variable was the type of context (appropriate vs. neutral vs. 
inappropriate). The dependent variables were naming accuracy and reaction times. 
Materials 
There was a total of seven ambiguous figures. The Bird/Plane, Mouse/Man 
and Duck/Rabbit figures were taken from a previous study by Goolkasian (1987; see 
Figure 7.1). The remaining figures, Indian/Eskimo, Old/Young Woman, 
Saxophonist/Woman and 13/B were taken from textbooks. The biased versions of 
these figures were taken from Goolkasian in the case of Mouse/Man, Duck/Rabbit 
and Bird/Plane. For the other figures the experimenter drew two biased versions for 
each figure, each emphasising the features of one of the interpretations. Fourteen 
biased figures were therefore used. These figures consisted of black drawings 
against a white background. All were approximately 10 x 14 ems. The contextual 
scenes were also drawn by the experimenter. None of the scenes contained the target 
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picture. Examples of the biased figures and contextual scenes used are shown in 
Figure 7.2 
In the appropriate condition, the contextual scenes were paired with the 
appropriate biased figure (i.e. the 'igloo' was paired with the biased 'eskimo'). In 
the inappropriate condition, the contextual scenes were paired with the inappropriate 
biased figures (i.e., the 'igloo' was paired with the biased 'indian'). In the neutral 
condition the biased figures were paired with a black frame as in the replication of 
Palmer's experiment reported in Chapter 3. 
Procedure 
All participants were tested individually in a quiet room in the University. 
Participants were randomly assigned to either the appropriate context condition 
inappropriate or neutral context conditions. In the appropriate and inappropriate 
conditions, participants were told that they would see a series of pictures. Some of 
these were complex visual scenes, and some others depicted just a single picture. 
They were instructed to name the single pictures but not contextual scenes. They 
were also instructed to give specific names and not simply 'a man' or 'a boy'. 
Participants in the neutral condition were told that they would see a series of 
pictures, each preceded by the presentation of a black rectangle. They were also 
asked to name the pictures and try to give specific names. 
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In all conditions, participants were asked not to respond if they could not 
identify the figure. Both accuracy of naming and reaction time were recorded. The 
pictures were presented in random order. 
Results 
Scoring criteria 
Responses were coded as correct if the participant gave the correct name (i.e. 
Indian) or a name that could be used to describe the figure (i.e., Man's face). Non 
responses (i.e. the participant did not respond) were coded as incorrect. 
Analysis of accuracy data 
Nine trials (1% of the total number of trials) had to be excluded from the 
analysis due to interruptions or equipment malfunction. The accuracy scores were 
therefore converted into proportion scores. Results are summarised in Table 7 .I. 
Performance, unlike in Experiment 1 with non-autistic adults, was not at 
ceiling. Hence the accuracy data could be analysed by means of a one-way 
ANOV A. This analysis revealed a significant effect of context (F(2,42)= 10.196, 
p=.001). Pairwise comparisons using the Tukey procedure revealed that participants 
were more accurate in the appropriate condition than in the neutral (p=.016) or 
inappropriate conditions (p=.001). As in Experiment 1, the comparison between the 
neutral and inappropriate condition did not yield significance (p=.283). 
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Table 7.1. Mean proportion accuracy scores and standard deviations across 
contextual conditions in Experiment 8. 
Appropriate Neutral Inapproptiate 
(n=15) (n=15) (n=15) 
Mean Accuracy .85 .74 .68 
SD .11 .08 .12 
To directly assess the effects of the contextual scenes, an item by item 
analysis was performed. This analysis consisted of a repeated-measures design in 
which the mean accuracy score for each figure was compared across conditions. 
That is, the analysis tested if the figures were more accurately identified when 
paired to the appropriate context than when paired to a neutral or inappropriate 
context. A repeated measures ANOV A revealed a significant context effect 
(F(2,26)= 9.535, p=.001). The pairwise comparisons showed that figures were easier 
to identify when paired to appropriate contextual scenes (Mean=;= .85, SD= .17) than 
when paired to a neutral scene (Mean= .74, SD= .26; p=.030) or inappropriate scene 
(Mean=.68, SD=.23; p=.OOO). The comparison between the neutral and 
inappropriate conditions did not yield significance (p=.998). 
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The second aim of the study was to explore performance for each of the 
figures that had not been used in research. Table 7.2 below shows the percentage of 
participants that coiTectly identified each of these figures. 









Old Woman 42 
Young Woman 70 
As can be seen on the table most of the figures were coiTectly identified by 
the majority of patiicipants. The figures that were most difficult to identify were the 
old woman, and the woman (saxophonist/woman). The old woman, although 
difficult to identify in the neutral and inappropriate conditions, was fairly easy to 
identify in the appropriate context condition (Old, 93%). Only about half of the 
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participants correctly identified the woman in any of the conditions. The alternative 
interpretation of this figure was easy to identify in all the conditions hence this 
figure was also kept in the design. 
Analysis of reaction times data 
All correct responses were included in the analysis to avoid biases 
introduced by trimming the data. As in previous experiments the use of a voicekey 
resulted in some trials missing. There were a total of 78 trials missing which 
accounted for 12.38% of the total number of trials. The mean reaction times for 
correct trials are presented in Table 7.3 below. 
Table 7.3. Mean reaction times and standard deviations across contextual conditions 
in Experiment 8. 
Appropriate Neutral Inappropriate 
(n=15) (n=15) (n=15) 
MeanRT 1410.72 1387.28 1632.33 
SD 318.63 293.34 322.12 
A one-way between participants ANOV A showed that the context effect was 
not significant (F(2,42)=2.824, p=.071 ). Unlike in Experiment 1, appropriate scenes 
did not increase the speed of identification of the figures. 
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An item by item analysis on reaction times usmg a one way repeated 
measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect of context (F(2,26)=4.257, p=.025). 
Pairwise comparisons revealed that biased figures were identified slower when 
presented after an inappropriate condition than after a neutral condition (p=.042). 
That is, there was a significant interference effect. Neither of the other two other 
comparisons yielded significance (Appropriate vs. Neutral, p=.999; Appropriate vs. 
Inappropriate, p=.243). Contrary to expectations and to the results of the accuracy 
data, the provision of contextual scenes did not facilitate the speed of identification. 
Discussion 
The aim of this study was to test the materials for a new method aimed at 
investigating the effect of context on the interpretation of ambiguous figures. At this 
stage in the development of the method, ambiguous figure stimuli were not used but 
instead a biased version of the figures were used to test with a set of contextual 
scenes in order to see whether these materials would operate well in the object 
identification paradigm used in Experiment 2. It was predicted that if the contextual 
scenes were appropriate they would facilitate the identification of the biased figures. 
The results showed that the set of contextual scenes did facilitate the correct 
identification of the figures when contrasted with neutral or inappropriate contexts. 
This facilitation occurred whether the data was analysed across participants or 
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across figures. Participants in the appropriate condition were more accurate than the 
participants in the other two groups. Similarly, the biased figures were identified 
more accurately when paired with appropriate contextual scenes than when paired 
with the other two types of scenes. 
This study aimed to explore also the patterns of performance for the biased 
figures that were not used in previous studies. The exploration of the results showed 
that most of the figures were identified by the majority of participants. Two of the 
figures, the old woman and the woman had low rates of identification. The old 
woman was correctly identified by the majority of participants in the appropriate 
condition and the counterpart of the woman figure was also identified by most 
participants. 
In terms of reaction time data, the results are quite difficult to interpret. It 
was predicted that participants would be faster in the appropriate condition than any 
of the other two conditions. Contrary to this expectation, the analysis revealed that 
participants responded similarly in the three context conditions. It is difficult to 
explain why in the standard version of the task participants' speed of identification 
of standard objects improves when appropriate scenes are provided but it does not 
when the objects are substituted by biased figures. Moreover, the item analysis 
revealed that figures were identified more slowly when paired with the 
inappropriate than when paired with the neutral scenes, that is there was a 
significant interference effect. The figures however were not identified faster when 
paired with appropriate scenes, in other words there was no significant facilitation 
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effect. Accuracy scores and reaction times usually show the same effects. That is, if 
participants are more accurate in a given condition they tend to be also faster. The 
results of this study however show that participants are more accurate in the 
appropriate condition but not faster. Also, the results showed that participants are 
slower in the inappropriate condition relative to the neutral condition but they are 
not less accurate. 
As in the final study the crucial measure was the interpretation given of the 
figure and not the time taken to identify the figures, the results of the time reaction 
data are not as relevant as the accuracy data. The aim of this experiment was to 
evaluate if the set of scenes developed for the final study would be suitable to elicit 
a particular interpretation of an ambiguous figure. If they were, the scenes should 
facilitate the identification of the biased versions of the figures relative to neutral or 
inappropriate scenes. The results of this study have confirmed the suitability of the 
scenes as participants were more accurate identifying the figures when these scenes 
were presented prior to the figure than when inappropriate or neutral scenes were 
presented. 
Having established that the contextual scenes devised for the fmal study with 
ambiguous figures facilitate the identification of biased versions of the figures, the 
second stage of the study was to present the figures in an ambiguous fonn. Again a 
group of adult participants was used to test this stage of the method design and this 
experiment is presented next. 
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7.3 The influence of visual contextual scenes in the interpretation of 
ambiguous figures 
EXPERIMENT 9 
The present study investigated whether the contextual scenes tested in 
Experiment 8 would influence the interpretation of the same figures when presented 
in an ambiguous form. If the scenes can facilitate the identification of biased 
versions they should also facilitate particular interpretations of the ambiguous 
figures. A similar design as Experiment 1 and Experiment 8 was used except that 
ambiguous figures were presented instead of objects or biased figures. The design of 
this experiment however did not include an inappropriate condition but two 
appropriate conditions were presented instead. In Context A condition, the 
contextual scenes of one of the interpretations were presented (i.e., a picture of an 
airport for the bird/plane figure). In the other context condition (Context B) the 
alternative contextual scenes were presented (i.e., the picture of a nest for the 
bird/plane figure). The third condition consisted of the presentation of a neutral 
context (i.e., black frame) followed by the ambiguous figure. 
Unlike in previous experiments, the targeted measure, was the interpretation 
of the ambiguous figures, that is, the name given (i.e., whether people saw an Indian 
or an Eskimo) and not reaction times. The interest was whether children with autism 
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would give context appropriate names for the ambiguous figures and thus reaction 
times were not as important as accuracy scores. 
Goolkasian (1987) has shown that the presentation of critical features (i.e., 
the ears of the duck/rabbit) or biased figures before ambiguous figures significantly 
increases the probability of a particular interpretation. Therefore it was predicted 
that the presentation of contextual scenes prior to the ambiguous figures would 
affect participants' interpretation of the figures. For instance, it was predicted that 
presenting the picture of an airport would increase the proportion of participants 
naming the bird/plane figure as plane relative to the proportion of plane responses in 
the no context condition. 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty tmdergraduate students took part in the experiment. 
Design 
As the figures needed to be presented three times, one for each condition, a 
between-participants design was adopted. The independent variable was the type of 
context (Context vs. No context). The dependent variable was the interpretation of 
the figure the participant made. Twenty participants in the context condition 
received a set of contextual scenes appropriate to one of the interpretations of the 
ambiguous figmes (i.e., the nest for the bird/plane) hereafter this condition will be 
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named Context A condition. Another twenty participants in the context condition, 
namely Context B, condition received the other set of contextual scenes appropriate 
for the alternative interpretations (i.e., the airport for the bird/plane). A final group 
of twenty patticipants received the ambiguous figures paired with the neutral 
context scene. The pmticipants were randomly assigned to each of the conditions. 
Materials 
Seven ambiguous figures were used in the experiment. These ambiguous 
figures have two interpretations each. Three of the figures were used in previous 
studies (Goolkasian, 1987) these were the Mouse/Man, Duck/Rabbit and the 
Bird/Plane (See Figure 7.1 ). The other four figures were taken from textbooks. 
Saxophonist/Woman, 13/B, Eskimo/Indian and the Young woman/Old woman (see 
Figure 7.3). The same contextual scenes as in Experiment 8 were used. The 
ambiguous figures were black drawings over a white background they all were 
approximately 10 x 14 ems. 
The contextual scenes were presented for 2000 msec. This was followed by 
an interval of 1300msec. after which the ambiguous figure was presented for a 
maximum of 3000msec. or until the participant responded. The ambiguous figures 
and contextual scenes were presented randomly within each condition. Participants 
were asked at the end of the experiment if they had seen any of the figures before 
and if so which ones. 
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Figure 7.3. Examples of ambiguous figures used in Experiment 9. 
a) Thirteen/B 





Responses were coded as valid if the participant gave the correct name for 
any of the two interpretations of each figure (i.e. Indian or Eskimo) or a name that 
could be used to describe either of the interpretations (i.e. , Man's face). Responses 
that could not be applied to any of the interpretations were coded as other. 
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Analysis of data 
As in Goolkasian's (1987) study the data for each figure were analysed 
separately. There were two main reasons for separating the analysis for each figure. 
First, Goolkasian's study showed that while some figures were significantly affected 
by the stimuli presented prior to the ambiguous figure (i.e., a critical feature or a 
biased figure) the interpretation of other figures was not affected by prior stimuli. 
Second, as Goolkasian's study shows, ambiguous figures have one interpretation 
more frequent than the other. Therefore it is important to compare the proportion of 
people that give a particular interpretation with the likelihood of that interpretation 
being given when no context is provided. Thus, as in Goolkasian's study, the 
responses were analysed by means of chi-square tests carried out separately for each 
figure. 
Sixty trials (14% of the total number of trials) had to be excluded from the 
analysis because either participants gave two names of the figure or, in most cases, 
participants gave a name that could be applied to either interpretation. Of the sixty 
trials, 30 corresponded to the indian/eskimo as about half of the participants name 
this figure 'man'. Table 7.4 shows the percentage and number of participants that 
gave context appropriate responses for each of the figures. As can be seen in the 
table none of the contextual scenes significantly changed the likelihood of giving a 
certain name relative to the no context condition. 
170 
Table 7 .4. Number of interpretations given of the ambiguous figures in each context 
condition. Percentages are given in brackets. 
Bird/Plane Figure 
Response Nest No Context Airport Chi-square 
Bird 8 (47%) 8 (40%) 8(44%) x2(2)=.193,p=.908 
Plane 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) -
Other 9 (53%) 12 (60%) 10 (56%) 
Duck/Rabbit Figure 
Response Pond No Context Hunter Chi-Square 
Duck 18 (95%) 20 (100%) 19 (100%) -
Rabbit 1 (5%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) -
Other 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Mouse/Man Figure 
Response Mousetrap No Context Office Chi-square 
Mouse 17 (85%) 15 (79%) 11(65%) x2(2)=2.199,p=.333 
Man 2 (10%) 4 (21 %) 5 (29%) x2(2)=2.230,p=.312 





Response Wigwam No Context Igloo Chi-square 
Indian 5 (42%) 4 (57%) 5 (46%) x2(2)=.436,p=.804 
Eskimo 6 (50%) 2 (28%) 6 (54%) x2(2)=.986,p=.611 
Other 1 (8%) 1 (15%) 0 (0%) 
Saxophonist/Woman Figure 
Response Rock Band No Context Art Gallery Chi-square 
Saxophonist 15 (79%) 10 (62%) 7 (44%) x2(2)=5.073,p=.079 
Woman 2 (11 %) 4 (25%) 6 (37%) x2(2)=3.54,p=.170 
Other 2 (10%) 2 (13%) 3 (19%) 
13/B Figure 
Response Numbers No Context Letters Chi-square 
13 18 (90%) 18 (95%) 19 (95%) -
B 2 (10%) 1 (5%) 1 (5%) -
Other 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Old/Young Woman Figure 
Response Fireside No Context Dance Chi-square 
Old 8 (53%) 12 (63%) 9 (53%) x2(2)=.490,p=. 783 
Young 4 (27%) 7 (37%) 5 (29%) x2(2)=.449,p=.799 
Other 3 (20%) 0 (0%) 3 (18%) 
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There were some figures that proved to have a strong bias towards one of the 
interpretations. The duck/rabbit for instance was interpreted as a 'duck' by all 
participants in the neutral condition and also by those participants receiving the 
context appropriate to the rabbit interpretation. Similarly, none of the participants 
interpreted the figure bird/plane as a 'plane' in neither the neutral condition nor in 
the condition when an airport was presented beforehand. Only 5% of participants 
interpreted the 13/B figure as a 'B' in both the context condition and the letter 
context condition. In these cases it was not possible to carry out statistical analyses. 
The data for the remaining figures were analysed by a series of 2 x 3 Chi-Square 
tests. None of these analyses yielded significance (see Table 7.4). 
Discussion 
It was predicted that the provlSlon of contextual scenes pnor to the 
presentation of ambiguous figures would influence the way participants interpreted 
the figures. This prediction was not supported by the results of this experiment. 
Participants tended to give the most frequent interpretation of each figure regardless 
the context in which they were presented. These results are quite surprising as 
previous studies have shown that the presentation of a critical feature or a biased 
figure influences the way in which ambiguous figures are interpreted (Goolkasian, 
1987). 
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A difference between homographs or ambiguous words and ambiguous 
figures, is that in the case of words, individuals know that the word has two 
different meanings or pronunciations. Research has shown that when participants do 
not know that a figure is ambiguous they fail in most cases to realise that there are 
two different interpretations (Rock & Kurt, 1992). When they are informed of the 
two alternative interpretations however they do not have problems reversing from 
one to the other. Maybe if participants had being aware of the two interpretations, 
the probability of giving context appropriate names would have increased 
significantly. If they had realised that the bird/plane, for instance, could be seen as a 
'plane', then maybe they would have named the figure as 'plane' significantly more 
when paired with the 'airport' scene. 
To explore this possibility, the percentage of participants that were familiar 
with each of the figures was calculated. Thirty-two participants were familiar with 
the old/young woman (65.33%) and approximately one third were familiar with the 
indian/eskimo (39%). The numbers for the indian/eskimo were too small to can·y 
out any statistical analyses. Table 7.5 summarises the number of participants that 
gave each of the interpretations for the old/young woman figure of those 
participants that were familiar with this figure. Although the numbers for this figure 
are also quite small to allow any definite conclusion, exploratory analyses were 
carried out on this data. This analysis revealed that even when aware of the 
alternative interpretation, participants failed to give context appropriate responses. 
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These results thus indicate that knowledge of the ambiguity of the figures was 
therefore not a determinant factor for the use of context. 
Table 7.5. Number and percentages (in brackets) of participants that gave each of 
the interpretations of the old/young woman figure when familiar with the figure. 
Old/Young Woman Figure 
Response Fireside No Context Dance Chi-Square 
Old 6 (75%) 8 (53%) 6 (55%) x2(2)=1.134,p=.567 
Young 2 (25%) 7 (47%) 5 (45%) 
How can we explain then the failure to bias the interpretation of ambiguous 
figures by use of contextual scenes? Several studies have reported that alternative 
interpretations of ambiguous figures are accompanied by distinctly different patterns 
of fixation (Ell is & Stark, 1978). Tsal and Kolbet ( 1985) argued that if participants 
look at different locations of the figure when seeing the different interpretations, 
then focusing the attention of participants in those locations would induce a certain 
interpretation. This prediction was confirn1ed in their study and also by Goolkasian 
(1987) in a later study. Thus what is important in determining which interpretation 
is given is where in the picture participants focus their attention and not in which 
context are the figures presented. Ambiguous figures as shown in this study are 
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particularly resistant to context influence, what seems crucial in the perception of 
ambiguous figures is the focus of attention. 
The question to be addressed then is why objects, words or ambiguous 
words and not ambiguous figures are processed in context. In this study participants 
were not aware of the nature of the figures except in a few cases, hence they should 
have treated the figures as standard objects. The pilot study testing the contextual 
scenes demonstrated that these contextual scenes facilitated the identification of 
biased figures, hence they should have facilitated the identification of the figures 
relative to the no context condition. Even when participants were aware of the 
ambiguity however, they failed to use context information and nevertheless gave the 
most frequent interpretation. These results contrast with those found in the 
homographs task were typically developing children when aware of the two 
meanings of a word, use the context to select the context appropriate pronunciation. 
It is evident from this study that ambiguous figures are processed in a 
different way than either standard objects or ambiguous words. Thus this type of 
stimulus seems not suitable to investigate the interaction of context and the 
processing of ambiguous material. 
The aim of the studies presented in this chapter was to develop a paradigm to 
investigate if children with autism are able to process ambiguous information. If 
children have difficulty holding two representations, as predicted by either the 
theory of mind account of autism or the executive function theory, individuals with 
autism should have difficulty processing not only homographs but also with 
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ambiguous visual stimuli. Unfortunately, Experiment 9 revealed that ambiguous 
figures are particularly resistant to context influence and hence alternative 
paradigms using different stimuli will have to be developed to investigate this issue 
further. It is not possible therefore to make any conclusion regarding a deficit in the 
processing of ambiguous information in autism. 
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Chapter 8 Can children with autism use global information of faces? 
So far this dissertation has examined the ability of children with autism 
to process and use context information. The findings from the empirical studies 
reported earlier in this dissertation have failed to find a general deficit in the 
ability to use context information. Contextual difficulties in contrast seem to be 
restricted to the use of sentence context information to disambiguate 
homographs. 
In Chapters 1 and 2 it was argued that failure to find difficulties to 
integrate information in the visual and verbal domains would have important 
implications for the notion of wee as it could no longer be defined in terms of a 
general deficit but as a specific language impairment. 'Global processing' has 
been used to refer to both the ability to extract holistic properties of visual 
patterns of stimuli and the ability to process information in context. These 
concepts can be considered to be distinct as the ability to use context, as defined 
as the ability to use background knowledge, might be possible without the ability 
to extract holistic infom1ation or relate parts to the whole and vice versa. 
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When the work of this thesis started, there was no definite evidence of an 
impairment in the ability to extract holistic information whereas there was 
evidence for difficulty in using context information. The results of this 
dissertation suggest a very specific difficulty confined to complex verbal stimuli 
and in particular with using sentence context to disambiguate meaning. 
It is not possible however to conclude that the global-context difficulties 
in autism are restricted to high level sentence processing. To confirm that weak 
central coherence is confined to the processing of complex verbal stimuli, it is 
first necessary to determine whether children with autism are able or not to 
process global pattems of stimuli. 
It has been repeatedly reported that individuals with autism have superior 
perception of object parts compared to non-autistic populations. This finding has 
been demonstrated in a number of different tasks such as the Embedded Figure 
test (Shah and Frith, 1983) or the Block Design test (Shah and Frith, 1993). A 
common assumption held by researchers within the WCC account is that the 
presence of a local bias in autism is due to a failure to process global pattems of 
stimuli (Happe, 1999; Happe, 2000). However, as discussed in Chapter 1, 
superior featural processing does not necessarily mean there is a lack of global 
processmg. 
Global processing has also been investigated by use of the Navon task. 
However, these studies have not provided conclusive evidence of a global 
impairment in autism. An alternative source of evidence for a global impairment 
comes from studies using face processing tasks. Faces are processed on the basis 
of featural and holistic information (Tanaka & Farah, 1993 ). In this chapter the 
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evidence for global impairment is first reviewed and a study is then presented of 
use of global processing to identify faces. 
8.1 Summary of evidence of global impairment in autism 
Evidence for impaired global processmg m autism has been largely 
drawn from performance on the Navon task (Navon, 1977). In the traditional 
Navon task participants are shown larger letters made up from smaller letters, 
where these have the same (i.e. compatible condition) or a different identity to 
the large letter (i.e., incompatible condition). When typically developing 
children or adults are asked to report the identity of the large letter in the 
incompatible condition, the identity of the small letter interferes, slowing down 
reaction times and leads to increased errors (Navon, 1977). When reporting the 
identity of the large letter, however, there is no interference from the small 
letters. This effect is referred to as the "global precedence effect". In the 
compatible condition, non-autistic populations are faster identifying the large 
rather than the small letters. This effect has been known as 'global advantage 
effect'. 
The predictions from central coherence are that, as a result of a global 
impaim1ent, children with autism would have local interference and local 
advantage effects in this task. Several studies have investigated the performance 
of autistic populations in this task with mixed results. Mottron and Belleville 
(1993) found that children with autism had local interference effects but neither 
local or global advantage. On the basis of these findings, Mottron argued that the 
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impairments in autism are related to the interaction of the local and global levels 
and not to a preference for features. A later study by Ozonoff et al (1994) 
however found neither evidence for wee theory nor for Mottron's proposal. In 
this study the results showed that contrary to predictions, individuals with autism 
showed typical global interference and advantage effects. 
Plaisted and colleagues (1999) argued that these contradictory findings 
could be explained by difference in the methodology used in the different 
studies. The Navon task has two different administration procedures. In the first 
procedure, selective attention procedure, participants are asked to focus on one 
level at a time and decide whether the small or large letter is a 'H' or a 'S'. This 
was the procedure used by Ozonoff et al. (1994). In contrast, in Mottron and 
Belleville (1993) study a second procedure was used, the divided attention 
procedure. In this procedure participants are asked to find a specific letter ('H' or 
'S ') in either the local or global level. 
To test if the differences in procedures were the cause of differences in 
results, Plaisted et al (1999) administered the two versions of the task to the 
same population of individuals with autism. Results for the selective attention 
task replicated Ozonoff et al findings. Individuals with autism showed global 
advantage and interference effects. The results of the divided attention procedure 
showed in contrast local advantage and interference effects. Plaisted et al 
concluded that the results provide evidence of weak central coherence. 
Specifically, they argued that global processing is intact in autism but needs to 
be primed by focusing attention to either the local or global levels. 
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A recent study by Mottron and colleagues ( 1999) however has failed to 
find local advantage and interference effects by use of the divided attention 
procedure. They found on the contrary, that individuals with autism and not the 
comparison group showed global advantage and interference effects. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the Navon task has inherent methodological problems. 
Changes in factors such as the brightness, sparsity or size of the stimuli can 
reduce or even reverse global advantage and interference effects (Lamb & 
Robertson, 1989). It is therefore difficult to draw any conclusions regarding the 
presence of a global impairment in autism from these studies. Another source of 
evidence of global processing abilities comes from studies using face recognition 
tasks. 
8.2 Evidence of global impairment by use of face recognition tasks 
Face processing, unlike other types of visual processing, involves both 
holistic (whole) and featural (parts) processing (Tanaka and Farah, 1993). A 
classical paradigm used to demonstrate the importance of holistic information is 
the inversion paradigm where faces are presented up-side down. It has been 
shown that non-autistic adults are more disrupted by the inversion of faces, and 
thus the removal of holistic information, than by the inversion of other types of 
stimuli such as bridges or houses (Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Donnelly & Davidoff, 
1999). The dominance of holistic processing over featural processing in face 
recognition has also been demonstrated by use of a different paradigm in which 
features are presented either within a face or in isolation. Non-autistic adults are 
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more accurate at recogmsmg features presented within a face than isolated 
features (Donnelly & Davidoff, 1999) a finding that suggests that additional 
holistic information facilitates the recognition of features. 
According to wee theory, individuals with autism have difficulty 
processing patterns of stimuli globally. It would be therefore predicted that 
children with autism, as a result of the global impairment, would fail to process 
holistic information of faces. Specifically, Happe (1999) has predicted that 
people with autism would use only featural and not holistic information to 
recognise faces. 
If children with autism fail to process holistic information of faces, they 
should be less affected than comparison samples by the inversion of faces. Two 
studies have found that children with autism are less affected than comparison 
samples by the inversion of faces. Langdell (1978) for instance, investigated the 
ability of children with autism to recognise faces that were presented either up-
side down or up-right. He found that children with autism were better than the 
comparison group in the inverted condition although they were affected to some 
extent by the inversion of faces. 
Similar results have been found by Hobson, Ouston and Lee (1988) also 
using an inversion paradigm. Hobson et al. presented identity and expression 
matching tasks in which the photographs were presented either up-right or 
upside-down. They found that children with autism were better than controls at 
recognition of both expression and identity when faces were inverted. Their 
perfonnance however deteriorated to some extent when the faces were inverted. 
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The results from these two studies have been taken as evidence of a 
global impairment in autism as they show that children with autism are not as 
affected as comparison groups by the disruption of holistic information although 
they are affected to some extent. A study by Teunisse (1996) however has shown 
that these results might be due to a developmental delay rather than to a specific 
deficit in autism to process holistic information of faces. 
In typically developing children, the ability to process faces holistically 
is a late developing process. Specifically it has been shown that inversion effects 
increase steadily from the age of 6 to the age of 10 when inversion effects are 
comparable to the ones found in adults (Carey & Diamond, 1977). Teunisse 
(1996) has found that adults with autism show an equal inversion effect for faces 
as comparison groups. Thus the failure to show similar inversion effects to 
comparison samples in Langdell and Hobson et al's studies might be due to a 
developmental delay rather than to a specific deficit in the processing of holistic 
information. 
Despite the evidence of abnormal inversion effects in autism, at least at 
an early age, it is difficult to make any conclusions regarding the extent to which 
holistic processing is impaired in autism. Children with autism do have inversion 
effects to some extent. It is not possible to conclude whether these effects are the 
result of the removal of the holistic information or the removal of featural 
information, as both types of information are disrupted by the inversion of faces. 
Another method of testing holistic processing of faces is by using the 
composite effect paradigm (Young, Hellawell & Hay, 1987). In this paradigm 
participants have to recognise the upper or bottom half of a composite face made 
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up of two different faces. When the upper and bottom parts of the composite 
face are aligned, and thus a new holistic representation is created, recognition is 
more difficult than when the halves are not aligned- although this effect appears 
only for faces in up-right orientation. This effect is known as the composite 
effect. This paradigm provides a more subtle and precise measure of holistic 
processing as the featural information remains intact. Any effects in performance 
using this paradigm can thus be only attributed to the presence of a new holistic 
representation. 
Teunisse (1996) administered this task to the same sample of adults with 
autism. The results were quite surprising. Although individuals with autism 
showed inversion effects in the first experiment, in this second experiment they 
did not show composite effects. Adults with autism were better than non-autistic 
adults at recognising halves of faces even when the two halves were aligned and 
thus a new holistic configuration was created. These results suggest that holistic 
information is not automatically processed in individuals with autism. 
The results however can be interpreted in terms of superior processing of 
parts. The composite task, as the embedded figures test, investigates the ability 
to process parts of a visual pattern and not the ability to perceive a global 
pattern. Thus the same criticism can be applied to this task. Individuals with 
autism when required to do so, might be very good at disengaging from the 
global information but this does not necessarily mean that they are unable to 
process the holistic configuration. 
Two further studies have looked at holistic perception of faces by 
presenting faces at differing angles. The rationale behind these studies is that by 
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changing the orientation of the face, featural cues are removed (i.e. features do 
not look the same any more). Therefore, participants have to rely on holistic 
information in order to make a decision. The results from these two studies have 
provided mixed evidence. Whilst a study by Gepner, De Gelder and Schonen 
(1996) have failed to find differences between children with autism and two 
comparison groups, a study by Davies, Bishop, Manstead and Tantam (1994) has 
found evidence of a global impairment in facial and non-facial visual processing. 
The study by Gepner et al (1996) included, as part of a wider battery of 
facial recognition tests, a task in which participants had to sort a set of faces into 
groups of three, according to identity. Each trio of photographs consisted of a 
full front face, a profile and a three-quarter view. Results showed that the 
performance of children with autism was lower than those of typically 
developing children matched on non-verbal mental age, however they did not 
differ from Down's syndrome children or the typically developing children 
matched on verbal mental age. Hence this study has failed to provide evidence 
for an impairment in holistic processing in autism. 
A study by Davies, Bishop, Manstead and Tantam (1994) on the other 
hand has provided evidence of a deficit not only in holistic processing of faces 
but also of a difficulty in processing global patterns of non-facial stimuli. This 
study included a battery of tests testing face recognition at different angles, 
emotional expression recognition, identity recognition and finally two control 
tasks with non-facial stimuli. These control tasks were designed to test holistic 
perception in non-facial stimuli. The sample comprised two groups of children 
with autism, a high functioning (HFA) group and a low functioning (LFA) 
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group. These two groups were individually matched on verbal mental age 
(VMA) to a control sample of handicapped children and another sample of 
typically developing children. 
Results showed that the LF A children did not differ to their controls in 
any of the tasks. Again it seems that results shed doubt about the existence of a 
configural deficit in autism. However, holistic processing of faces only appears 
in typical development at around 6 years of age and it increases steadily until 10 
years of age when holistic processing fully develops. The sample of LF A 
children and their controls had a VMA of 7. Thus neither the comparison group, 
nor children with autism, may have yet developed properly holistic processing. 
The results of the HF A sample on the other hand support the prediction that 
children with autism have difficulty processing holistic information as they had 
lower scores than the control samples in all the facial tasks. Furthermore, these 
results confirm that the deficits in holistic processing are not restricted to facial 
stimuli. 
It is difficult however to ascertain the extent to which children with 
autism are able to process faces holistically as by presenting faces in different 
angles, not only featural information is removed but holistic information is also 
dismpted to some extent. To fully confirm a deficit in holistic processing, it 
would be necessary to compare directly the effect of providing or not providing 
holistic information. 
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8.3 Selecting a paradigm to investigate holistic processing in 
autism 
In the previous two sections, the evidence for a global impairment in 
autism has been discussed. The studies using the Navon task have provided 
mixed findings. Whilst some studies show normal global advantage and 
interference effects in individuals with autism (Ozonoff et al., 1994; Mottron et 
al., 1999), other studies have found either local advantage or local interference 
effects (Plaisted et al., 1999; Mottron & Belleville, 1993). There is reason to 
believe that the Navon task is very susceptible to small changes in procedure, 
such as changes in the size or sparsity of the stimuli (Lamb & Robertson, 1989). 
Thus no reliable conclusions can be made from these studies about the ability to 
process global patterns of stimuli in autism. 
Regarding the evidence from facial recognition tasks it is also difficult to 
reach any definite conclusion. Although in general studies seem to indicate less 
sensitivity in autism to the removal or disruption of holistic information, none of 
the studies have directly tested the extent to which individuals with autism are 
able to use this inforn1ation. 
It is necessary therefore to find an alternative paradigm. There is one 
paradigm in the face recognition literature that provides a measurement of the 
direct effect of providing holistic inforn1ation to the identification of features. 
Davidoff and Donnelly (1990) have suggested that if faces are processed 
holistically the recognition of features should be better if they are presented 
within a complete face than when presented in isolation. To test this suggestion 
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they designed a paradigm in which participants were presented with a picture of 
a target face followed by two stimuli. In some trials, the stimuli consisted of two 
complete faces differing only by one feature. Alternatively, trials consist of two 
isolated features (i.e. two noses, two eyes or two mouths). In the complete face 
trials, participants have to decide which of the two faces matches the target face. 
In the feature trials, participants have to decide which of the two features 
belonged to the target face. Results have shown that non-autistic adults recognise 
features better when they are presented within a complete face than when 
presented in isolation. This effect has been named 'complete face advantage' 
(CF A). The presence of CF A, Donnelly and Davidoff argue, indicates that adults 
rely on holistic information to recognise features and faces. 
This paradigm has been also used with typically developing children 
(Donnelly and Hadwin, submitted). As studies using inversion paradigms show, 
typically developing children do not use holistic information of faces until 
approximately 10 years of age. Young children are as accurate recognising 
features in isolation than within a face. 
Plaisted et al. (1999) have shown that the provision of cues focusing the 
attention of individuals with autism in one level, either global or local, enhances 
global processing in individuals with autism. A manipulation of the CF A 
paradigm also allows an exploration into the effect of cues in face processing. 
Donnelly and Davidoff (1999, Experiment 5) showed that by presenting a cue 
immediately before the target face to inform participants of the feature on which 
to base their matching decision (i.e. 'Look at the nose') facilitated, but did not 
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qualitatively change, performance m both complete face and feature trials 
(Donnelly and Davidoff, 1999). 
It was therefore decided to use this paradigm to test the extent to which 
children with autism are able to use holistic information to identify features. 
Using this paradigm in addition allowed the investigation of the impact of cueing 
on face processing. 
8.4 Are children with autism able to use holistic information of 
faces? 
EXPERIMENT 10 
In this study the complete face advantage paradigm developed by 
Donnelly and Davidoff (1990) was administered to a sample of children with 
autism and a sample of TD children matched on chronological age. The 
experiment consisted of two tasks. In the first task, the cued task, a cue was 
presented immediately before the target face to inform participants of the feature 
on which to base their matching decision. In the uncued task, no cue was 
provided. The uncued version of the face task is very demanding for children as 
shown in previous studies (see Donnelly & Hadwin, submitted). Therefore 
following Donnelly and Hadwin procedure, the cued task was always presented 
first to familiarise children with the task. If cues focusing attention in one level, 
enhance global processing in individuals with autism as shown by Plaisted et al, 
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( 1999), then similar cues may serve to facilitate holistic face processing in this 
population. 
With respect to the proposition that individuals with autism have a global 
impairment, if individuals with autism showed a CF A in both the cued and the 
uncued task, this would reflect a capacity to process faces holistically. This 
finding would question the assumption drawn from weak central coherence that 
autism is characterised by a global impairment. In contrast, failing to find an 
effect in the uncued task and finding an effect only when attention is focused on 
one level, would support the notion of weak central coherence theory by 
demonstrating that individuals with autism were able to process holistic 
information in faces only when cues were provided. 
The current paradigm also allows an independent test of a second 
prediction from central coherence theory. If individuals with autism have a 
preference for processing parts, that is a local bias, then they should show 
superior performance in the current task when matching isolated features, 
relative with the control sample. 
Method 
Participants 
Seventeen high functioning adolescents with autistic disorder (AD) took 
part in the study. Fourteen of these children took were the same as in 
Experiments 2-7. Three more children with autism were recruited from a range 
of special schools. All had received a diagnosis of autism by experienced 
191 
clinicians using the guidelines of standard criteria as DSM-IV (APA, 1994), 
DSM III-R (APA, 1987), or ICD-10 (WHO, 1990). Participants' IQs were 
measured using four subtests of the Weschler Intelligence Scale for Children -
Revised (WISC-R; Weschler, 1974; Infom1ation, Vocabulary, Block Design and 
Object Assembly). Following Ozonoff et al (1994), these four subtests were 
chosen because they load most highly on the verbal comprehension and 
perceptual organisation factors ofthe WISC-III (Weschler, 1974). 
The control group consisted of a group of seventeen typically developing 
(TD) children approximately matched on chronological age to the autism. 
Thirteen of these children were the same as in Experiments 2-7. The remaining 
four children were recruited from a local school. The groups did not significantly 
differ in chronological age (CA: t(32)=.997, p=.326), verbal IQ (VIQ: 
t(32)=.865, p=.364), performance IQ (PIQ: t(32)=1.807, p=.080) nor full scale 
IQ (FIQ: t(32)=1.382, p=.177). Table 8.1 summarises participant characteristics 
for both groups of children. 
Table 8.1. Chronological age (CA), Verbal IQ (VIQ), Performance IQ (PIQ) and 
Full Scale IQ (FIQ) mean scores of participants in Experiment 10. 
N Group CA VIQ PIQ FIQ 
17 TD Mean 13:08 90.65 103.71 96.53 
SD 0:11 16.40 18.01 15.31 
17 AD Mean 13:02 84.18 92.29 87.18 
SD 1:07 26.13 18.81 23.33 
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Design 
A mixed design was employed. The within-subjects factors were 
stimulus type (complete face vs. feature) and cue (cued vs. uncued). The 
between subject factor was group (children with autism vs. typically developing 
children). The dependent measure was the number of correct responses. 
Materials and apparatus 
The same stimuli as in Donnelly and Davidoff (1999) were used in the 
present study. There were two types of stimuli: complete faces and features. For 
the complete face condition a set of six target faces was formed in which the 
features of eyes, nose and mouth were varied, keeping all other aspects of the 
face constant. The feature condition comprised three examples of eyes, noses 
and mouths. 
In complete face trials, the target was presented alongside a second face 
that was identical except for the replacement of one feature. No distractor face 
was the same as any other target face. In feature trials, a feature (eye, nose or 
mouth) presented previously in the target face was presented alongside a 
distractor feature (eye, nose or mouth respectively). Targets were presented to 
either the left or right of distracters. There were thirty-six complete face and 
thirty-six feature trials. An example of a complete and a feature trial is shown in 
Figures 8.la and 8.lb. 
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Figure 8.1 a Examples of stimuli used in the complete face condition. 
COMPLETE FACE CONDITION 
1. Pm1icipants were presented with: 
2. After a short delay (500ms) they were then presented with: 
3. The participant then had to select the face from Step Two that matched 
that from Step One. The two faces differed in only one feature. 
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Figure 8.1 b Examples of stimuli used in the feature condition 
FEATURE CONDITION 
1. The participants were presented with: 
~'''~.· 
UJ 
2. After a short delay (500ms) they were then presented with: 
~-.......... ' 
3. The participant then had to choose the feature that belonged to the face in 
Step One. 
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In the cued condition, prior to the presentation of the faces, cues were 
presented in the centre of the screen for 1000 msec. The cues presented read: 
'Look at the eyes', 'Look at he nose' or 'Look at the mouth'. The stimuli and the 
cues were presented in a Macintosh Laptop computer using Superlab software. 
Procedure 
Children were taken individually to work in a quiet room. Following the 
procedure of Donnelly and Hadwin (submitted) the sequence of presentation of 
stimuli in the cued task was as follows: a) presentation of the cue for 1000 
msec., b) a delay of 500 msec., c) presentation of the target face for 500 msec., 
d) a delay of 500 msec., e) presentation of two items. 
Participants had to decide which of the two faces (complete condition) or 
features (feature condition) matched the face presented before by pressing one of 
two keys in the keyboard -"a" for the item on the left, or "1" for the item on the 
right. 
The uncued condition was administered after completion of the cued 
condition and followed exactly the same procedure except that no cues were 
provided prior to the presentation oftarget faces. 
Resunts 
One sample t-test confirmed that responses were above chance level for 
all conditions across both groups. The mean accuracy scores for each condition 
are presented in Table 8.2 for both the TD and AD groups. 
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Table 8.2. Mean accuracy scores and standard deviations in the cued and uncued 
conditions in the face recognition task. (Maximum =36) 
Cued Uncued 
N Group Complete Feature Complete Feature 
17 TD Mean 28.71 26.59 23.12 21.06 
SD 4.44 3.62 3.02 3.05 
17 AD Mean 25.82 22.12 21.71 21.47 
SD 4.03 4.26 3.16 3.28 
CA and FIQ scores were not significantly different in the two groups. 
However, as individual matching had not been used and, as previous research 
shows, that CF A is related to chronological age in TD children (Dom1elly & 
Hadwin, submitted), these variables were included as covariates in the analysis 
of the data. 
A three-way mixed repeated measures ANCOV As was therefore run 
with stimulus type (complete face vs. feature) and cue (cued vs. uncued) as 
within participants factors, group (AD vs. TD) as a between participants factor 
and CA and FIQ as covariates. 
Results showed a significant interaction of CA and stimulus type 
(F(1,30)=5.152, p=.031) replicating Donnelly and Hadwin's finding indicating a 
relation between CF A and CA. CA however did not have a significant effect in 
overall performance (F(1 ,30)=.021, p=.885). FIQ was significantly related to 
overall accuracy scores (F(l,30)= 9.635, p=.004) and interacted significantly 
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with cue (F(1,30)=5.026, p=.033), indicating that the ability to use cues 
effectively depends on the IQ level. 
The analysis revealed a significant main effect of stimulus type (F(l ,30)= 
4.650, p=.039) indicating that children were more accurate when recognising 
complete faces rather than isolated features. A significant interaction was found 
between cue and group (F(1,37)= 4.203, p=.049), indicating that cues enhanced 
performance significantly more in TD children compared with AD children. 
Neither the main effect of cues nor the main effect of group yielded 
significance (F(1,30)= .592, p=.448; F(1,30)=2.588, p=.118, respectively). The 
interaction between cue and stimulus type was not significant either 
(F(1,37)=.405, p=.529). 
Finally, there was a significant three-way interaction between cue, type 
of stimulus and group (F(1,30)= 5.408, p=.027). To further investigate the 
source of the three-way interaction, a further two-way ANOV A was run for each 
group separately with cue (cued vs. uncued) and type of stimulus (complete face 
vs. feature) as within-subjects factors. The covariates were not included in this 
analysis because none of them interacted significantly with group, indicating that 
IQ and CA had similar effects on performance for both groups. 
The cue x stimulus type x group interaction is explained by a significant 
interaction of stimulus type and cue in the AD sample (F(1,16)= 15.733, p=.001) 
but not in the TD group (F(l,20)=.004, p=.950). Post-hoc tests to explore the 
source of this interaction revealed that only when given a cue were children with 
autism more accurate in the complete face condition (t(19)=4.722, p=.OOl). In 
the uncued condition, AD children showed no difference between the complete 
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face and the feature conditions (t(l9)=.260, p=.798). TD children on the other 
hand were more accurate in the complete face compared with the feature 
condition for both the cued and uncued conditions (t(20)=2.680, p=.016; 
t(20)=2.582, p=.020 respectively). 
The two-way ANOV As for each group also showed a significant main 
effect of stimulus type in both groups (AD: F(1,16)= 7.374, p=.015; TD: 
F(l, 16)= 10.440, p=.005), indicating that overall both groups were more 
accurate in the complete face condition than the feature condition. The effect of 
cues was significant in both groups (AD: F(1,16)=8.310, p=.Oll; TD: F(1,16)= 
43.005, p=.001), indicating that children were more accurate in the cued than 
uncued conditions. 
Discussion 
The mam a1m of this study was to establish whether there is an 
impairment in autism in holistic processing of faces. If children with autism use 
holistic information of faces, they would find the recognition of features easier 
when presented within a face than when presented in isolation. The results 
showed that, at least regarding the uncued condition, children with autism failed 
to use holistic information of faces to aid feature identification. They were as 
accurate in recognising features in isolation than when presented within a face. 
This result contrasts to that found for the TD children, even when IQ and age 
were controlled for. Typically developing children showed better recognition of 
features in complete face trials in both the cued and uncued conditions. 
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An additional aim of the study was to confirm Plaisted et al's findings 
that the use of cues for focusing attention in one level enhances global 
processing in autism. The results showed that the use of cues is critical in 
generating holistic processing of faces in individuals with autism. It was only 
when cues focusing the attention on a particular feature were provided that 
individuals with autism showed grater accuracy in recognising faces than 
isolated features, that is global processing. Therefore both this study and Plaisted 
et al study show that individuals with autism have an impairment in the 
processing of global patterns of stimuli in the absence of cues. However this 
impairment can be overcome by the provision of cues focusing attention to one 
level. 
This result, however, needs to be interpreted with caution. In this study 
cues enhanced global processing of both AD and TD children so it is not a 
specific effect of autistic samples. Cues also enhance global processing in non-
autistic adults (Donnelly & Davidoff, 1999) and in young TD children (Donnelly 
& Had win, submitted). More imporiantly, typically developing children 6 to 10 
years old also show global processing only when cues are provided (Donnelly & 
Hadwin, submitted). Although in this study cues had a differential effect in AD 
and TD children, the results of the children with autism are similar to those 
found in Donnelly and Hadwin study for young TD children. Thus the effects of 
cues in holistic processing of faces are not specific to autism. The similar 
performance of AD children and young typically developing children points to a 
developmental delay in holistic face recognition in autism. Only a study 
investigating the effects of cues in adults with autism would clarify if the cues 
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have a differential effect in autism. That is, if adults with autism can process 
faces holistically only when given cues. 
Children with autism benefited from the provision of cues but only in the 
complete face condition whilst the performance of TD children was enhanced by 
cues in both the complete face and feature conditions. One explanation for this 
pattern of results may be that children with autism did not use the infonnation 
about cues effectively and thus they did not focus their attention on the relevant 
feature. Cues seemed to have merely alerted their attention in a non-specific 
way. This result provides additional support to previous evidence showing that 
alerting children with autism by non-specific cues facilitates other types of 
behaviours that otherwise are impaired, such as gaze-following (Leekam, 
Hunnisett & Moore, 1998) or symbolic play (Gould, 1986; Lewis & Boucher, 
1988). 
Independently from the effects of cues, the results of this study confirm 
that individuals with autism do not spontaneously use holistic information when 
processing faces. Traditionally, it has been assumed that the presence of a local 
bias is a result of a deficit in global processing. So far research had investigated 
the ability of individuals with autism to process parts. It was thus necessary to 
test the ability to use global infom1ation in autism to confirm the existence of a 
deficit in global processing. 
Although other studies had already confirmed the presence of a deficit in 
the use of holistic infom1ation in face recognition tasks (Langdell, 1978; Hobson 
et al, 1988; Davies et al, 1994), these studies had used paradigms in which either 
the featural or global information was distorted precluding any definite 
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conclusion. The present study has confirmed a deficit, or at least a 
developmental delay, of global processing of faces in autism by use of a facial 
task in which recognition of faces can be directly compared to recognition of 
features. This study has also confirmed that cues enhance global processing 
although this effect seems not to be restricted to autism. 
Face processing is a very particular type of visual processing. It will be 
therefore necessary to confirm this deficit and the effects of cues focusing 
attention to one level by use of other non-facial tasks in which the actual use of 
the global configuration is tested. 
In relation to the presence of a local bias, the results of this study failed 
to find confirmation for previous evidence suggesting superiority in the 
recognition of parts in autism. If children with autism are superior at recognising 
parts of objects, they should also be more accurate than TD children at 
recognising features in isolation. Children with autism on the contrary were no 
better than TD children in the uncued condition and significantly worse in the 
cued condition. The results of the cued condition can easily be explained by the 
failure of AD children to use cues effectively relative to the TD sample. 
However if children with autism had a local bias, they should be better than TD 
children at recognising features in the uncued condition. 
In Chapter 6 it was argued that superiority for parts in autism might be 
restricted to the segmentation of pictures into meaningless parts and not general 
ability to segment pictures in its parts. The parts in this study, as in Experiment 
9, were identifiable objects, in this case features. Thus the failure to find superior 
performance in these two tasks might be evidence for superior identification of 
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parts in autism only when parts are meaningless. The confirmation of superior 
featural processing only for meaningless material would have important 
implications for the definition of WCC. Confirmation for this suggestion would 
indicate that individuals with autism do not attend preferentially to features of 
objects, that is a local bias, but that they have superior ability to segment a 
picture into meaningless parts when required. 
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Chapter 9 Summary of findings and discussion 
In Chapter 1 it was argued that the concept of central coherence as it is 
currently defined is problematic for two main reasons. The first is that it is 
assumed that superior featural processing presupposes a lack of global 
processing. The second is that it is assumed that global and context processing 
are one and the same thing. This thesis has attempted to address these two issues 
by investigating separately the ability to process context and global information 
and by concentrating on the investigation of global and contextual processing 
instead of examining featural processing. In addition, the thesis also examined 
the assumption that context and global processing is a general property of the 
cognitive system by testing the ability to use context across visual and verbal 
domains. 
In this chapter a summary of the empirical findings is first presented. 
This is followed by a discussion of their significance to our understanding of the 
issues of context and global processing in autism and to the question of whether 
children with autism lack central coherence. 
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9.1 Summary of findings 
The first study investigated whether children with autism are able to use 
visual context to facilitate object identification. A visual context task was 
developed in Experiment 1 to test the influence of contextual scenes on object 
identification. This paradigm was administered to children with autism and a 
comparison sample of typically developing children in Experiment 2. The results 
showed that children with autism were as able as the comparison group to use 
visual context information. Both groups of children were faster and more 
accurate identifying objects that were preceded by appropriate contextual scenes 
than at identifying objects that were preceded by either neutral or inappropriate 
contextual scenes. 
To explore if competence in the use of context was confined to tasks 
where stimuli were presented visually, in Experiment 3, we adapted the visual 
context task by presenting words instead of objects and contextual scenes. The 
results of this task showed that children with autism were as able as the 
comparison group to use verbal context infonnation to aid word identification. 
Both groups were faster at identifying words preceded by related words than 
words preceded by either unrelated words or a series of Xs. 
The results of Experiments 2 and 3 failed to provide support for weak 
central coherence in autism in either the visual or verbal domains. These results 
were difficult to reconcile with evidence showing difficulties in the use of verbal 
context infom1ation in a single word semantic memory task originally developed 
by Tager-Flusberg ( 1991 ). In Experiment 4 this task was adapted to include a 
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visual condition and additional set of lists to double the amount of stimuli. The 
results of this replication showed that although the original lists produced a 
similar effect to that found by Tager-Flusberg, none of the other set of lists 
provided evidence of an impairment in the use of visual or verbal semantic 
category information to aid recall. Children with autism benefited to the same 
extent as TD children from the presentation of semantically related material. It 
was concluded that Tager-Flusberg's results were confined to the particular set 
of stimuli employed in the original study and not a deficit in autism in the ability 
to use semantic information to aid recall. 
Experiments 2, 3 and 4 therefore failed to support the case for weakness 
m central coherence. Individuals with autism performed like non-autistic 
samples and were sensitive to context and semantic category information, 
regardless of whether the information was presented in visual picture form or 
purely verbally. The aim of Experiment 5 was to investigate if the children with 
autism in the previous experiments would show difficulty in the use of sentence 
context information to disambiguate homographs despite their ability to use 
context information in single word tasks. The results of this study replicated 
previous findings (Happe, 1997; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999). Children with 
autism tended to give the most frequent pronunciation of the homographs 
regardless of the context in which they were presented. Children with autism 
seem to have specific difficulties with the use of sentence context to 
disambiguate homographs. 
It was argued that the different pattern of performance between the 
homographs task and the tasks used in Experiments 2-4 could be explained by 
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either a difficulty in integrating infom1ation that is presented simultaneously or a 
difficulty processing ambiguous stimuli. The first of these alternatives was 
investigated in Experiment 6. In this study the visual context task used in 
Experiment 2 was adapted so that the objects were embedded in the contextual 
scenes. The results of this study indicated that children with autism are as able to 
use context infom1ation when this is presented previously or as background to 
targets objects. Thus the difficulty children with autism have with context tasks 
where the target is embedded in the background (i.e., Jolliffe's visual context 
task) is not likely to stem from difficulty in simultaneous processing of 
information. 
The embedded task used in this study was very similar in format to the 
Embedded Figures test in that both test the ability to identify a pati. It was thus 
predicted that children with autism would be faster than TD children at 
identifying objects (i.e., parts) in this condition regardless of their ability to use 
context information. This prediction was not supported by the data. Experiment 
7 explored if the failure to find enhanced performance in the embedded 
condition was due to the nature of the stimuli used, namely the parts depicting 
meaningful objects (i.e., objects) and not meaningless parts as in the Embedded 
Figures test. In this experiment an adapted version of the Embedded Figures test 
was developed in which the shapes to be found consisted of identifiable objects 
(i.e., a circle was a Christmas decoration). Results showed that children with 
autism were as fast as TD children at finding the shapes. The failure to include a 
control condition with the standard EF test precludes any definite conclusion. 
However, the results suggest that superiority for parts in autism might be 
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restricted to the segmentation of pictures in meaningless parts and not to superior 
general ability to process parts. This result will need to be confirmed in future 
research. 
The second proposal for the difficulty with the homographs task, namely 
that children with autism have difficulty processing ambiguous stimuli was 
investigated in Experiment 8 and 9 by developing a method to examine the 
influence of context in the disambiguation of ambiguous figures. This method 
was based on the paradigm used in Experiments 1 and 2. Experiments 8 and 9 
provided tests of the method with typical adults participants. Experiment 8 
aimed to test if the contextual scenes selected for the final study were 
sufficiently related to each of the interpretations of the ambiguous figures. The 
results of this study showed that they were significantly related and thus were 
appropriate to elicit each of the interpretations. 
Experiment 9 examined if the prior presentation of these contextual 
scenes would increase the probability of giving a particular interpretation of the 
ambiguous figures. Unfortunately, the results of this study showed that 
ambiguous figures are particularly resistant to context effects leaving the 
hypothesis of difficulty in the processing of ambiguous stimuli to be tested. 
The final study moved away from examining the influence of context to 
study a different measure of central coherence in order to clarify if the 
competence of children with autism applied not only to context but also to global 
processing. For this study, the ability to process global infonnation in faces was 
chosen because faces are processed both in tem1s of holistic and featural 
information. Experiment 10 had tlu·ee main aims. The first aim was to examine if 
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children with autism would be able to process faces globally. Secondly this 
study aimed to replicate Plaisted et al findings that cues enhance global 
processing in children with autism. Finally this study aimed to explore if 
children with autism would fail to show superiority in the processing of parts 
when these constitute meaningful objects (i.e., features). 
The results from this study confirmed the presence of a global 
impairment in autism, at least regarding the processing of facial stimuli. This 
global impai1ment was overcome by the use of cues focusing attention to 
features. The effects of cues however might not be specific to autism as they also 
enhance global processing in young typically developing children and adults. In 
relation to the presence of a local bias, as predicted, children with autism did not 
show enhanced processing of parts relative to the comparison group as the parts 
were meaningful objects (i.e., features), indicating that there is not a general 
local bias in autism, but this is restricted to the processing of meaningless 
materials. 
9.2 Do children with autism fail to use contextual and global 
information? 
Following the distinction between context and global processing raised in 
Chapter 1 and throughout the thesis, the analysis of impairments in context and 
global processing are discussed separately. 
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9.2.1 Context processing in autism 
Given the results presented m this dissertation, it is not possible to 
conclude that there is a general deficit m autism m processing context 
information. Experiments 2, 3 and 4 failed to find contextual difficulties in the 
autism group. The replication of the homographs test on the other hand has 
provided evidence of a deficit in the use of sentence context information to 
disambiguate homographs. Children with autism, as in previous studies, failed to 
give context appropriate pronunciations and instead tended to give the most 
frequent pronunciation of the homographs. Results however provide some 
evidence of sensitivity to context in autism, as shown by the superior 
performance when homographs were placed after the sentence context than 
when placed at the beginning of the sentence. 
It seems therefore that context difficulties m autism are restricted to 
specific tasks. The homographs task is particularly taxing for children with 
autism. This task differs from the other contextual tasks used in the dissertation 
in that it involves sentence processing and the processing of ambiguous stimuli. 
Thus the difficulty experienced by children with autism might stem from an 
inability to process sentence context or an inability to process ambiguous 
stimuli. Brian and Bryson (1996) have suggested that the ability to make 
meaningful connections between single items is intact in autism, whereas ability 
to integrate multiple items of infom1ation within sentences is impaired. There is 
evidence for difficulties in sentence context processing in autism in studies using 
memory tasks in which the recall of word strings is compared to the recall of 
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sentences (Frith, 1969; Wolff & Barlow, 1979; Hermelin & O'Connor, 1967). It 
is unclear however the extent to which the deficit in sentence processing is 
specific to autism. One study failed to find differences with a sample of children 
with learning difficulties (Ramondo & Milech, 1984), two studies failed to 
include a learning difficulty group (Frith, 1969; Wolff & Barlow, 1979) and 
another study found that this ability is related to memory span and not to autism 
(Fyffe & Prior, 1978). 
The remaining evidence for a deficit in the ability to integrate multiple 
items of information within sentences comes from the homographs studies and a 
study by Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen (1999). The tasks employed in Jolliffe and 
Baron-Cohen's study are the homographs task, a different task examining the 
ability to disambiguate ambiguous sentences and a task examining the ability to 
draw inferences to connect two sentences. The first two tasks involve the ability 
to process ambiguous stimuli. The ability to process ambiguous information has 
been related to executive function abilities (Ricci & Blundo, 1990; Meenan & 
Miller, 1994) and also to theory of mind abilities (Gopnik & Rosati, 2001). This 
is so because the ability to shift between alternatives is proposed to be a critical 
element of executive function ability (Russell, 1998; Pennington & Ozonoff, 
1996). Also, the ability to represent alternative interpretations is considered to 
require metarepresentational ability (Perner, 1991 ), a hallmark of 'theory of 
mind'. If either executive function or theory of mind are impaired, as is the case 
in autism, it would be expected that individuals with autism would perform 
poorly in tasks such as the homographs task or ambiguous sentences. The results 
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from these studies could therefore be equally explained in terms of weak central 
coherence or in terms of an executive function or theory of mind deficit. 
An alternative interpretation of the results of the homographs task is that 
children with autism might lack familiarity with rare forms of homograph words 
or have difficulty accessing these words. Neither the replication presented in this 
dissertation neither previous studies have tested if the children were familiar 
with the two interpretations of the homographs. Thus it is possible that children 
give the most frequent pronunciation simply because they are not aware that 
there is an alternative pronunciation. There is evidence showing that when 
children are instructed in the two pronunciations and meaning of the 
homographs, children with autism are as able as comparison samples to use 
sentence context to disambiguate homographs (Frith and Snowling, 1986). It is 
possible therefore that the difficulty individuals with autism experienced with 
this task is due to lack of familiarity with homographs words and not contextual 
difficulties. 
Given the range of different interpretations for the results of the 
homographs task, it is not possible to conclude that the difficulty experienced in 
the homographs task is due to a context processing impairment in autism. The 
difficulty could stem from an inability to process ambiguous information, 
explained by either theory of mind or executive function deficits or lack of 
familiarity with rare pronunciations, explained by language acquisition 
impairments. Even if the difficulty were to be related to the integration of 
multiple items of information within a sentence, as suggested by Brian and 
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Bryson (1996), it is not clear that this difficulty is specific to autism, as shown 
by Ramondo and Milech (1984). 
In view of the different alternative explanations, the main priority for 
future research is to establish the extent to which the difficulty experienced by 
individuals with autism in the homographs task stems from contextual 
difficulties. As discussed above, it is difficult to tell whether the difficulty 
experienced by children with autism is due to the ambiguity of the word or to the 
sentence context. Future research should attempt to separate these two 
components of the task. 
A possible way to investigate this issue would be to adapt the verbal 
priming task used in Experiment 3 by including another condition in which 
instead of presenting single words the primes consist of sentences. To examine 
the effects of ambiguity, target words could consist of homographs or non-
ambiguous words. If children with autism have a specific difficulty with using 
sentence context, they will fail to have priming effects in the sentence priming 
task but not in the single word priming task. This result would support the wee 
account. Alternatively, if the difficulty is related to ambiguity, they would fail to 
have priming effects for the ambiguous targets and not for the non-ambiguous 
targets regardless whether the primes were single words or sentences. This result 
would support the alternative theories of autism and therefore the existence of 
context difficulties in autism would be challenged. To ascertain the extent to 
which children with autism have difficulties with other ambiguous words, it 
would also be useful to include in this design homophones which are words with 
two meanings but one pronunciation. 
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There is some reason to predict that difficulty with ambiguity might not 
be independent of context however. Happe (1997) found that performance on the 
homograph task is not associated with performance on theory of mind tasks. 
This result suggests that the homograph task involves additional cognitive 
demand. It is possible that the sentence context in the homograph task might be 
important in addition to the problem with ambiguity. 
In Chapter 1 it was argued that a problem of weak central coherence 
theory is the lack of specificity in the level at which central coherence operates. 
Frith (1989) claimed that central coherence only operates at high levels of 
integration. She failed however to specify the precise level at which individuals 
with autism fail. Happe (2000) attempted to solve this lack of definition by 
suggesting that connections between items are weak in autism whilst single 
object/word processing for meaning is intact in autism. Although this issue has 
not been addressed directly in this thesis, Experiments 2, 3 and 4 indicate that, 
contrary to Happe's suggestion, children with autism are able to connect words 
and objects on the basis ofmeaning. Specifically, these experiments demonstrate 
that children with autism are no different than typically developing children in 
their ability to integrate stimuli on the basis of semantic infonnation, whether 
information is presented visually or verbally and whether c01mections in 
meaning are based on items within semantic categories or objects associated 
with familiar everyday locations. In view of these results, the level at which 
impaim1ents manifest in autism need to be revised. 
Chapter 1 also identified a problem with the definition of central 
coherence as a general property of the cognitive system and subsequently the 
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assumption that individuals with autism have difficulties in both the visual and 
verbal domains. The literature review presented in Chapter 2 revealed a lack of 
empirical evidence for difficulties in the visual domain. This thesis attempted to 
confirm the presence of weak central coherence in the visual domain by 
investigating the ability to use context in visual tasks and the ability to process 
global patterns of stimuli. Experiments 2 and 4 failed to find confim1ation for 
contextual difficulties in the visual domain. Children with autism however did 
not show difficulties in the verbal versions of these tasks either. As argued 
above, the findings from Experiments 2, 3 and 4 suggest that the ability to 
connect words and objects on the basis of meaning is intact in autism. It seems 
that contextual difficulties in autism are restricted to making cotmections across 
multiple items of information within a sentence. If this suggestion is confirmed 
in future research, it would be important to investigate if this difficulty also 
applies to the processing of non-verbal information. 
This issue could be investigated by, for example, a task testing the ability 
to make connections across multiple items of visual information that are not 
related to each other but when put together make a coherent visual scene. 
Establishing whether context difficulties are restricted to the processing of verbal 
information is important to allow a better definition of WCC. If it is confirmed 
that individuals with autism only fail to process context information of sentence, 
the notion of wee should be redefined in terms of a specific language 
impairment rather than a general deficit. 
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9.2.2 Global processing in autism 
Having established that contextual difficulties in autism are specific to 
certain tasks, possibly sentence processing tasks, the question is whether 
children with autism are able to process global information. Traditionally it has 
been assumed that contextual difficulties are accompanied by an impairment in 
the ability to process visual patterns of stimuli globally. However, as discussed 
in Chapter 1, global and context processing might be independent cognitive 
abilities. Thus the final study of the thesis investigated the ability of children 
with autism to process global patterns of stimuli. In particular this study 
examined children's ability to process faces globally. 
The results of Experiment 9 have confirmed the existence of a global 
impairment in autism. Evidence for the claim that individuals with autism fail to 
process global information have been drawn mainly from evidence showing that 
individuals with autism are superior than comparison groups at processing parts. 
For instance, they are superior in the Embedded Figures test (Shah & Frith, 
1983). Happe (2000) has suggested that this superiority does not stem from 
superior ability in disengaging from the global picture but a specific impairment 
to process global information. 
There is however equivocal evidence for global difficulties in autism. 
Most of these studies have used the Navon task (Navon, 1977). As discussed in 
Chapter 2, this task has proved to be very sensitive to procedural changes (e.g., 
Lamb & Robertson, 1989) and thus no evidence can be drawn from these 
studies. Most importantly, neuropsychology research has shown that superior 
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performance for parts does not necessarily mean the existence of a deficit to 
process visual information globally (Lamb & Robertson, 1989). It was thus 
necessary to find confirmation that superior featural processing in autism is 
accompanied by a global impairment. 
The results from the face recognition task have confirmed the presence of 
a deficit in global processing. Thus there is evidence of difficulties in both the 
processing of context infmmation (homographs task) and global processing, as 
predicted by weak central coherence theory. The combination of these two 
impairments would suggest that global and context processing are one and the 
same thing, as assumed by researchers within the weak central coherence 
account. However, as discussed above, the results from the homographs task 
might be explained by difficulties different from a contextual impairment. 
Similarly the failure to process faces globally cannot be taken in itself as definite 
evidence for a general global impainnent in autism. 
It has been assumed that face processing difficulties in autism stem from 
a difficulty to process faces holistically. However, according to Hobson's (1993) 
affective deficit theory, the difficulties in face perception in autism might stem 
from the social nature of the stimuli. Thus it is possible that the difficulty with 
the face recognition task is related to a difficulty to process facial stimuli and not 
to a difficulty in global processing. Further research will need to investigate the 
ability to process non-facial stimuli globally to confim1 the presence of a global 
impairment in autism. Confirming the presence of a global impairment would 
also confirm the presence of difficulties in the visual domain and hence the 
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notion of central coherence as a general ability that applies to both the visual and 
verbal domains. 
The pattern of performance of children with autism is similar to that of 
young typically developing children, indicating a possible developmental delay 
and not a specific impairment. The development of the ability to process faces 
holistically is a long process that it is only developed at about 10 years of age 
(Carey & Diamond, 1977). Holistic processing of faces is therefore a complex, 
high-level ability. The context studies reported in this dissertation have shown 
that children with autism only have difficulties with high-level tasks, such as the 
homographs task. It is therefore possible that similarly, the ability to process 
global information might be only impaired at higher levels. A study by Ropar 
and Mitchell (1999) has indeed confirmed that global processing is intact in a 
task requiring low levels of integration, such as the visual illusions. Specific 
research should attempt to establish the precise level at which central coherence 
is manifest in global processing. 
An additional finding from the face recognition study is that global 
impainnents can be overcome by use of cues focusing attention to the local 
level. This finding confirms the results of Plaisted et al (1999) also showing 
enhanced global processing when attention is focused to either the local or 
global levels. This finding has important implications for educational strategies 
in autism. It is still not clear however, the precise manner in which cues facilitate 
global processing. Results show that children with autism have difficulty using 
information from cues. Despite this difficulty however they seem to benefit from 
the focusing of attention to one level. Interestingly, even cues that focus 
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attention on the local level enhance global processmg. This is a very 
counterintuitive and interesting finding. If children with autism had a preference 
for local processing, it would be expected that this local bias would be 
strengthened by local cues. Understanding how the provision of cues enhances 
global processing could facilitate the understanding of the difficulties in autism 
to process patterns of stimuli globally. 
In Chapters 1 and 2 it was argued that it is problematic to assume that 
superior featural processing is the reflection of a global impairment is 
problematic. Thus to demonstrate the presence of weak central coherence it is 
necessary to find evidence for a global and/or contextual impairment. Research 
within the weak central coherence account has instead tended to investigate 
featural processing in autism. This research has provided wide evidence of a 
local bias in autism as demonstrated by superior performance relative to 
comparison groups in tasks such as the Embedded Figures test or the Block 
Design. Experiments 6, 7 and 10 have however failed to find superior 
performance for processing of parts in children with autism relative to controls. 
One possible explanation for these results is that whilst in these three studies the 
parts to be either identified or found depicted either objects or facial features, in 
the standard Embedded Figures test or the Block Design, the parts are usually 
abstract shapes although in some cases the parts depict geometrical/meaningful 
shapes. 
One way in which weak central coherence was originally defined is in 
terms of the ability to process for meaning. Specifically, Frith ( 1989) initially 
claimed that individuals with autism are 'less captured by meaning'. As a result, 
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she claimed, children with autism tend to process incoming information 
independent of context or the global configuration. Later developments in 
research have re-interpreted this claim in tenns of a general preference for the 
processing of featural, local information. The results from these studies and the 
study by Pring, Hetmelin and Heavey ( 1995) have however confirmed the 
existence of a general local bias in autism. It is possible that superior part 
processing may be restricted to the segmentation of global patterns of stimuli 
into meaningless shapes, such as the ones usually depicted in the Block Design 
or EFT, which would indicate that, as Frith suggested, superior performance 
stems form being less captured by meaning. It would be interesting to compare 
performance of individuals with autism in the items of the EFT that entail 
meaningful parts (e.g. triangle) and performance in trials in which parts are 
meaningless. 
9.3 Do children with autism lack central coherence? 
There is still some evidence of a difficulty to process context information 
that remains uncontested. A study by Tager-Flusberg (198la) for instance has 
shown that individuals with autism fail to use semantic context/knowledge in 
language comprehension. Frith and Snowling (1983) have also found evidence 
of impairments in the ability to use sentence context to select the missing word 
in a sentence or to use text information to select the correct word missing in the 
text (Frith & Snowling, 1986). These studies however only provide evidence for 
a difficulty in processing complex, high-level verbal stimuli which could be 
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explained in terms of a language impairment or an impairment in the ability to 
integrate verbal complex information in context. The results reported in this 
thesis have provided some evidence for difficulty in the processing of global 
visual information, specifically global facial information. This difficulty 
however might be related to a more general, face perception impairment. 
Evidence for contextual difficulties in the visual domain is scarce and 
contradictory (Pring & Hermelin, 1993, Jolliffe, 1996) thus further research will 
be needed to confirm the presence of global and contextual difficulties in autism. 
Until the precise nature of the contextual/global difficulty in autism is 
established, it will be difficult to first, ascertain whether central coherence is 
weak in autism and second, to define the relation of this impairment to other 
cognitive deficits in autism (i.e., theory of mind and executive function). In the 
introduction to this thesis it was argued that the way in which cognitive theories 
of autism have been formulated, makes it difficult to establish which of the three 
competing theories, central coherence, theory of mind or executive functioning, 
accounts best for the cognitive difficulties of children with autism. 
A clear example of this difficulty is the issue of ambiguity. The strongest 
evidence for weak central coherence comes from studies employing the 
homographs task which involves the processing of ambiguous stimuli. Yet 
difficulties in ambiguity processing can be equally explained by a theory of mind 
or executive deficit. Hence it is difficult to specify which of the three cognitive 
impairments in autism are responsible for the psychological difficulties in autism 
or whether these are complementary deficits. 
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In Chapter 1 it was argued that a clear advantage of weak central 
coherence theory was in its power to explain a cognitive profile that is 
distinctive to autism while the theory of mind and executive function accounts 
have difficulties is establishing the distinctiveness of the impairment as evidence 
that is claimed to provide support for one theory also provide support for the 
other theory. The results of this thesis and the interpretation of the literature 
suggests that the cognitive profile might not be as distinctive as first described. 
The traditional view of superior featural and inferior global context processing 
may no longer be supported. Nevertheless, a different fonnulation of the 
cognitive problems of children with autism might emerge from the observation 
that certain impaim1ents such as difficulty in processing ambiguous stimuli are 
common across the three theories. Further theoretical development of the cause 
of such difficulty might in tum facilitate the task of relating cognitive deficits to 
behavioural and biological deficits. 
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